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1. INTRODUCTION 
The following thesis addresses the issue of the reforms in the Central Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) in respect to Greece. The main aim of the thesis is to 
assess the impact of the reforms on the Greek economy. The thesis describes the 
Greek business activity in response to the reforms that were initiated in Eastern 
Europe in 1989. The focus is on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a major 
economic response of Greek companies. 
The political and economic reforms in the Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) initiated in 1989, generated a new geography of economic relations in 
Europe. The removal of barriers that restricted economic relations for years created 
new opportunities and challenges for economic interaction between East and West. 
The consequences were expected to be significant not only for the CEECs themselves 
but also for Western European countries (CEC 1993, Hudson 1994, Hughes 1996). 
For Greece, the impact of the reforms in the CEECs is of great importance involving 
many opportunities but also some threats. 
The case of Greece is of interest due to special geographical, economic and historical 
factors that operate in the area. Greece is a relatively poor, peripheral country of the 
EU that still appears to have problems in integrating economically within the 
Community. The geographical position of Greece in the periphery of Europe has 
always been an impediment in the economic relations of the coxmtry with the EU, and 
it has been considered as one of the main reasons for its poor economic performance. 
Specifically, Greece is the only EU country that is located at the South East of 
Europe, a backward region comprised of former communist countries (excect Greece) 
with a long history of disputes over national minorities and ethnic borders. 
The economic relations of Greece with these coimtries were limited for many years, 
being affected negatively by the post-1945 cold war climate. Therefore, Greece was 
not only geographically isolated from other EU member states but also was missing 
benefits that might have arisen from economic interaction with neighbouring 
coimtries. 
The reforms of 1989 have been seen as an opportunity for the country to come out of 
its peripheriality, to restore economic relations with neighbouring countries and to 
deal with its regional problems as well as with the difficulties it faces in the process of 
the EU integration (Petrakos 1997). The opening up of the CEECs represents a new 
market for the Greek products and new opportunities for Greek enfrepreneurs to co-
operate and expand their economic activities (Dimelis & Gatsios 1995). Benefits 
arriving from specialisation, a more efficient division of labour and economies of 
scale were predicted for Greece during the early years of fransition (CEC 1993). 
Of specific importance for Greece has been the economic fransition of the Balkan 
countries into market led economies. The opening up of the Balkan region represents 
for Greece a new regional market, where Greek producers can more easily sell their 
products. Greece's geographical isolation and its small domestic market were 
resulting in specialisation of the economy in sectors with small international potential. 
Now the opening of a new regional market of more than 50 million people in the 
Balkans offers to Greek producers the opportunity to invest and expand their 
economic operation. In general the Balkans have been seen as "a region of hope" 
(Hellenic MFA 1999). Moreover, the new conditions bring opportunities for Greek 
companies to co-operate with low-cost Balkan producers, to develop specialised 
products that could compete internationally or at least to take advantage of the cheap 
labour force in the neighbouring countries in order to survive in a highly competitive 
environment. 
The opening up of the CEECs can be considered as a great opportunity for Greek 
exporters. Greek firms that find it either unprofitable or difficult to place their 
products in the EU markets could find a relatively easy outlet for their products in the 
CEE countries. These countries have been through a process of restructuring of their 
economic relations and are looking for new economic partners. Furthermore, the 
relative shortage of, and conversely high demand for, consumer products in the 
eastern countries gives the potential for access to Greek consumer good industries in 
these markets. 
Indeed, the results of the reforms have become immediately obvious in the pattern of 
trade between Greece and the CEECs. This has changed remarkably since 1989, 
particularly the exports. The share of Greek exports to the CEECs accounted in 1989 
for 3% of the total exports of the country. In 1997, the share reached 15%. Even more 
impressive is the evolution of Greece with the Balkan countries. On the other hand the 
volume of Greek exports to the EU is in gradual decline. Thus, trade with the CEECs 
is gaining significance in the Greek economy and many Greek producers seem to be 
re-orientating their trade operations towards the East (table 5-12 and 5-13) 
Concerning FDI the opening of the CEECs economies signalled a new era for Greek 
firms contacting outward investment. Since the early 1990s an impressive number of 
Greek firms started undertaking FDI in the CEECs. The phenomenon was 
unprecedented. It is estimated that approximately 2000-3000 companies with Greek 
interest have set up their operations throughout the CEECs during the last 10 years. 
The reforms in those countries seem to have been the driving force that urged the 
Greek firms to follow strategies that leads to their intemationalisation. Furthermore, 
the Greek government is adopting various measures in order to help and promote 
outward investment, believing that Greece can become a multinational power (at least 
in the area of Balkans). 
However, questions arise about the alleged intemationalisation of Greek firms and its 
potential effects on Greece. Concerns are raised regarding the nature of the firms 
investing, the strategies followed, their viability and the potential benefits for the 
Greek economy. The phenomenon of Greek FDI and its impact often has been 
exaggerated by the Greek media and the politicians and its real dimension is under 
question. It is therefore necessary to look further into the issue of Greek FDI in order 
to gain better understanding and avoid the myths surrounding it. 
Furthermore, the prospects for economic co-operation and development should not be 
exaggerated, since a number of factors act in the opposite direction. First, in the 
Balkan countries (where the main economic interest exist) the markets are unstable 
and involve a high degree of risk. Political instability, imcertainty and constrained 
purchasing power are all impediments to Greek investment, and co-operation. 
Furthermore, in the Visegrad countries the economic activity of Greek entrepreneurs 
is, comparing to the Balkan countries, rather limited. 
Overall, it can be argued that the reforms of the CEECs represent a significant 
challenge for Greece, raising many questions open for investigation. This thesis wi l l 
focuses on the Greek firms and FDI as a competitive strategy. In order to address the 
above issues, the chapters of the thesis have the following structure. 
The second chapter is looking into the historical and political factors that influenced 
the economic relations of Greece with the CEECs during the cold war period and 
assesses the effect of the reforms. Specifically, it attempts to describe and assess the 
forces that determined the economic policy that was implemented diuing the turbulent 
years of the post-war world and how this was reflected in the economic relation of 
Greece with the countries of the Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the chapter stresses the 
changes that occurred in regional economic and political power in south East Europe 
and its implications for the Greek economic and political relations with other Balkan 
countries. 
The third chapter focuses on FDI. The aim of the chapter is to examine the nature of 
foreign direct activity of Greek firms into CEECs and to evaluate the consequences 
for the Greek economy. The first part of the chapter reviews the theories of FDI while 
the second explores the question of the effects of FDI on the home and host country. 
Finally, the last section of the chapter, drawing from the previous theory, attempts to 
explain in short why Greek firms have undertaken FDI in the CEECs and what might 
be the possible effect for Greece as a home country. 
The fourth chapter attempts to analyse the economic behaviour of Greek firms 
drawing from the theories of the firm literature. By using the firm as the focus of 
analysis, the chapter attempts to provide a dipper understanding of the process of FDI 
and the behaviour and strategies followed by the Greek firms. The chapter provides a 
thorough literature review of the theory of the firm and how the firm is related to 
society and place. Specifically, the chapter is looking into the economic behaviour of 
the firm and how this is affected by the environment were it is located. 
The fifth chapter presents the secondary data available on the FDI and Trade flows 
between Greece and CEECs. The amount of FDI, the type of investment and the 
sectors are presented as well as the spatial patter of both FDI and Trade. The chapter 
also attempts to make an qualitative analysis of FDI in order to explain process of 
investment and to evaluate its significance. 
Finally, drawing from the above chapters and the empirical evidence available, the 
final chapter makes an overall assessment of Greek FDI in the Balkans, the behaviour 
of Greek firms and the the potential impact on the Greek economy. 
2. T H E IMPLICATION OF T H E POLITICAL REFORMS ON T H E ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF 
G R E E C E WITH T H E C E E C S : A G E O - P O L I T I C A L ASPECT 
I. Introduction 
A geopolitical analysis of South Eastern Europe would be beyond the scope and 
objectives of this thesis. Nevertheless, in order to achieve a broader perspective of the 
overall changes that took place in the region as well as a greater understanding of how 
those were reflected in economic relations, certain analyses are deemed to be important. 
Specifically, this chapter attempts to demonstrate how geopolitics affected economic 
relations between Greece and former communist countries before and after the reforms of 
1989. The Greek FDI in the Balkans that followed the reforms could not be simply 
explained in economic terms. The political background that effected those economic 
relations is presented in this chapter. 
This introductory chapter is employed to demonstrate the geo-political context within 
which the economic relations between Greece and the Balkan countries were shaped and 
to observe the underlying political considerations that influenced those relations before 
1989. Through this chapter it is argued that the geopolitical position of Greece, a western 
ally surrounded by former communist countries, deprived the country from the expected 
economic relations with neighbouring countries. International politics. Cold War climate 
and divisions of East and West, together with internal politics, consecutive wars and 
disputes over borders and ethnic minorities in south east Europe, were negatively 
influential with respect to the economic relation of Greece and the CEECs. 
I f not for any other reason, due to its geographic proximity, Greece should have been 
expected to develop strong economic relations with its Balkan neighbouring countries 
(see chapter 5 gravity model). From the perspective of regional theories, there were 
several factors conducive to cooperation in South East Europe. Yet, political obstacles 
were offsetting those potentials. It was not until 1989, a sudden break with the past, that 
the political barriers preventing close economic relations would fall. The reforms that 
initiated in 1989 in the CEECs significantly improved the relations between Greece and 
Balkan countries and set the ground for economic activity to take place. 
An attempt will be made to describe and assess the forces that determined the economic 
policy that was implemented during the turbulent years of the post-war world and how 
this was reflected in the economic relations of Greece with the countries of Eastern 
Europe. This task is complicated by the fact that economics and politics became very 
closely interwoven. Political considerations and external influences were important 
factors determining the economic relations of Greece with the rest of the countries. 
The chapter follows the following structure. In the first section of the chapter the focus is 
on the geopolitical position of Greece after the end of the Second World War and the 
struggle of the so-called great powers to incorporate her into their respective spheres of 
influence. The important element of this section is the attempt it makes to examine the 
economic consequences that this had for the country - especially with respect to its 
relations with the CEECs. The basic argument is that the incorporation of Greece under 
the western sphere of influence determined to a great extent the economic process of the 
Greek economy and deprived her for developing close economic relation with its natural 
hinterland; the Balkans. 
The second part of the chapter describes in greater detail the economic relations of 
Greece with the Eastern European countries during the period 1950-1989. The above 
period will be subdivided into smaller ones, with greater political cohesion, in order to 
enhance understanding. The early years immediately after the end of Word War I I are not 
analysed because of a lack of reliable sources. Emphasis is placed on the trade relations 
of the country with Eastern Europe and how they evolved during the Post War period. 
Finally, in the third part an assessment of the present situation is made in view of the 
reforms in the CEECs. This section describes the new conditions, assesses the Greek 
response and comments on current possibilities and/or opportunities open to Greece. A 
significant aspect that is stressed in this section is the significant changes that occurred in 
the economic and geopolitical sphere of influence in the Balkans during the post war 
period (Constas and Papasotirou, 1999). Greece, during the last decades has followed a 
very different developmental path compared to its Balkan neighbouring countries. 
Today, she is considered among the most developed countries of the world. Greece, after 
some turbulent years, succeeded in establishing a stable democracy and eventually in 
joining the EU while the other Balkan countries established different types of communist 
regimes. Through this trajectory Greece developed economically much more rapidly than 
any of her Balkan neighbours. Notably, while Greece's GDP in the 40s was less than that 
of Bulgaria, today it is higher than the sum of all Balkan GDPs combined. Furthermore, 
Greece, being a member of the EU and having established a long-standing democracy, is 
considered a significant actor in international relations, promoting democracy, human 
rights and stability in the entire region. This economic and political advancement of 
Greece over the other Balkan countries enables it to play a significant economic and 
political role in the South East Europe. Furthermore, this upgraded economic and 
political role of Greece created new conditions under which Greek firms could operate, 
invest and trade with CEECs from comparatively advantageous positions. 
11. Post-war Greece: internal conflict and external intervention 
11.1 Greece and the Division of Europe 
After the end of World War I I the whole map of Europe was redrawn. The European 
continent came to be divided into two political and economic zones; the Eastern and 
Western. Greece was caught in a peculiar position. In a time when East and West were 
distinctively and clearly separated into two political and economic blocks, Greece found 
itself somewhere at the crossroad. Although geographically located in the South-East of 
Europe, in the Balkan Peninsula, it was at the same time a political and military ally and 
economic partner of the West. Within this segregated Europe, Greece after some 
turbulent years of struggle and ethnic division was finally assimilated by the Western 
block. Unlike Greece, the rest of the south-eastern European countries like Albania, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia fell under the eastern block and adopted a Soviet type 
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of command economic system. Therefore, Greece during the years of the cold war period 
was considered a strategic part on the anti-Communist fight of the U.S. against the 
expansion of the USSR. . The economic policy and the relations of the country were 
strongly influenced by this factor. Therefore, Greece limited its relations with the east 
and was more closely related to the Western Europe. 
The fact that Greece came to be considered under the Western sphere of influence was of 
extreme importance for the future of the country. Greece during the war had been a 
Westem ally, and it was meant to remain after the end of the war. Britain, having a long 
legacy of influence over Greece and a strong interest in the area, was determined to keep 
Greece under its influence and control. The problem for her plans strangely enough came 
not that much from Stalin, who agreed with Britain taking other countries under its 
influence as a reward, but from a strong internal leftist partisan movement that was 
created for resistance purposes in Greece during the occupation. Thus, while the war 
ended in the 1944 Greece did not find a peaceful solution to its various political 
economic and social problems. Political order and economic stability did not arrive 
immediately. On the contrary, the country entered a turbulent period that was soon 
escalated and ended up into a devastating Civil War. The Great powers played a very 
important part in this. No doubt the role of the great powers was magnified by a very old 
Greek political habit of seeking patrons in the struggles for power at home. 
IL2 The British influence 
Greece, since the movement of independence, in 1821, has been under the sphere of 
British influence. Britain played an important role in the country's fight of independence 
and ever since was exercising a significant degree of influence over the country's issues. 
Under those conditions Greece was one of the countries that it looked very natural to 
come after the war under the westem block and under Britain's hegemony. 
However, by the end of the war the control of most the country was under armed 
communist led partisans that had fought against the Germans during the war and they 
were enjoying much popularity among the Greek people. The Peoples Liberation Army 
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(ELAS), the strongest resistance movement, was controlled by communists and therefore 
it was a potential threat to British plans. Thus, this movement had to be stopped. Stalin 
after an agreement he had with the British government did not intervene and on 
December 1994 did nothing to help them from the British gunfire. 
Specifically, after the end of the war the great powers made a crude divide of Europe into 
two separate spheres of influence. Churchill had a strong interest in Greece and he 
wanted by all means to keep it under his control. Churchill and Stalin reached an 
agreement in May 1944, that Greece would become a British "sphere of operation". 
Britain, gained 90 percent of influence over Greece while the Soviets gained 80 percent in 
Hungary and Bulgaria, 90 percent in Romania and 60 percent in Yugoslavia. 
However, by the summer of 1944 the Greek Communist partisans were close to the point 
of forming a (Yugoslav style) national Liberation government. They had the military 
power and the popular support that would allowed them to attempt it with good chances 
of success. The reason for their final decision to co-operate with the government in exile 
it is argued came from their compliance to followed Moscow's commands (Swain, 
McNeil). Stalin ordered that they should come to terms with the British-supported exile 
government in Cairo. 
On 1944 British troops arrived in Greece. However, a clash did not take long to come and 
indeed a bloodshed confrontation with the communists started on December 1944 
(Dekembriana) when Papandreou ordered their disarmament. Great Britain assisted the 
anti-communist forces and successfully defeated the National Liberation front, EAM, the 
political arm of the communist-guerrilla resistance movement. Stalin did nothing to 
prevent it. Churchill was the first to admit, "Stalin did fulf i l his pledges with respect 
Greece...without lifting his finger he allowed the British to massacre the ELAS partisans 
who were led by Greek communists". Stalin probably expected the same generous 
response from his allies concerning his sphere of interests. 
After the Athens revolt, "Dekembriana", the British government assisted in the formation 
of "Service governments" in Athens. These transitory governments were designed to 
quell the communist threat while giving the royalist forces time to consolidate and 
prepare for restoring the King (George II). The governments, however, tolerated 
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violence against the leftists. A certain group of right-wing gangs and paramilitary 
organisations launched a wave of "white terror" tactics that was directed against the 
leftists. That was taking place with the encouragement of the British authorities in 
Greece, which were partly responsible for provoking the Civil war in 1946-1949. British 
and soviet geopolitical interest were thus realised by exporting civil were to Greece. 
(Berend,1996) 
While the Greek Communist party's policies were also to blame for the fateful conflict, 
there is no doubt that most of the republican and monarchists parties did not have a 
propensity towards compromise and deliberately sought confi-ontation. Finally, the cold 
war policies in the Greek political arena exacerbated the tensions and contributed to the 
polarisation of the country during the three decades after the liberation (Stavrianos,1989). 
Under the above situation, lawlessness and intimidation of communist, on March 1946 
held election which turned out to be a victory of royalist and conservative politicians. In 
Spring 1946 Stalin became convinced that the era of war-time co-operation with Britain 
and the United States was over and that newly formed United Nations would become a 
forum for confrontation rather than co-operation. His response, with respect to Greece 
was to ask on September 1946, the Yugoslavs to step up support for the Greek 
communists in their nascent civil war against the British supported Greek government. 
However, he was still unwilling to commit himself fiilly to such confrontation, and by 
December of 1946 Soviet aid to the Greek communists, though promised, had still not 
come (Swain Geoffrey and Nigel Swain). 
On the other hand, the Balkan communist states were offering military aid to the Greek 
partisans. Yugoslavia, under Tito's government, had started an active campaign to 
establish an international aid network for Greek communists. Tito however was acting 
under his own initiative and without consulting Stalin. One of the main plans that Tito 
had in mind was to create an independent state of Macedonia that would include part of 
the Greek as well the Bulgarian Macedonian. However, Stalin, who made clear that he 
would not accept an independent foreign policy formulated by Yugoslavia, did not like 
this act on behalf of Tito. Stalin, first of all had promised Greece to the British and 
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furthermore he could see the Americans being increasingly involved into the Greek 
dispute. Therefore he was not willing to go into a serious confrontation over this issue. 
Thus, Stalin's limited support for the Greek communists ended without result. At this 
time due to the weight of the primarily economic problems they were facing in their 
colonies, the British decided to withdraw, and the Americans took over. 
11.3 The American intervention 
After 1947, when the British were unable any longer to sustain the financial burden of 
control over Greece, the Americans undertook the above task with significant implication 
for the political and economic developments of the country. 
Undeniably, after the end of the disastrous World War I I , Greece needed urgently some 
source of financial aid in order to meet its basic needs. The economy was threatened 
collapse and the Greek government, royalists, (1946) was seeking for assistance from 
outside. Greece had been a wartime ally and much of the problems of the country were 
the immediate cause of the war. So naturally, it was seeking assistance from its western 
allies. The Greek government in order to achieve its target was using the communist 
threat as a useful devise in order to extract foreign aid. Characteristically, Tsaldaris 
warned Greece's (western) allies in an interview in Paris "Greece is surrounded by the 
occupying armies of communism and her internal economic and social structure cannot 
continue to exist without outside aid...." (Kofas, 1989, p.55) 
At the same time United States preoccupation with Greece was very much related to its 
anti-Soviet campaign. Greece constituted the western part of the "Northern Tier", which 
was a strategic belt that included Turkey and Iran and was preventing USSR from 
expanding^ The country was useful as an outpost of the anti-Soviet camp. It was the only 
Balkan country that was not assimilated in the Soviet block. Therefore, the country was 
considered of strategic importance for the sfrategic plans of the U.S. 
The United States were determined to prevent the expansion of the USSR's influence in 
Europe by whatever means were required. At that time the means that were envisaged 
' This was based on the Domino theory of the U.S foreign policy. Greece and Turkey were considered 
front-hne states; if they fell, then Europe would also fall (Short R J, 1993). 
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were more political and economic rather than military. The United States were willing to 
launch a new era of close commercial and financial relations in exchange of establishing 
close diplomatic and strategic ties with Greece. Under those circumstances on 11* of 
March of the 1947 Truman declared to the congress that the U.S. had to "support fi-ee 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures" He suggested economic assistance to assure "economic stability and orderly 
political process...". 
However, its is argued that although the American involvement in Greece initially was 
conceived as a program of financial support its emphasis shifted its emphasis on military 
and security issues (latrides, 1999). 
11.4 The economic dimension 
Ever since the war of independence, there was a large degree of British involvement in 
Greece's economic affairs. The immediate result was a lender-borrower relationship. 
Consequently, Britain had developed many economic interests in Greece that she was not 
willing to lose. 
Greece also became an aid recipient and a client country of the U.S. after 1947 (Kofas, 
1989). The American mission for aid in Greece wielded considerable degree of influence 
in a wide range of economic matters of the country. 
A program of reconstruction started to take place in 1948, four years after the liberation, 
with the influx of economic aid from the US. However, it is argued that the broader lines 
of this developmental plan was very much affected by the main idea of the Marsall Plan 
which looked Western Europe and the United States as an economic block separate from 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet sphere of influence. Therefore, the 
development program that was formulated in 1948 was aiming to direct Greece's trade 
with Western Europe and the United States (Thomadakis, 1995). 
On the other hand, the USSR undertook the formation of an economic block by linking 
the Eastern European economies to it through a network of bilateral trade agreements. 
The Council for mutual economic assistance (CMEA, or known as Comecon) was the 
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organ that was formally established in 1949. On the side of the Soviet-type socialist 
economies the foreign trade behaviour was determined by the policy of 'Block' autarky^. 
This separatist behaviour from both blocks however, would deprived Greece for many 
years form developing economic relations with its natural hinterland; the Balkans. 
III . Economic Relations of Greece with Balkan countries before 1989 
Due to its geographically proximity, i f not for anything else, Greece was always a 
potential trade partner for the countries of the CEECs and especially South Eastern 
Europe. However, as long as cold war politics determined their external relations this 
potential could not be fully explored. This section demonstrates how the political climate 
was affecting the economic relation of Greece with the East during the post-war period. 
In order to achieve a better understanding the above period is divided into five smaller 
ones that each one represents relative homogeneity in terms of the political and economic 
conditions of Greece. The period immediately after the World 40s is not analysed due to 
lack of sufficient and reliable data. 
In general, trade with Eastern Europe has always been of great importance for the Greek 
economy. Greece ranks among the first EU countries as to the weight of Eastern Europe 
in its total foreign trade. However, its economic relations fluctuated during the post war 
period according the political climate. The share of Greek exports to Eastern Europe 
reached its peak in 1966, under the political detente climate, they accounted for 29% of 
the total foreign exports of the country and 10% of the imports. During the military, anti-
communist regime in Greece (1967-1974) the proportion decreased considerably 
(1974:16% exports and 6% imports), while during the period 1975-1980, with the 
restoration of democracy, there was a stabilisation in trade relations between Greece and 
the Eastern countries. In 1980, on the eve of Greece's accession to the EC the Eastern 
countries accounted for 11.3% of the country's exports and 9.5% of the imports (both the 
percentages were the highest among the EU) (Table. 1, Wallden, 1988). However, 
^ According to the 'bloc' autarky policy the Comecon members were supposed to seek suppliers within the 
block first. 
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Greece's accession in the EC (1981) and the economic crisis in Eastern Europe had as a 
result a considerable deterioration of economic relations. 
It was only after the removal of the Iron Curtain and the introduction of measures for 
political and economic liberalisation when major changes were initiated in the economic 
relations of Greece and the CEECs. 
1950-1967 
During the period of 1950s and 1960s the trade relations between Greece and the CEECs 
were of significant importance in the economic and political situation of the counfry. The 
CEECs were important export markets for the Greek products. That was happening 
because of the structure of Greek exports. Exports consisted almost exclusively of 
agricultural products and raw materials, tobacco and raisins constituting almost half the 
total value. The East European countries proved to be easier export markets for the Greek 
products comparing to the Western markets were the demand for those products was 
limited and that was accompanied by sfrong competition. Therefore, the Eastern countries 
were of vital importance for the trade balance of the country. 
The dependence of Greece by those countries for its agricultural surpluses urged the re-
establishment of economic relations between them. That happened in spite of the strong 
anti-communistic atmosphere that prevailed in Greece after the Civil war. In fact it was 
Greece and Poland were the countries that first signed the East-west frade agreement 
within the framework of the ECE consultations in 1952 (Wallden, 1993). 
The economic relation of Greece and the East was very much a political issue and it was 
dominated by political and security considerations. However, although the government in 
power was conservative and hence strongly anti-communist, with respect to trade policies 
they dealed with a "business" attitude. At the same time the left parties were trying to 
take advantage of the situation by arguing that trade with the east was the solution to the 
country's economic problem. 
The economic cooperation with neighbouring Balkan countries was more complicated. 
Deeprooted historical issues and classic Balkan conflicts proved a quagmire in relations. 
Specifically, the economic relations between Greece and Yugoslavia were very much 
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influenced by the Macedonian^ issue. Thus, although re-approchement between Greece 
and Yugoslavia was very much supported by the Allies, Athens was reluctant to deepen 
economic relation because of political issues. As far as Albania was concerned, economic 
co-operation and trade were almost not existent. Albania, after moving to China sphere of 
influence adopted a very strict isolationist policy. Furthermore, the presence of Greek 
minority in the south was an issue which was creating a fiirther tension between the 
relation of the two countries. Relations with Bulgaria and Romania were normalised 
evidently in response to Western "bridge-building" tactics. Overall, Cold War tension 
and pending bilateral issues were preventing economic relations and co-operation frpm 
flourishing in the Balkan Peninsula. It was only in mid-1960s after the change that 
occurred in Great Powers policies that relations start to improve. 
1967-1974 
During the period 1967-1974 Greece entered a 'black' period, being under a military 
regime. The policy followed was in line with the previous one: anti-communist alliance 
with the west and economic and political integration with Western Europe. The situation 
however was more complicated due to the nature of military regime that was ruling the 
country. 
Europe did not approve the military regime since the beginning and its disapproval and 
the reactions got stronger in the course of time. On the 12 December 1969, Greece was 
indicted before the council of Europe and was expelled from the council. In the 
meantime, the European Economic Community executive had decided to withhold the 
balance of a development loan. Overall, military junta did not enjoy full approval in the 
Western Europe and in the United States a large body of public opinion was morally and 
' The end of the World war followed a devastating Civil War. The war ended in 1949 with the defeat of the 
communist supported democratic army. After the end of the Civil war many of the communist, both 
civilians and partisans, flyeed to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and the borders with those countries were sealed. 
Furthermore, Yugoslavia, which was actively supporting the communist partisans during the whole Civil 
war had territorial claims over Greek Macedonia because of an alleged Macedonian minority that was 
leaving in the area. 
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politically against the military regime. Under those conditions Greece seemed that was 
loosing its 'natural' fiiends and allies: the Western Europeans. 
Paradoxically, the Eastern European countries recognised and did business with the 
regime since the beginning of the establishment of the regime. Good relations between 
Greece and the Eastern countries were soon established and visits of the foreign ministers 
of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia foreign minister and the Romanian prime minister were made 
to Athens. In June 1971 the Greek minister of commerce visited Bucharest. The Eastern 
countries and mainly the Soviet Union saw an interesting possibility developing by the 
regime: to increase their influence in an important strategic area. Therefore, the relations 
between Greece and Eastern countries seemed to be based on a non-ideological, 
pragmatic type of international economic relations. 
Two explanations are given for this attitude of the Greek Junta by Xydis AG(1972). The 
first was related to the disapproval that the regime was facing by the West. The regime 
needed both domestic and international approval and since it could not have this from the 
West it was seeking it from Eastern Europe. By the same line of thought Hunta was using 
these relation from the communist countries in order to counteract the pressure it was 
facing by the West for restoration of democracy. Furthermore it could be used as a hint of 
blackmail towards the Americans that Greece might move away of NATO and closer to 
political co-operation with the Soviets. At the same time, in this way the regime managed 
to maintain commercial exchange at a satisfactory level, which was reached before the 
coup, and to obtain important investments from the Soviet Union and the German 
Democratic Republic. 
In the Balkans too, some progress was made. Greece strengthened her ties with 
Yugoslavia and paved the way for a settlement of all differences outstanding since the 
World War I I with Rumania and Bulgaria'*. Economic co-operation was developed and 
institutionalised in sectors such as tourism, water management, fransport, etc. With 
Albania relations was normalised on 1971, although the Greek minority that was leaving 
in the southern Albania remained to be a source of tension. 
•* Those developments must be seen in the wider context of a period of detente (1964-late 1970) between 
the great powers that allowed improvement of the international relations. 
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However, a closer look into the relation of Greece both with West and the East reveals 
another picture. First of all it appears that there was a gap between the rhetoric and the 
action of the Western countries regarding their disapproval of the Hunta. This is reflected 
in the trade and the investment flows between the two partners. Indicative, while in 1966 
the exports of the EEC countries to Greece worth 485 million dollars, by 1969 the 
amount of exports reached the 610 million dollars, comprising 43% of Greece's total 
imports. The other western countries increased their exports to Greece at a rate of 49% 
during the same three-year period. Furthermore, the exports of the United States 
increased substantially since the military took over. (Treholt A, 1972). On the other 
hand the proportion of the frade with the Eastern countries dropped significantly: in 
exports from 28% in 1966 to 16% in 1974 (table 1). It has to be sfressed however that the 
above figures was not just the results of the economic policy followed by the regime but 
also the results of the structural changes initiated in the early 1960s in the Greek 
economy and its exports. Indeed, after 1966, several new export-oriented industrial units 
started operating, thus boosting Greek industrial exports to the West and reducing the 
relative importance of agricultural exports. 
1974-1980 
The restoration of the democracy in 1974 and East-West detende contributed to an 
amelioration of the political and economic climate in Greek-East European relations. 
Although Greece's main objective during that period was to enter the European 
Community it also pursued an active 'ostpolitic'^ both in the Balkan region (particularly 
during 1975-76) and in the other eastern countries (mainly during 1977-78). 
In terms of frade, the economic relations with Eastern Europe expanded. During 1977-
1978, anticipating EC accession but also responding to pressure by Eastern partners, 
Greece agreed to abolish the clearing agreements with Yugoslavia and the USSR. On the 
whole, the downward frend of eastern Europe's share in total Greek trade started, but this 
^ The term was used to describe the policy that was followed by west Germany during 1969-1974 and 
which was aiming in the termination of the cold war climate and the establishment of good relation 
between East and West. 
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was due to rising imports (mainly because of oil crisis); eastern Europe's share in exports 
fixrther dropped from 16% in 1974 to 11 percent in 1978". 
In mid 1970s there was an increased desire on the part of Greece to improve and expand 
its economic relation with its Balkan neighbours. That was driven by an ambitious image 
of Greece as a "bridge" from east and Southeast Europe to the Middle East and Africa. 
"However, deterioration of the economic conditions, both in Greece and the Eastern 
countries, doubts as to the economic feasibility, and political second thoughts related to 
underlying potential conflicts particularly with Yugoslavia, resulted in a gradual change 
of mood, and most of the projects were abandoned in practice"(Wallden, 1993) 
1980-1989 
In the 1980s many important events altered the economic relations of Greece with 
Eastern Europe. The most important factor may have been the accession of Greece in the 
European Community. That had as a result an alteration of the economic policy of 
Greece. The second factor was the economic deterioration of the economic situation on in 
Eastern Europe during the same period. 
The accession of Greece in the EC had as a consequence the abolishment of all the 
bilateral and clearing agreements that had established during the previous years with the 
eastern countries. That had as a result the economic relation with those countries to 
become more difficult. As far as imports with CEECs were concerned, those became 
more difficult to implement and Community rules and pressures imposed their 
replacement with EC ones. For example, the inclusion of Greece in the common 
agricultural policy entailed a costly diversion of meat imports from Yugoslavia and other 
European suppliers to community suppliers. That had some negative consequences to the 
country's bilateral balances .^ 
As far as exports with CEECs were concerned, those were also hampered by the 
economic crisis that hit those countries in the 1980s. This proved to be a serious 
impediment and consfrained the Greek exports towards those countries since the Greek 
export products were not of firs priority. Overall, Greek trade with Eastern Europe 
* Although some Greek agricultural exports to eastern countries profited fi-om CAP subsidies. 
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declined considerable during the 1980s. Eastern Europe's share in Greek foreign frade 
fell from 8.6 percent in 1979 to 6.4 percent in 1989. 
Another determining factor for the Greek relation with East during the above period was 
the accession of PASOK (socialist party) in power in 1981. The PASOK government 
diverged its policy form that of the rest of the community and NATO: it opposed 
economic sanction and on the contrary pursued close relations with The Eastern 
European Countries. In general PASOK's philoshophy in economic policies were not in 
line with that of the European Community. However, despite the political will the attempt 
did not bear great results in purely economic terms. Nevertheless, its economic policies 
that implemented, particularly before 1989, had important consequences for the country's 
relations with Eastern Europe. 
However, it is only after the collapse of the communist regimes and the fall of the "iron 
curtain" when Greece emerges as a major economic partner. Greece indeed after 1989 
emerged very dynamically as an important economic partner of the CEECs offering very 
good potential for economic relation and co-operation. 
Table 1- Eastern Europe's share in total Greek trade 
Year % Exports % Imports 
1950-1954 6.1 1.8 
1955-1959 15.8 8.2 
1960-1964 25.8 10.2 
1965-1969 24.0 10.0 
1970-1974 17.2 6.6 
1975-1979 13.5 8.1 
1980-1984 10.3 7.2 
1985-1989 6.5 6.7 
Source: Wallden (1993), National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) 
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IV The present state: Greece in a changing geopolitical scenery 
IV.l The Reforms and the Opportunities 
Since autumn 1989 the former socialist countries initiated a number of political and 
economic reforms in their effort to be transformed into a western type, market led 
economies. The "Iron curtain" fell, the Cold War was over and the obstacles for 
economic co-operation between the Western and Eastern countries seemed to have been 
gone for good. Thus, the transition of the former socialist countries opened up a new era 
of potential collaboration and mutually beneficial economic relations between the 
countries of the East and the West. 
For Greece, the demise of the communist regimes and the reforms that initiated in 1989 
in Eastern European countries has significantly altered the picture. It offered an 
opportunity to re-establish historical, economic and trade relations that during the post-
war period experienced significant shrinkage. Furthermore, Greece emerged as a state 
that could play an important political role in the remote comer of South-East Europe. 
Greece was ideally placed within the Balkan region. Its position in the international 
community, member of the EU and NATO, and its long established democratic 
institutions constituted an important advantage over the rest of the South-eastern 
neighbours. Greece could become the "bridge" between the Balkan countries and the EU 
as the only EU member in the region. Also it could be a stabilising agent in the volatile 
area of the Balkans. Therefore, Greece since the early beginning of the reforms, 
envisaged playing a very strong political role in the area of South-Eastem Europe. 
According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Mr. Papandreou Greece, being at 
the same time a Balkan and an EU member deserved a leading role in the political and 
economic reconstruction of the Balkans. 
Another important factor is the upgraded position of Greece in the area of Southeast 
Europe. It is striking the change that occurred in the regional balance of power in the 
Balkans during the cold war (Constas D and Papasotiriou, 1999). Greece, appears to be in 
a superior position comparing to those countries that fallen under communist regimes in 
both economic, political and military terms. The magnitude of the structural changes that 
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occurred becomes evident by comparison to the Balkan balance of power before and after 
the cold war. In he 1930s Greece's economic development was very similar to those of 
Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. In the 1990s, by way of contrast, Greece exceeds by 
far all other Balkans countries added. Notably, Greece's GDP alone is greater then the 
GDP of all the Balkan countries. Thus, Constas and Papasotiriou (1999) maintain that 
those changes in the sfructural conditions presented major opportunities for Greece to 
predominate in the Balkans (Constas and Papasotirou, 1999). 
However, it should be mentioned that together with the opportunities that appeared with 
the reforms, Greece was also confronted by many serious political problems. The 
proliferation of new states, the reappearance of claims of numerous national minorities 
and disputes over national borders were all issues the Greece had to deal with. Some of 
the reactions and measures that were implemented, especially the first years of after the 
reforms, have gone under scrutiny and they have been criticised for isolating the country 
instead of allowing her to play the role that was envisaged^. Nevertheless, the relations of 
Greece with the other Balkan countries are improving and a framework of good 
neighbourhood has been established. 
IV.2 The Greek policy in the Balkans 
The recent Greek policy in the Balkans moves along two main lines: a) towards 
integration of the Balkans into EU and NATO b) towards promotion of interregional co-
operation in the area (Ioakimidis,1999). 
The Greek government has recognised that the country has significant interest from the 
integration of Balkans states into the European Union. The successful integration of the 
Balkan area into the European structures is of strategic importance to Greece, since it will 
provide its northern neighbours with the possibility of finding themselves in the same 
^ The most controversial issue is that of "Macedonia". The Greek government did not recognize the newly 
formed state now recognized as " Former Republic of Macedonia' under the name "Macedonian" and 
imposed an embargo towards the new estabhshed state despite the disagreement of the European Union. 
Furthermore, Greece's stance towards Serbia's reaction over the autonomist attempts of other nationalities 
during the turbulent years of the spht of the former Yugoslavia has been criticised by the international 
community. 
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geopolitical area for the first time since the second World War. Furthermore, the 
economic integration of the countries of South East Europe will greatly contribute to the 
well-being and prosperity of the area and of Europe as a whole. I f the Balkans remain at 
the margins of European developments, then the prospects of further destabilisation in the 
region is increased (Ministry of foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/year99/southeurl 10399.htm) 
Integration into the EU is seen as a powerful factor capable of contributing decisively to 
consolidating stability, democracy, and prosperity in the region. Greece as a member of 
the European Union in the Balkans has the opportunity to bring the countries of the 
region into frans-European networks and projects facilitating economic change and 
development. Wallden (1999) argues that a marginalised Balkans wil l contribute in the 
marginalisation of Greece on the fiinges of Europe. 
Inter-Balkan co-operation is the second major objective of the Greek government. Greece 
has realised that its fiiture in the Balkans lies in regional co-operation schemes. Efforts 
are being made in order to facilitate the process of "physical integration" between Greece 
and East and particularly its Eastern neighbouring countries. Joint ventures, infrastructure 
improvements and expanding frade finance and services are tools that are used towards 
this aim. Overall economic relations with the east are thought to bring prosperity and also 
to contribute in the stabilisation and peaceful coexistence of the area of the Balkans. 
In 1997, in a meeting in Thessaloniki the Balkan countries set out very clearly the 
principals and the objectives of international co-operation: a) enhanced political co-
operation b) Reinforced economic co-operation c) Promotion humanitarian, social and 
cultural co-operation and finally co-operating in the field of criminal justice. 
The Greek government, in order to enhance prospects of economic development and co-
operation with the Balkans initiated a number of supporting policies to support frade and 
investment, implementation of co-operative schemes in the fields of transport, 
telecommunications, energy, infrastructure, small-and medium size enterprises, 
technology and cross-border Cupertino. 
Greece at the same time is actively promoting all initiatives for multilateral co-operation 
in the region. These include the European Union's PHARE and INTEREG programms, 
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the US inspired South east cooperative initiative and the Black sea Economic 
cooperation. 
In this context, Greece has also drawn up the Second 5- Year Program of Hellenic 
Development Aid for the period 2002-2006; an important part of this program, is the 
Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconsfruction of the Balkans (HiPERB). 
The HiPERB, which was adopted by the Hellenic Parliament in March 2002, is the first 
effort made by Greece as a donor country to incorporate various separate development 
aid initiatives into a single comprehensive plan so as to promote an integrated 
development policy. The HiPERB is a five-year development aid programme in the total 
amount of 550 million Euros (Table 1-2), that undertakes the financing of projects, 
investments and activities in 6 Balkan countries, namely Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Romania. 
(http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/hiperb) 
Table 1-2 Financial aid according to the HiPERB, million Euro per country 
Countries 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
Albania 5.99 9.97 12.47 11.48 9.97 49.89 
Bulgaria 6.51 10.85 13.57 12.49 10.85 54.29 
FYROM 8.98 14.96 18.71 17.22 14.96 74.84 
Romania 8.45 14.08 17.61 16.20 14.08 70.43 
FRYugoslavia 51.35 47.24 45.19 30.82 30.82 205.43 
Bosnia-
hergzegovina 
18.34 16.87 16.14 11.1 11.1 73.37 
Total 99.62 113.97 123.69 99.31 91.78 528.25 
Exfra 21.75 
Total 550 
Source: Economic review, June 1998 
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V Conclusion 
This chapter adopted a geopolitical approach in order to demonstrate the magnitude of 
changes and the opportunities that were initiated in 1989 for the Greek economy. 
Through the chapter it is shown how Greece's geopolitical position, somewhere in the 
crossroad between East and West, affected its economic relation with the CEECs. The 
incorporation of Greece within the western block inevitably oriented its economy towards 
the Western countries and separated her from the Eastern Block. Thus, despite that 
Greece was expected and was on her benefit to develop close economic relation with its 
neighbouring Balkan countries, this was restricted by the separatist behaviour that was 
prevailing in both blocks during the years of cold war. Therefore Greece, for many years 
was deprived form benefits that accrue from regional economic co-operation and frade. 
1989, brought a new era were those barriers fall and opportunities were created. Those 
changes took place in a time where the political and economic power in the region had 
change significantly. Greece, appears to be in a superior position comparing to the 
countries that fallen under communist regimes in both economic, political and military 
terms. This economic and political advancement of Greece over the other Balkan 
countries gives her the opportunity to play a significant economic and political role in the 
South East Europe. Furthermore, under those conditions, Greek firms could operate, 
invest and trade with Balkan countries from a comparatively advantageous positions. 
Overall, it could be argued that the political changes that were initiated in 1989 had a 
great impact on the economic relations of Greece and Eastern Europe. The above year 
has been a breaking point with the cold war climate that was preventing close economic 
relations from developing between a 'western' ally and communist countries. Since, 1989 
a new era of economic relations has been initiated between Greece and East Europe with 
great expectations especially on the part of Greece. 
The following chapters will attempt to demonstrate how the wide opportunities that 
opened for Greece with the momentous events of 1989 are underscored by the economic 
performance of the Greek entrepreneurs. In the following chapter the focus is on FDI. 
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3. THEORIES OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE MOTIVES OF FIRMS ENGAGING IN 
F D I ACTIVITIES AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE HOME COUNTRY. 
I. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the nature of foreign direct activity of Greek firms 
into CEECs and to evaluate the consequences for the Greek economy. In order to do that 
it is necessary to determine the criteria under which foreign direct investment (FDI) 
decisions are taken and the conditions under which home countries are benefited by FDI. 
Therefore, the chapter will focus on established theories on FDI. 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. In the first one a short review of the theories 
of FDI is presented. The second part explores the question of the effects of FDI on the 
home and host countries and the different theories and opinions are discussed. Finally, 
the third part of this chapter attempts to apply the above theories in the case of Greece. 
Drawing from the first two theoretical sections the third will attempt to shed some light 
onto the question of why Greek firms have undertaken FDI in the CEECs and what might 
be the possible effect for Greece as a home country. 
IL Review of theories of FDI 
One main issue that has to be explored is the reason why firms undertake FDI. There are 
several strands of theories that attempt to explain the phenomenon. However, the task to 
present analytically those theories would be well beyond the aim and limits of this 
chapter. Nevertheless, a brief consideration and presentation of some of the most 
significant theoretical efforts is necessary for our understanding and it will follow in this 
section. 
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The concept of FDI, as we understand it today^, did not emerge suddenly, rather it 
developed as a result of a long process. It took a substantial time until a specific theory 
was built to explain explicitly FDI. Originally FDI was simply reduced to a variant of 
international capital and was explained by capital movement and trade theories. 
Specifically, it was not until the 1960s when a substantial body of theory emerged 
attempting to explain FDI at a time when FDI experienced an unprecedented increase. 
Capital movement explanations accounted for foreign investment simply on the basis of 
higher rates of return abroad. Classical theory suggests that international capital 
movements are due to the differences in interest rates among countries. Therefore funds 
will flow fi-om one area where there is abundance of capital and low interest rates to areas 
of capital scarcity where interest rates are higher. However, the above theory, while 
adequate to explain portfolio investment, was not appropriate for direct investment. At 
the same time traditional trade theory had little to contribute to the subject (Gilpin, 1987). 
Hyraer (1976) argued that the orthodox international trade and capital movement theories 
do not explain FDI. In particular they are insufficient to explain two-way FDI flows 
through countries and even more between countries with similar product factors. More 
than that, Hymer brought the firm in the central focus of his theory. His explanation of 
why firms undertake FDI was based on the theory of the firm and industrial organisation. 
Hymer argued that firms that undertake FDI should possess some kind of firm-specific 
advantages (which could offset the advantages held by indigenous firms) (Hymer, 1976). 
Such advantages were essentially those of firm size and economies of scale, market 
power and marketing skill (for example, brand names, advertising strength), 
technological expertise (product, process or both), or access to cheaper sources of 
finance.Since then many different theoretical frameworks emerged in the search for an 
appropriate explanation of FDI. Some of the most important are reviewed bellow. 
^ " 'Direct investment' is defined as the investment by one firm in another with the intention of gaining a 
degree of control of the firm's operations. 'International' or 'foreign' direct investment is simply direct 
investment which occurs across national boundaries". The distinction with the 'Portofolio investment' lies 
in the control of the investment. In that case the firm purchases stock/shares in other companies purely for 
financial purposes; but it does not gain the control of the foreign enterprise (Dickens 1992, Hymer, 1976). 
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II. 1 Product life cycle 
Product life cycle theory was developed has by Raymond Vernon in 1966 and it was 
successful in explaining the early overseas investment of (mainly) American 
corporations. Vernon's contribution was to introduce a locational aspect into the product 
cycle that in the original form had no spatial connotation at all. 
The product life cycle theory suggests a model to explain the evolution of international 
production. According to this theory the pattern of international trade and investment are 
very much influenced by the life cycle stage of a firm's products or processes. The life 
cycle of a new product progresses through three stages: a) the introductory or innovative 
phase, b) the maturing or process-development phase and c) the mature or standardised 
phase (Giplin, 1987). According to the theory different types of economies are better 
equipped to stage a specific phase of the production and therefore the firm decides to 
produce in the home or host country or export accordingly. 
Specifically, during the first stage of the product firms choose to innovate in their home 
country, which is most likely to be an industrialised country. That can be explained both 
by the rich technological research capabilities acquired by those countries as well as from 
the greater demand for innovative products. Furthermore, at this early stage of production 
there is no price competition that could urge the company in search of low cost location. 
Production can therefore take place near the site of product development and research, 
where the production process can be monitored and adjusted (Czinkota, 1992). 
During the maturing stage exports to other countries expand rapidly. At the same time 
attempts to break the monopolistic position of the innovator firm erupt fi-om home firms 
and other industrialised countries (Taoka, 1991). The innovator firm might face strong 
competition as it becomes subject to quotas or tariffs and supply increases by local 
producers. As a result of this competition, prices are falling and an effort to reduce cost is 
made by further improvements in the method of production. 
Eventually in the final, mature phase, firms begin to replace their exports with local 
production to avoid import barriers imposed by the host governments, transportation cost 
and in order to protect the foreign market. This will lead to licensing agreements or joint 
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ventures with firms in the foreign country, or to wholly owned investments (Taoka, 
1991). 
The product cycle theory applied best to FDI in manufacturing, the early overseas 
expansion of American corporations, and what is called 'horizontally integrated' 
investment, that is, the establishment of plants to make the same or similar goods 
everywhere. However, since the end of the Second World War several important changes 
have taken place that the theory could not explain (Gilpin, 1987). 
11.2 Oligopolistic-Monopolistic advantage 
Other theories emphasised on the oligopolistic or monopolistic advantages of the 
multinational corporations. Those advantages were assumed to overcome the 
disadvantages faced by MNCs when they go to an unfamiliar foreign market. However, 
as far as the monopolistic factor is concerned, Kickerbocker (1973) pointed out that it 
plays a role in motivating firms to invest abroad only when another rival company 
preceded it in establishing production abroad. He considered the second firm's behaviour 
as an oligopolistic reaction. To understand the first move of FDI he depended on the 
product life cycle theory. 
11.3 Market Imperfection 
Also another strand developed based on the assumption of market imperfection. Hymer 
(1976) was the first to talk about the relation between market imperfection and FDI. In 
the core of this theory is the assumption that a decision by a firm to undertake FDI is in 
order to take advantage of certain capabilities not shared by local competitors. Robock 
(1989) argued that the competitive advantage of firms is explained by imperfections in 
markets of goods or factors of production. "In the theoretical world of perfect 
competition, firms produce homogeneous products and have equal access to all 
productive factors. In the more realistic world of imperfect competition, as explained by 
the industrial organisation theory, firms acquire competitive advantages through product 
differentiation, brand names, special marketing skills, and restrictions to entry"(Robock, 
1989 p.43). Finally although he recognises the contribution of the theory he claims that 
the model leaves many questions unanswered. 
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"Given the special advantages that permit the firms to invest abroad...the model stops 
short of explaining why foreign production is the preferred means of exploiting the 
advantage (i.e., the sufficient condition). The firms advantage can also be exploited 
through exporting or licensing" (Robock, p.44). 
II. 4 Eclectic paradigm 
However, most of the theories suffered fi-om limitations and a more inclusive theory of 
the multinational corporation and FDI was needed. John Dunning's eclectic paradigm 
offered this alternative. The eclectic paradigm is considered as one of the most widely 
accepted frameworks to explain the intemationalisation of business. Dunning's major 
contribution was to propose a framework that attempted to integrate various strands of 
explanation of international production. Dunning proposed a set of three general and 
interrelated principles which, he suggests, are fundamental to an understanding of 
international production. The three principles themselves have derived from a variety of 
theoretical approaches- the theory of the firm, organisation theory, trade theory and 
location theory. Therefore, Dunning labels his approach eclectic. 
Dunning's model states that a firm's decision to engage in international production 
requires three conditions or advantages: the firm's possession of certain ownership-
specific advantages (O) not possessed by firms of other nationalities. Also, there must be 
location-specific factors (L) which make it more profitable for the firm to exploit its 
assets overseas, rather than in the domestic locations. Finally, the third set of advantages 
are associated with intemalisation (I). That is when it is more profitable to internalise 
these advantages within the firm rather than sell them to independent parties. 
In the eclectic paradigm it is contended that multinationals have competitive or 
ownership advantages vis-a-vis their major rivals. Such advantages are most suitably 
exploited by the firm itself rather than by selling or leasing them to other firms. In other 
words, the firm internalises the use of its ownership -specific advantages. 
IL5 Investment Development Path (IDP) 
Dunning has also developed an Investment Development Path (IDP) model in order to 
illustrate the relevance of the eclectic paradigm in explaining the Net Outward 
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Investment (NOI) position of countries. The IDP model systematically relates the 
outward and inward direct investment of a country with the stage of its economic 
development. It supposes that there are consistent patterns of structural change with 
development; and second that these changes are systematically related to patterns of FDI 
(Dunning andNarula, 1996) 
Specifically, the IDP model identifies five different development stages according to the 
propensity of the country concerned to be outward and/or inward investor. This 
propensity rests on the extent and pattern of the ownership specific (O) advantage of the 
indigenous firms, on the location-bound resources and capabilities of that country (L) 
related to the others, and last, on the choice of the firms to internalise these advantages 
(I). Dunning and Narula (1996) argue that the relationship between FDI, on the one hand, 
and the ownership, locational and intemalisation (OLI) advantages of the countries and 
firms, on the other, change according to the country's stage of economic development. In 
other words, "the relative weights and roles of the three elements of OLI or eclectic 
approach to international production vary as countries and their firms become richer, 
shift from natural to created assets, and become more embedded in the world economy" 
(Campa, p.207). 
Finally, according to Dunning (1996) the impact of both outbound and inbound MNCs 
activity on the development and economic restructuring of the countries in which they 
operate depends on three main variables: a) the type of FDI undertaken, b) the structure 
of the indigenous capabilities of the countries concerned, and c) the macro-economic and 
organisational policies pursued by governments. For instance, according to the IDP 
model, the level of development of the host country is a major predictor of the type of 
inward investment. A less developed country does not have a high level of created assets 
and its comparative advantage lies in its natural endowments. Therefore it is argued that a 
country's per capita income is inversely related to the percentage of factor-seeking FDI 
into the country and positively related to the percentage of asset-seeking investment. 
Existing trade flows will also determine the purpose of FDI activity. 
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/ / . 6 Third World Multinationals (TWMCs) 
Over the period 1977 to 1985 there was a growing interest in the rise of FDI firms based 
in developing countries. Therefore, a new theoretical strand developed concerning FDI 
fi'om Third world countries (TWCs), since this was not predicted to a great extent by the 
normal postulates of international or development economics. The main proponent of this 
theoretical strand was Sanjaya Lall (1985). 
The previous theoretical analysis of FDI was mainly based on studies done on MNCs 
fi-om the USA and therefore the literature had barely taken note of the different nature of 
monopolistic advantages that firms fi-om other countries might have (Lall, 1985). Lall 
argues that there can be several conditions under which a firm fi-om a less industrialised 
country can develop a proprietary advantage vis-a-vis competitors fi-om more advanced 
countries. Wells (in Lall, 1985) based on an empirical work claims that the advantages of 
the MNCs fi-om TWCs are not based on 'high technology' or advertising; rather many 
firms posses a know-how that enables them to produce at a low cost with small 
production runs and inexpensive labour. Furthermore, in many cases, they meet little 
challenge fi-om firms of rich countries as long as they stay on this turf. However, 
although their experience at home gives them advantages over local firms, in most cases 
it would be only a matter of a few years until local firms could copy their skills and 
develop similar skills themselves. Furthermore, he argues that only a few firms continue 
development activities at home that would lead them to innovations to replace old ones. 
Wells also comes to the conclusion that Third World MNCs become active mainly in 
sectors marked by price competition rather than product differentiation and their scale of 
investment is relatively small. 
Lecraw (1992) offers a brief summary of the conclusions about Third World MCs 
(TWMCs). Some of the most important points he makes are the following. First of all, 
TWMCs investment are based on firm-specific advantages in the generation of product 
and process technology that are appropriate to the factor cost, input characteristics and 
demand conditions in the host countries where they invest. Second, usually TWMCs 
utilise smaller scale, more labour-intensive, more flexible technology compared to the 
"true" multinationals. Furthermore, their output is again of lower quality and they 
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compete more on price rather than on product differentiation. Finally, TWMCs usually 
export less of their output compared to 'true' MNCs and their exports are directed to 
other countries than their home country. At the same time, they tend to import a lower 
proportion of their input in comparison with other firms. 
Overall, it could be argued that the TWMCs " are more adapted and more adaptable to 
the economic, social, cultural and climatic conditions of the host countries: that their 
technologies save capital and foreign exchange and generate more jobs; that the firms are 
on a smaller scale, more flexible and readier to enter into joint ventures, use more local 
materials and generally are more adapted to the host's environment" ( Hamilton, 1985). 
However, looking from the point of view of the home country they have some 
drawbacks; as for instance they might remit of a smaller proportion of their profits back 
home since they are usually more independent fi-om their parent firms. 
The above discussion about theories of FDI is indicative of the importance that is placed 
on FDI and the intemationalisation of economic activity. The operation of multinational 
corporations to the international arena has undoubtedly significant economic as well as 
political consequences. These have been investigated both on the side of the country 
where the MNCs begins (home country) as well as from the country where the MNCs 
invest (host country). The opinions about the role of the MNCs and the effect their 
operations have both in the host as well as in the home country differ considerably. 
"Some consider MNCs to be an advantage to mankind, superseding the nation-state, 
diffiising technology and economic growth to developing countries and interlocking 
national economies into an expanding and beneficial interdependence...while others view 
them as imperialistic predators, exploiting all for the sake of the corporate few while 
creating a web of political dependence and economic underdevelopment" (Gilpin, p.231, 
1987). This topic will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
III. The MNC and Home and Host Countries 
During the 1960s and the 1970s the literature on multinationals (MNCs) gave a lot of 
attention to the arguments for and against FDI. The literature focused on the impact of 
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FDI from various angles, including the so-called 'source' and 'host' country concerns. 
The issue was about the alleged benefits and/or costs that the operation of MNCs entail 
on the host as well as on the home country. 
Most of the arguments over the possible costs and benefits of MNCs have been 
concerned with their effects on the host economies (Dickens 1998). This is not surprising 
since the majority of the multinational firms were coming (especially in the first years) 
from a small number of developed countries, while the host countries were relatively 
underdeveloped countries that many times were counting on foreign capital for their 
economic development. However, this thesis is looking at FDI from a different angle, 
from the point of view of Greece, a western, EU country that is conducting outward 
investment in the CEECs. Therefore the main interest is on home country effects. 
Nevertheless, a short literature review follows from both perspectives to provide a more 
complete picture of the issue. 
IILl Host country effects 
Multinationals were widely believed to have the potential to benefit the country and 
region where they were investing. According to this assumption FDI (FDI) from the 
1960s onwards has been used as a possible solution to the problems of regions with low 
levels of regional development. In this context, the attraction of FDI was used as a tool 
for regional regeneration by central and regional authorities. This strategy, however, fall 
into considerable criticism in the early 1980s. FDI was criticised as leading to littie more 
than 'cathedrals in the desert'. Therefore, some alternative policies of regional 
development, focusing on small firms and endogenous development were pursued as 
being more suitable. However, in the 1990's, attention once again turned to 
multinationals. This was due to two different but parallel processes. Firstiy, it was due to 
the problems that appeared with the endogenous growth strategies. Policies focusing on 
indigenous development and small firms were proved fragile and inadequate to generate 
self-sustained growth. Secondly, the policy shift was also due to the alleged changes that 
are taking place in the organisation and management of multinationals. These changes 
imply that the use of territory by multinational firms may well be changing and that the 
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potential benefits for the host economies are greater than ever (Amin et al 1995, Dicken 
etal 1994). 
During the 1960s and the 1970s the attraction of inward investment was used extensively 
as a measure for regional economic development. Within Europe, many less favoured 
regions were offering incentives in order to attract FDI. The multinationals were expected 
to act as growth poles in the host area by offering, apart fi-om the direct benefits (like 
employment), dynamic benefits through spillover effects. In other words, inward 
investment was expected to contribute the host area by facilitating self -sustained and 
innovative economic development. However, the reality was rather different. Many 
multinationals were establishing their plants in certain areas in order to take advantage of 
the incentives offered by the governments and/or to exploit the cheap labour force in the 
area. The plants were used mainly for assembly and they were employing low skilled 
personnel, establishing hardly any linkages within the area. This type of plant, though, 
did not become embedded in the host area, and did not contribute much in the host area. 
Therefore they were characterised as 'cathedrals in the desert'. In particular, they were 
criticised for offering in the host economy little in the way of skill formation, technology 
transfer, linkage opportunities, transmission of managerial and entrepreneurial know-how 
or reinvestment of profits (Amin et al 1995). Therefore, multinationals, apart from 
offering some static, short-term benefits, failed to serve the aims of the host area; to 
facilitate self-sustained economic development (Netherlands Economic Institute 1992 in 
Young etal 1994). 
However, in the 1990s the perception about multinationals and their potential impact on 
host economies changed. Recent developments in the organisation and technology of 
production processes suggest that there have been changes that might significantly affect 
the relationship of MNCs and host areas (Dicken et al 1994). Furthermore, changes have 
been occurring in the organisation and management of the firm that might mean different 
use of territory by multinational firms (Amin 1995). For example, the introduction of just 
in time (JIT) production systems have meant that the firms themselves may try to 
establish greater links with firms of the locality. Furthermore, the emergence of the so-
called 'entrepreneurial firm' or 'performance company' have led to an emerging re-
evaluation of the relationship between MNCs and local areas. Therefore, it has been 
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argued that there is a tendency of multinational firms to engage more with the local 
enviromnent. 
From the economic perspective, it can be argued that the most important single indicator 
of local embeddedness relates to the linkages that are developing between the 
multinational firm and local suppliers. Turok (1993) gives emphasis to the 'quality' and 
the dynamic nature of linkages, together with the long term implications for local 
economic development and he distinguishes between two different scenarios; namely 
developmental and dependency. In the developmental scenario the pressures for greater 
flexibility lead to vertical disintegration of production and collaborative partnership 
between suppliers and distributors, encouraging geographical clustering. The clusters act 
as an internally generated growth pole, transfer technology and expertise to local firms. 
Finally the multinational firm gets deeply embedded in the local economy through the 
creation of a network of sophisticated, interdependent linkages which support the 
expectation of local firms and generate self-sustained growth of the cluster as a whole. 
Conversely, in the dependency case, the linkages with suppliers are hierarchical, 
governed by price considerations or other short-term objectives. The suppliers do not 
participate in the technological development and their capacity to upgrade is undermined. 
The MNCs ties to the locality are very weak and, hence, the local subsidiary is vulnerable 
to external decisions and corporate decisions. 
Similar to the above developmental scenario is the notion of the performance plant. Amin 
et al (1995) argues that the performance plant has developed as a result of the acute 
pressures of the economy for high quality products and continual ability for change and 
innovation. The performance plant possesses a set of distinctive attributes which makes 
it an attractive opportunity for stimulating endogenous development. In particular, he 
groups the attributes that justify the re-examination of the role of inward investment as a 
stimulus to self-sustained local economic development under four categories. First, 
quality plants exhibit a wide range of fimctions and competencies, including high-skill 
functions such as research and development. Thus they can promote the skill base and 
entrepreneurial qualities of the host region. Second, the performance plant has a degree of 
autonomy and decision-making authority that serves to the involvement of local 
managers, committed to the long-term survival of the plant. Third, it has a great 
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propensity to stimulate closer and more collaborative supplier linkages. Finally, the 
strategic position that the company possesses within the corporation reduces threats for 
closure or rationalization. 
III.2 Home country effects 
As far as the home country is concerned the beliefs have been mixed. The main worries 
lay around the belief that FDI may take away domestic investment, displace exports and 
consequently have a negative impact on employment (Dicken 1998). On the other hand, 
the most common argument in favour of outward investment is that it is necessary for 
firms to invest abroad in order to stay competitive in a highly international environment. 
Balance of payments 
The first worries, expressed by the 'home' countries, were centred around the impact of 
outward investment on the balance of payments of the country. Considering first of all 
balance of payments issues, a number of possible effects may result. This depends 
mainly, as Young and Hood (1979) argue, on what multinationals would or could have 
done i f they have not established affiliates overseas. In other words, does the direct 
investment abroad substitute for domestic investment, does it substitute for domestic 
consumption, or does it supplement both? 
One of the negative aspects is the possibility that outward investment may replace 
exports, or stimulate imports with an adverse effect on the balance of payments. Pitelis 
(1996) argues that the full impact of this would depend on the extend to which the 
overseas operations take exports from the home country, and the extent to which there are 
lower order effects as a result of the overseas investment increasing economic activity 
overseas, hence causing a general rise in the exports fi-om the home country. 
Furthermore, that might depend also partly on whether foreign investment contributes in 
the increase of the income of the host country and hence stimulates import demand. 
Finally, the general impact on the balance of payment might be affected by the degree to 
which the profits of the foreign investment are repatriated in the home country. 
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Empirical assessment 
A number of studies have sought to determine the effect on home country exports and 
balance of payments of outward investment^. The crucial question that occupied those 
studies was what might have happened i f the FDI had not taken place. Three extreme 
cases had been identified as possible (Hood and Young 1979, Buckely and Artisien 
1988): 
a) The classical assumption 
This postulates that FDI produces a net addition to capital formation in the host country 
but produces a similar decline in capital formation in the home country. This implies that 
direct investment abroad is a perfect substitute for investment at home and that the 
output of foreign investment substitutes for exports. 
b) Reverse classical assumption 
In this case FDI substitutes for investment in the host counfry to some degree but does 
not diminish capital formation, in the investing country. This is essentially the defensive 
argument, which states that foreign investment is required to maintain markets, as 
exports are likely to be excluded by host country policies designed to promote self-
sufficiency. In other words, this type of 'defensive' investment can occur where tariffs, 
quotas or other restrictions prevent imports to the market. 
c) Anti-classical assumption 
This case applies where FDI does not substitute for capital investment in the home 
country, but it does increase capital formation in the host country. Consequently, world 
capital formation is increased by FDI. This situation could occur when MNCs establish 
projects in the host country that local firms were incapable of undertaking. 
Several important studies were based on those assumptions. One of these was the major 
initial study, over the impact of FDI on USA's balance of trade, which was undertaken by 
Hufljauer & Adler in 1968. The Hufbauer-Adler study investigated all three hypotheses 
and shows outward investment to have a negative impact on the home country's balance 
' Reddaway et al (1968), Hufbauer and Adler (1968), Dunning (ed) (1985) 
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of payments when it is assumed that exporting fi-om home is an alternative to overseas 
production. Immediately preceding this, somewhat similar research has been undertaken 
for the UK by Reddaway and others (1967 and 1968). Reddaway's study was limited to 
the reverse classical hypothesis and it concluded that the UK's balance of payment 
benefited from UK outward investment. However, Reddaway's assumption, that in the 
absence of overseas production the market would have been totally lost, is open to 
criticism. 
From the above empirical cases it becomes clear that it is not easy to give definite 
answers on the effects on the balance of payments of the home country that arise as a 
consequence of outward investment. Different assumptions can lead to different results. 
Furthermore, the above assumptions have been criticised as rigid and static (Buckley and 
Artisienl988). In addition, Hood and Young (1979) pointed that there are several 
weaknesses with such investigation. The models do not give sufficient weight to the 
existence of 'anticipatory exports' (i.e. goods exported by the home country in 
anticipation of building the plant abroad) nor to 'associated exports' (i.e. complementary 
products exported by the home country after the establishment of the subsidiary). 
Furthermore, they do not take into account 'balancing exports' that result after the first 
plant build upon is operating at fiiU capacity. Finally these models do not reveal the 
dynamic effects of overseas direct investment in terms of maintaining the competitive 
position of home country firms. Therefore Buckley and Artisien suggest that the impact 
of outward investment must be investigated on a case by case basis, taking account of the 
feasible changes open to the firm, and the changing supply and demand conditions and 
other environmental circumstances. 
The employment effect 
As shown before, the act of establishing an overseas operation has implications for the 
home country's balance of payments, through its influence on capital and financial flows 
and its effect on trade. However, the most obvious implication for the average citizen is 
the effect on employment (Dicken 1998). 
The possible effects might vary significantly, depending on whether the foreign 
investment will displace local jobs or will give a further stimulus to local economy. In the 
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first case there might be a loss of domestic employment through overseas production both 
directly (relocation or job exports i f foreign affiliates substitute for production at home) 
and indirectly (loss of jobs in firms/industries linked to production/ activities that are 
relocated). While, in the second case there might be a creation of new jobs both in the 
parent company and/or in supplier/service industries at home that cater to foreign 
affiliates. 
More detailed, Hawkins (1972) distinguished four possible employment effects: 
a) Production displacement effect: In this case, there are job losses arising from the 
transfer of production from home to host country and also from servicing foreign 
markets by those overseas affiliates. 
b) Export stimulus effect: This occurs when home country exports increase as a result 
of affiliate's demands for capital equipment, intermediate goods, and complementary 
products. Thus, domestic employment rises through the production of goods which 
would not have taken place in the absence of the foreign investment. 
c) Home office: employment gains in non-production categories at the company's 
headquarters made necessary by the expansion of overseas activities. 
d) The supporting-firm effect: employment gains in other domestic firms supplying 
goods and services to the investing firms in connection with its overseas activities. 
As a result of outward investment labour at home may be released from marginally 
productive jobs and fransferred to jobs where productivity is higher. Therefore, the 
employment effect on home countries must be viewed not only in terms of impact on the 
level of employment but also on the mix in employment. 
Spillover effects 
Although the issue of 'spillover effects' has rarely been used in the home country debate, 
Blomstrom & Kokko (1995) argue that spillover effects similar to those that occur in the 
host country can take place in the home country as well. In particular, they argue that it is 
likely that the linkages between MNCs and their suppliers in the home country yield 
similar effects as linkages in the host countries. The only problem according to the 
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authors is the difficulty of defining what is a spillover effect in the home country context. 
Nevertheless, the authors bring a number of examples of potential positive effects that 
might occur to home country firms as a consequence of the outward investment of home 
multinationals. 
Firstly, FDI opens up opportunities to benefit from economies of scale, since it allows 
the MNC to grow larger than what would be possible i f its production was restricted to a 
single country. When that results in reduction of the average cost then it may generate 
productivity spillovers. For instance, there are spillovers i f the MNC produces 
intermediate goods that become available at a lower cost to all home country firms as a 
result of FDI, and i f this cost reduction raises the international competitiveness of home 
country firms. Moreover, there may be market access spillovers on the non-multinational 
home country firms from the distribution networks and the knowledge of foreign markets 
that is built up through FDI. For example, there might be positive effects on the home 
country's exports only by the establishment of a good name, and the familiarity with the 
products of the home country in a foreign country'^. There are also more obvious 
spillover effects, for example the increasing R&D operations at home that usually follow 
a firms's investment abroad can be expected to result in positive spillovers in the home 
country. Other possible spillover effects in the home countries stem from the structural 
changes that take place as domestic firms become (more) multinational. As MNCs 
expand their foreign operations, it is common for a shift in the structure of their 
production in the home country to occur. The structural effects can be both positive or 
negative, depending significantly on the level of development of the home compared to 
host country". 
Overall, the effect of the outward investment on the home country depends, as was shown 
above, mainly on the impact on the trade balance of the country, the employment effect 
For example, Swedish products are highly regarded for their quality in Latin America, partly because 
Swedish MNCs have been producing there for decades. 
'' For, instance, if the home country's labour force is well educated and the wages higher in relation of that 
of the host country, then the structural shift is likely to bring an increasing emphasis on the home country 
production in advanced industries with labor productivity-simple production processes requiring lots of 
unskilled labor may be moved to foreign affiliates. 
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and the possible spillover effects. The effects are in general believed to be positive, but 
nevertheless there are also some negative aspects involved with outward investment. In 
the case of Greece there is a widespread optimism about the effects of the 
intemationalisation of firms, but this is merely an assumption and it has not been based 
on solid research and investigation. Therefore, all the above issues must be thoroughly 
examined and a serious evaluation has to done on the impact of outward investment on 
Greece. The following section will present the first findings of research done on the 
above issue. 
I V . Greek outward investment Application of theories of FDI in the case of 
Greek investment in the CEECs 
The first two sections of the chapter provided a brief overview of the theories of FDI. The 
first one is focused on the theories that explain the reason why firms undertake FDI while 
the second refers to the theories that have been designed to evaluate the consequences of 
FDI in the home and/or host country. In this section the aim is to examine how the above 
theories apply in the specific case of Greece. There are two main tasks: one is to explain 
the phenomenon, defining the mechanisms that underlie FDI. Second, is to evaluate the 
consequences for the Greek economy 
The plan of the section is as follows: the first part sets, in brief, the general picture of FDI 
in the CEEC and places Greece in this wider context. The second, and main part, attempts 
to address some of the most significant questions related to Greek outward investment in 
the CEECs based on the existing literature about the topic. 
At this point it should be mentioned that the task of analysis of the Greek case is 
confi-onted with certain obstacles. Firstly, one problematic issue is that both Greece and 
its firms are difficult to place in fixed categories (i.e. Greece is not a developing country 
but neither a typical developed industrialised one). This is also related to the fact that the 
theories of FDI have been developed mainly in order to explain certain types of 
economies and firms (i.e. American) that are not similar with the Greek ones. Therefore 
there is a difficulty in choosing an appropriate set of theory where the Greek case falls in 
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(i.e. is the theory about TWMCs relevant to the case of Greece)? Finally, there is a 
considerable problem with the availability of data on Greek FDI. There are limited 
sources of data and those are not always reliable. Therefore, most of the studies on Greek 
FDI end up with tentative suggestions rather than concluding with fixed results. 
IV.l FDI in the CEECs 
The reforms in the CEECs have been a major political and economic event that has given 
rise to a lot of discussion. One of the major issues that has attracted a lot of attention is 
that of FDI in those countries. FDI has been seen as both an opportunity for foreign firms 
as well as a major contributing factor in the restructuring efforts of these economies. 
Therefore, a new theoretical interest developed around the benefits and opportunities that 
appear for western firms through FDI to the CEECs (see Buckle & Ghauri,1994). 
"Closely allied to this corporate interest in Eastern Europe are the forces shaping EC 
integration and enlargement...in the EC context, moreover, there has been some debate 
on the ways in which corporate integration might be encouraged to promote the 
objectives of regional integration" (Hood & Young, 1994). Related to the second 
concern, an optimistic climate about the role of FDI and its developmental potential in 
less favoured areas raised great expectations on FDI in the CEECs. 
One segment of literature has been focusing on the effects of FDI on central and eastern 
European countries (CEECs) and their transformation process on the national level. There 
was a widespread optimism that FDI in the CEECs would facilitate their economic 
development. Much commentary has stressed the importance of integrating the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe into the global economy, emphasising the view that 
investment by transnationals could play a significant role in assisting these countries to 
develop. Dunning (1994) argues that judging fi-om previous experience it should be 
reasonably expected that the opening of Cential and Eastern Europe to market forces will 
markedly improve the economic lot of its citizens. Finally he concludes that "foreign 
technology, management expertise and the access to foreign markets can...play a critical 
role in Central and Eastern European economic development". Similarly, reports by the 
World Bank, UNCTAD and the EBRD are in favour of FDI. For example the EBRD in 
its 1995 transition report states, "FDI and partnership can carry great benefits in 
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providing market skills, management, technology and finance as well as effective 
corporate governance". 
Another strand of literature focuses specifically on the effects of FDI on the regional 
level (Michalak 1993, Hardy 1998, Pavlinek P 1998, Sadler & Swain 1994, Smith & 
Ferencicova 1998). They examine the locally specific impacts of inward investment in 
relation to mode of entry, institutional engagement, different corporate strategies, 
technology transfer and linkages created in the local region. In this case the results are not 
that optimistic. After examination of several case-studies in various countries of CEE 
most of the authors are arguing that inward investment has not provided the solutions to 
sustainable restructuring that many hoped. The authors suggest that the FDI, although it 
had significant transforming impacts on the individual firms, had rather limited impact on 
the regional economies. They find limited the role of FDI in establishing a deep network 
of 'embedded' linkages. On the contrary some argue that FDI has created 'cathedrals in 
the desert' (Hardy 1998). MNC's strategies are said to impel private but not necessarily 
social efficiency. There may be a substantial gap between the corporate optimum and the 
regional optimum. 
Greece finds itself in the middle of this interplay between different (and often 
contradicting) interests among firms, countries and regions. Greece's geographical 
position (in the Southeast of Europe) and its economic condition (the poorest country of 
the EU) put her among the countries most immediately involved in and affected by the 
reforms in the CEECs. Despite its small size and its limited economic power, the country 
desired to play a significant role in the restructuring process of the CEECs. The 
government immediately saw many opportunities arising firom the opening up of the 
CEECs for Greek firms and also its (acclaimed) ability to play a significant regional role 
in the area of Balkans. Therefore, the reforms of the CEECs have triggered strong 
reaction from the part of Greek firms, mainly in the form of outward investment towards 
these countries. 
IV.2 Greek FDI in the CEECs 
The demise of the communist regimes in the CEECs has triggered a remarkable new 
phenomenon in the Greek economic business world. A significant number of firms of 
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Greek ownership have started an active investment into those countries. The phenomenon 
itself and its magnitude were imprecedented by Greek standards. Greece, for many years 
has been mainly, i f not solely, a recipient country of FDI flow (table 3-1 and 3-2), but 
that has altered significantly since 1989. This novel phenomenon attracted much attention 
and became the topic of extended presentation in the media. However, the actual picture 
is not yet very clear. There are many questions to be answered related to the nature of the 
investment and its implications for the Greek economy. A certain number of academics 
have been dealing with those questions, attempting to explain the phenomenon, and 
evaluate the possible effects in the Greek economy ( Labrianidis 1999, Kamaras 2001, 
Pitelis & lammarino, Pitelis, Tsipouri and Sudgen 1996, Louri et al 2000, Dimelis and 
Gatsios 1995). Drawing from their work, the section will attempt firstly to explain this 
phenomenon, defining the mechanism that underlies FDI, and second, evaluate the 
consequences for the Greek economy. 
The Greek FDI rises many questions. How can it be explained? Under which theoretical 
fi-amework does it fall? What type of companies are those investing abroad? What are the 
implications for Greece's development and international competitiveness? 
Firstly, the Greek outward investment could be explained as a country-specific 
phenomenon. This explanation would come in accordance with the theory of the 
investment development path (IDP) (that was developed in the first section). According 
to the theory the propensity of a country to engage in outward investment goes through 
various stages as the country develops, with outward FDI becoming a means of industrial 
restructuring only in the final stages of development (lammarino & Pitelis). 
According to Louri et al (2000) Greece could be classified as a stage three country. At 
this stage the comparative advantages in labour-intensive activities deteriorate, domestic 
wages rise, and outward investment is directed more to countries at lower stages in their 
IDP. Specifically, outward investment increases and is directed to stage 1 and 2 countries, 
both as a market seeking investment and as export platforms as prior domestic location 
(L) advantages in resource-intensive production are eroded. Efficiency or asset-seeking 
do not seem to influence Greek FDI decisions at the initial phase (of the Balkan 
expansion) according to the model (Louri et al 2000). 
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Outward direct investment also might occur in stage 3 and 4 countries, partly as a market 
seeking strategy, but also to acquire strategic assets to protect or upgrade O advantage of 
the investing firms. Finally, it is predicted that the government will seek to encourage the 
country's companies to invest abroad in those sectors in which they have strong 
ownership (O) advantages and the comparative locational (L) advantages are weakest. 
The same question about the mechanisms underlying FDI can be examined from the 
point of view of the firms. Many theories are focusing on firm-level characteristics in 
order to investigate the determinants of FDI (Hymer, Dunning's OLI paradigm. Caves 
1996, Grubaugh 1987). Louri, Papanastasiou and Lantouris (2000), using the above 
conceptual framework are attempting to explain the phenomenon of Greek outward direct 
investment. They are looking into the decision-making process of Greek firms before 
undertaking any type of intemationalisation strategy. They seek to investigate the 
determinants of alternative expansion strategies (i.e. exports versus FDI) by focusing on 
the importance of firm-specific characteristics. The novelty of their research, they argue, 
is that they use firm specific characteristic in order to determine the probabilities of each 
alternative strategy. 
The paper uses an econometric model trying to calculate the returns of each strategy 
using financial-asset characteristics of each firm i.e. borrowing capacity, liquidity and 
profitability and size advantages. The location and sectoral factors are not examined since 
there is homogeneity in their research. 
The empirical findings seem to support the theory. The Greek firms undertook FDI taking 
into consideration their financial and market structures. It was found that there is a 
significant positive effect on the long and medium term borrowing capacity of firms 
engaged in FDI in contrast to the negative effect of short-term borrowing. Furthermore, 
on the market basis it was noticed that there is a positive effect of relative firm size as 
well as the growth rate of sales. Moreover, it appears that the more intense the acquired 
familiarity with the foreign market through exports, the more likely it is for a firm to 
undertake FDI. In addition, labour intensity and old local comparative advantages were 
found to affect positively the choice of FDI as opposed to exports. 
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Overall, the model predicted a different strategic reaction between domestic catering and 
export oriented firms (the two subgroups examined) with the former appearing more keen 
to engage more intensely in FDI, while the latter being more indifferent between 
exporting or investing, possibly preferring a home production based expansion strategy. 
Another issue that needs investigation is what kind of firms are those investing abroad; 
are they similar with the typical multinational firms; or could they fall under the category 
of New Multinationals? This question is addressed by Labrianidis (1999). He has written 
extensively on Greek FDI. His interest is to examine the novel phenomenon of Greek 
outward investment and to evaluate its effect on the Greek economy. In order to do that 
he attempts to identify the type of firms that have invested in the CEECs. 
Labrianidis (1999) initiates a theoretical debate on whether the Greek firms that have 
invested in the CEECs are meeting the criteria of the conventional types of Multinational 
Companies ("true companies") or MNCs from Developing countries (new 
multinationals). According to the author the aim is not just to come to a simple 
classification of Greek investment projects but to understand the mechanisms causing this 
intemationalisation. 
Labrianidis offers a systematic work on the character of Greek FDI. He is looking into 
the push factors (saturation of the Greek market and the intensification of competition) as 
well as the pull factors (cheap labour cost, exploitation of natural resources) that urged 
Greek firms to invest in the CEECs. Furthermore, he is looking into the monopolistic 
advantages that the Greek MNCs have over the other local and foreign firms. According 
to Labrianidis the main advantages that the Greek firms have over the firms of the host 
country are that they have substantial capital and that they also have established relations 
with the Western market. However he comments that these "monopolistic advantages" 
will not last for too long, it will be a matter of a few years only until local firms manage 
to develop similar skills themselves. 
As far as the advantages over the other foreign firms are concerned, those seem to be 
based on the following factors: first they are more experienced and familiar in working in 
an unstable environment (as the Balkans). Furthermore, they are favoured by the 
geographical proximity to the host countries. Moreover, they have access to cheap labour 
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in their home country and finally the structure of the Greek firms, being relatively small 
and owned by one family, gives them the flexibility of taking decisions faster and being 
able to take risks more easily and hence grab the opportunities available. 
Judging from the empirical evidence provided by Labrianidis it could be argued that 
Greek firms investing in the CEECs resemble in many respects MNCs from the Third 
world. The firms lack strategy and they give priority to labour cost reduction 
considerations in their decision, also they operate in labour-intensive industries and their 
size and the investment volume are small. 
Therefore, Labrianidis expresses worries about the position of those firms in the CEECs. 
He believes that many of them are characterised by an opportunistic attitude and 
furthermore he suggests that to a great extent this type of investment could be described 
more accurately as immigration rather than as FDI. 
lammarino & Pitelis are looking into Greek FDI towards two Balkan countries as FDI 
fi-om and towards Less Favoured Regions (LFRs). They attempt to analyse the key 
criteria that underlie the investment choices of Greek firms. The aim is to help identify 
their role in the restructuring process and the impact that outward flows may have on the 
Greek economy. By investigating the strategies that have been followed by the Greek 
MNCs in CEECs are trying to shed light on the implications that outward flows have for 
a peripheral EU economy such as Greece. 
Their empirical analysis is based on the results of a survey carried out in 1995-96 as part 
of an ACE project supported by the European Commission on the economic integration 
through FDI in the less favoured CEECs and the impact on the LFRs of the European 
Union. They classify the FDI, according to the main objective of the investment itself, 
(into Exporters, Local suppliers, and Distributors,) and also by the control mode chosen 
by the parent company to establish an affiliate abroad (Wholly owned, joint venture;-
licensing-franchising). By investigating on the strategies that have been followed by the 
Greek MNCs in CEECs they are trying to shed light on the implications that outward 
flows have for a peripheral EU economy such as Greece. They are using a probabilistic 
econometric model. 
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lammarino and Pitelis argue that the result of outward FDI on the home country depends 
crucially upon the characteristics of the economies involved and upon the strategies 
followed by multinational enterprises (MNCs). In other words it depends on the type and 
pattern of FDI and upon the comparative points of stiength and weakness of the national 
economy. Their empirical findings express some caution about the implications of FDI 
on the home country, especially when the FDI comes fi-om a LFR. That is because some 
FDI might be negative for its possible substituting effects on similar exports, reducing 
effects on domestic capital investment and negative impact on jobs creation. Thus, they 
conclude that the "Competitiveness of Greek firms need not imply competitiveness of 
Greece as a nation" and they suggest some caution, and a pragmatic stance on the part of 
the Greek policy makers. 
Finally, Pitelis, Sugden and Tsipouri (1996) are looking into Greek outward investment, 
competitiveness and development. They investigate the case of Greek outward 
investment in the Balkans. The paper examines the extent of the investment and the 
potential impact on Greek international competitiveness and industrial development. It 
addresses fundamental questions about the meaning of the term competitiveness and how 
it is related to social objectives. The authors question whether there is a relationship 
between outward investment by Greek firms and Greek competitiveness (as a nation), 
and i f so what kind this is. Specifically they wonder " I f and how outward investment will 
serve (the wishes of communities in) Greece"(Pitehs et al, 1996, p i 69). 
The authors make a distinction between private and community costs and benefits. They 
claim that there is likely to be a divergence between the private and social community 
costs and benefits of overseas investment. Thus the Greek firm's investment in (say) the 
Balkans may bear profits for the firms and the Greek capitalists but not necessarily for 
the people of Greece. This can be the case for firms that either do not repatriate profits or 
paying taxes in their home base and/or export from their host nation to their home. 
Drawing from a wide literature on the implications of FDI (that has already developed in 
the second section) and taking into consideration the case of Greece, they conclude that 
outward investment per se is not unambiguously good or bad. Therefore they conclude by 
arguing that "it is inappropriate for the Greek Government to presume outward 
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investment as unconditionally desirable". Finally, they conclude by suggesting that the 
Greek government should attempt to design an industrial strategy which only facilitates 
outward investment beneficial to Greece. 
V. Conclusions 
Attempting to apply the theories on FDI in the case of Greece we come up immediately 
with the following observation: no single theory seems to be sufficient on its own to 
explain the phenomenon of Greek outward investment to the CEECs. An analysis of FDI 
theories shows that most of them are useful and partly applicable in explaining the 
phenomenon of Greek outward investment, but none would be adequate by its own to 
explain the motives that underlie Greek outward investment. Further research is required 
in order to establish a better understanding over the issue. 
Table 3-1. Inflows and Outflows of FDI per $1000 GDP per country, 1970-2000 
YEAR 1970 1980 1989 
1990-1996 
average 1997 1998 1999 2000 
COUNTRYGROUP 
Inflows per $1 000 GDP 
World 4,84 5,24 10,27 9,60 16,10 23,55 35,65 47,69 
Developed countries 4,36 5,86 10,70 7,73 11,92 21,28 35,09 50,94 
European Union 6,47 5,99 13,76 11,39 15,49 30,69 57,11 102,92 
Greece 4,41 13,76 11,06 10,53 8,12 0,70 4,58 9,67 
Outflows per $1 000 GDP 
World 6,17 5,60 12,45 10,77 16,07 23,34 34,34 44,37 
Developed countries 6,56 6,40 13,90 11,74 17,59 27,74 40,46 52,76 
European Union 6,59 6,83 19,77 16,33 26,76 48,62 83,78 123,22 
Greece -0,19 0,05 1,28 2,16 4,32 18,66 
Source: UNCTAD/DITE (http://stats.unctad.org/fdi) 
Table 3-2. Inflows and outflows of FDI as percentage of gross fixed capital formation by 
country (GFCF) 1970-2000 
1990-1996 




Worid 2,41 2,28 4,67 4,40 7,44 10,96 16,50 22,03 




















Worid 3,07 2,49 5,74 5,00 7,42 11,03 15,91 20,61 
Developed countries 3,26 2,97 6,55 5,78 8,86 13,95 20,07 25,90 
European Union 
Greece 












Source: UNCTAD/DITE (http://stats.unctad.org/fdi) 
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4. T H E RECONCEPTUALISATION O F T H E FIRM IN ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: K N O W L E D G E 
CREATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 
I. Introduction 
The previous chapter focused mainly at the national/regional level, looking into the 
consequences of Greek business activity on the home country (Greece) and on the host 
countries. This chapter will focus on the firm as the unit of analysis. This allows us to 
increase our understanding of the process that underlies the Greek FDI phenomenon. The 
aim of the chapter is to add fiirther to our understanding on the behaviour and response of 
Greek firms, the process of decision making, and the importance of the place where firms 
are located in this process. 
The chapter provides a thorough presentation of the theories of the firm and the latest 
debates over the firm in economic geography. The relation of the firm's home 
environment and its competitiveness is also discussed. Emphasis is put on the recent 
literature on knowledge and learning as competitive assets of the firm. The chapter 
further discuss the importance of knowledge in the intemationalisation process of the 
firms and theoretical insights together with empirical evidence of Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SME) contacting FDI in the CEECs are presented. 
II. Review of theories of the Firm 
The nature of the firm has been an issue of increasing interest in recent years in economic 
geography, largely because a clarification and re-conceptualisation of the object was 
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needed. According to Taylor, Yeung and Maskell respectively, the firm in economic 
geography has been criticised for being indefinite grouping, an unclear and ambivilant 
analytical category, and a grey area unable to be clearly defined with respect to form and 
fiinction. Maskell goes on to state that the reason for this perhaps lies in the fact that the 
majority of economic geographers perceived (for many years) the internal analysis of the 
firm as being beyond their rightful agenda, or even, in some cases, derogatory with 
respect to the competence of economic geography as a discipline. However, recent years 
have witnessed a growing number of attempts to re-conceptualise the role of the firm in 
economic geography. 
This attempt at re-conceptualisation occurs in the context of a broader 'cultural turn' that 
takes place in 'new economic geography' and reshapes both the topics, concepts and 
approaches of economic geography (Crang, 1997). Previously leading schools of thought 
are today on the defensive and, together with the reshaping of the old topics, new 
questions are appearing in the research agenda (Lee and Wills, 1997). Under this broader 
'reconstruction' that occurs in economic geography the old conceptions of the firm have 
been challenged severely. Yueng (2000) characteristically argues that only recently have 
the "new economic geographers" developed and reshaped the notion of the firm and its 
social-spatial constitution. 
However, until very recently economic geography was mainly adopting classical or neo-
classical theories of the firm, where the enterprise was hardly seen as something more 
than a 'black box' that responded in the pressures of the market. The firm was 
represented more as a set of cost and revenue curves and less as an organisation 
(Hodgson, 1998). The mainstream neo-classical world did not deem theoretically 
significant phenomena including firm's stiategies, managerial forms, entrepreneurial 
efforts and competitive alliances. (Maskell, 2000). 
Nevertheless, a new literature has started to develop around the firm in economic 
geography that is concerned more with linkages and relations: opening up the 'black-box' 
conception of the firm dominant in mainstream economics and focusing upon the internal 
organisational make-up of firms (Lawson, 1999). Many of the academics that are 
interested in the redefinition and broadening of the concept of the firm are drawing 
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insights from other 'neighbouring' disciplines (i.e. network theories, management theory, 
economics). Dicken (1990) makes a plea for a much greater cross fertilisation between 
researchers in different traditions (within economic geography). Maskell (2000) goes 
fiarther talking about the developments that "cousins in economics" have made on 
theories of the firm and how these can be useful and applicable within economic 
geography. Therefore, it is apparent that a broader investigation on theories of the firm on 
different disciplines can be of great use in our effort to better understand the nature of the 
firm. 
Among the different theories of the firm, in mainstream economics, the evolutionary, 
competence theory of the firm appears to gain ground among the economic geographers. 
Foss, for example, argues that the dominant standpoint with respect to the conduct of 
firms is the competence perspective (Foss, 1996, p. l ). This opinion seems to be 
supported by many others. Amin (2000) maintains that the competence based approach 
has led to promising new avenues of research for both economics and sociology of 
organisation. Furthermore, Hodgson (1998) argues that recent research conducted in the 
fields of organisational learning and cultural transmission seems to reinforce a 
competence-based explanation of the persistence and relative efficiencies of firms. 
Maskell (2000) also claims that the competence approach to the firm is the most suitable 
theory to be applied in economic geography. Finally, Lawson (1999) argues that the 
competence theory can be applied both in the micro and macro level since it can be used 
in the analysis of regions. 
II.l The firm in economic theory 
Although the firm has been the topic of many and long-term studies there is not yet a 
general consensus (among economists) over the subject matter designated by the title 
'theory of the firm'. The study of the firm is a wide and complex subject and can be 
examined from several perspectives. Many sfrands of theories have developed over the 
years, focusing in different issues of the firm, making different assumptions and 
following different approaches. This section will present some of the most important 
theoretical schools in economics that also had a great influence on the conceptualisation 
of the firm in economic geography. 
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Economic thought changed throughout time and a continuous reconstmction of the theory 
of the firm took place. Gustafsson (1990) argues that "Looking at the theory of the firm 
firom the point of view of economic history, it is manifest that theories of the firm are 
bom, flower and give way to new theories not only because existing theories are 
destroyed by new and superior ones but because historical reality, in this case the 
institutional settings, stmcture and behaviour of firms, is changing, making old theories 
outmoded and creating a demand for new ones". 
11.2 The neo-classical school 
Accordingly, the original classical and neo-classical theories of the firm have received 
substantial criticism and have become outmoded. Standard neo-classical theory takes the 
firm as given; no attention is paid to how it comes into existence, the nature of its intemal 
organisation, competitive strategy or the dynamics of the capitalist system (Best, 1990; 
Taylor, 2000; Hart). The firm is described as a production function; it is simply the place 
where inputs are transformed into outputs. Furthermore, the economic agents are 
considered to be rational, perfectiy informed, homogeneous and display non-
opportunistic behaviour. In short, in a world of pure and perfect competition, market 
price mechanisms are what drive the firm's decisions and activities (Cooke, 1998). Neo-
classical theory, based on several simplistic assumptions, is incapable of explaining 
complex real-world occurances and policy instruments implemented by firms including 
partnership, networking, oligopolistic situations, choice of satisfying rather than optimal 
decisions. Furthermore, it is unable to assess and explain the impact of phenomena such 
as history, routines, location of research and production centres, or the advantages of 
technologic superiority and human capital (Cooke, 1998). Therefore, new theories, like 
the 'contractual' and the recent 'competence' view of the firm came to be considered as 
the ones that can explain better the nature of the firm (Hodgson, 1998). 
11.3 Contractarian approaches 
Contractarian perspectives originate from the work of R.H.Coase (1937), who wrote a 
seminal article that opened up the research agenda of the theory of the firm. Coase's 
began to deal with questions that neo-classical theory had ignored. He claimed that the 
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firm and market were alternative modes for organising the very same transactions. 
Specifically, he claimed that the economic activities of individuals in a capitalist 
economy are co-ordinated in one of two way: spontaneously, by the price mechanism in 
the market, or planned via an authority relationship within the firm (Best, 1990). 
Williamson (1975, 1985) made a significant contribution in the contractarian strand of 
literature. Williamson's work is critical in the respect that he tried to replace the 
conventional conceptualisation of the firm as a production function with that of 
governance structure. He attempted to explain why firms decide to make (internalise) or 
buy (purchase in the market) economic activities. His answer, concurring with the basic 
argument of the new institutional economics, was that the organisational forms that 
prevail are those that deal most efficientiy with the cost of economic transaction 
(Grabber). The firm and the market are seen as alternative modes of governance, and the 
choice between the two is principally decided by transaction cost differences. In other 
words transaction cost approaches describe the firm as a response to market failure. 
Profit-seeking firms internalise operations when by so doing the cost of organising and 
transaction business will thereby be lowered (Teece, 1998). 
However, this approach may not without criticism. Contiactarian approaches are 
criticised for their neglect not only of the production but of the dynamic features of firm 
behaviour more generally, and also for the treatment of individual agents as atomistic and 
as given (Hodgson, 1998). Also, they have been accused of describing the behaviour of 
the firm in terms of optimal reaction to the environmental signals detected by the firm 
(Amin, 1999). Dicken and Thrift (1992) reject transaction cost theory as, in effect, merely 
a reaffirmation of neo-classical economics. According to them, efficiency is the basic 
calculus. It allows for the minimisation of costs by rational actors embedded in a matrix 
of exchange. With the same rationale, Yeung (1994) criticises tiansaction cost theory 
because socio-spatial factors are easily overshadowed by sensible economic reasoning. 
Specifically, he argues that the firm is regulated to the status of only a puppet in the 
crowd of tieaties and contracts. Its causal powers, as expressed in the mode of rationality, 
are overlooked. Furthermore, important social (network) relations are discarded and 
replaced by the economising of transaction costs. In this way, economic reasoning 
eclipses less important social-spatial considerations. Finally, the notions of 'treaties' and 
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'contracts' are deemed by Yueng to be too descriptive in explaining anything causally 
within, and outside of, the firm" (Yueng, 2000). 
Therefore, a number of researchers are looking into the 'competence' theory of the firm 
for explanations (Amin, 2000; Hodgson, 1998; Lawson, 1999, Maskell, 2000). Hodgson 
(1998) makes a thorough comparison between competence and contractual theories of the 
firm. Although, he does not discard the contractual theory of the firm he is argues that 
key questions can be answered using the competence-based approach that concern the 
nature of the firm accordingly to the transaction cost and other contractarian theories. He 
is emphases more the limitations of the contractarian approaches: treating individuals as 
given, overlooking the dynamic aspects of the firm and neglecting production and 
technology and downplaying the distinctive kind and rate of human learning that takes 
place within firms. Therefore he claims that competence theory is more appropriate for 
work on organisational learning and cultural transmission. Amin (2000) also, observes 
that the new 'competence' based view of the firm as 'a process of knowledge' opens up 
promising avenues for the economics and sociology of organisation. 
IL4 Evolutionary theories of the firm 
Economic agents, firms and markets can be conceived differently using evolutionary 
economics, which gives emphasis to history, routines, and influences of given 
environments and institutions (Cooke, 1998). Firms are not homogeneous, atomistic units 
who act with the primarily aim to maximise profit. According to evolutionary economics, 
firms differ from one another and inputs in their production vary accordingly. One of 
these inputs is knowledge. (Dosi, 1988). Knowledge and learning plays a fundamental 
role. 
Furthermore, Cooke argues that firms have their own developmental histories which they 
learn from and which ultimately shapes their actions. They are founded, they travel 
differentiated routes of growth, develop technological prowess, engage in various 
opportunities and adapt to ever-changing constraints and competition. Indeed, several 
cannot respond to these challenges and inevitably slowly exit markets. (Cooke, 1998). 
Furthermore, firms do not operate in a vacuum. Evolutionary economics, and even more 
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modem economic geography, emphasise the importance of the socio-cultural miHeu 
within which network forms of interfirm organisation are embedded. 
Recently, an evolutionary, 'competence' theory of the firm has gained ground becoming 
a leading approach (Maskell, 2000). Being influenced by the notion of 'competences' 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) and 'capabilities' (Teece and Pisano, 1994), there is a 
growing number of researchers whose work upon (dynamic) 'capabilities' and/or 
'competence' of firms is gaining importance and influence into the study of firm's 
behaviour. 
II.5 Competence theory of the firm 
Both competence theory and the knowledge based views of the firm are seen as distinct 
alternatives to both neo-classical and transaction-cost economics (Malecki, 2000). The 
competence perspective rejects the idea of the firm as a production function and 
emphasises management and organisation features instead (Williamson, 1999). The firm 
is a database, storing skills, experience and knowledge, not simply a set of mechanical 
responses to information or transaction costs (Malecki, 2000, Lawson, 2000). Hodgson 
(1998), more explicitiy, argues that in contrast to the 'contractual' theories, that 
emphasise the cost of making and monitoring transactions, the competence perspective 
does not simply respond to individual and organisational responses, it is essentially a 
repository of knowledge. 
Furthermore, competence-based research ascribes great importance to learning. In 
contrast to transaction cost, that downplays the distinctive kind and rate of human 
learning that takes place in the firm, for the competence theories of the firm, learning and 
relationships (of trust, etc.) that facilitate learning are of central importance. 
In short, the competence perspective has to do with understanding the firm and its actions 
through a realistic, multifaceted approach, a (Lawson, 1999). 
A critique of this school has been done by Williamson (1999), which according to his 
words, has been curiously exempted fi-om sustained critique. He criticises the theory for 
being "obscure and often tautological definition of key terms". Furthermore he criticises 
the concept of core competences for "relying on ex post rationalisation: show me a 
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success story and I will show you (uncover) a core competence (or show me a failure and 
I will show you (uncover a missing competence)". Nevertheless, on his conclusions he 
claims that the relation between the two sets of theories are more complementary than 
rival since the differences are more apparent than real. 
H.6 Which theories of the firm apply better in economic geography? 
Maskell (2000) expresses a very interesting criterion in order to identify the theories of 
the firm that are the most appropriate for economic geography. The main criterion that he 
uses is how far the theory of the firm is applicable in the local and regional level of 
analysis. Specifically, he questions the fact that the theory of the firm gives theoretical 
significance to the spatial context in which the firm is placed. 
Maskell comes to the conclusion that the 'competence' theory of the firm is the most 
suitable for economic geography since it fulfils better than all the other theories the 
spatial requirements that can be useful for economic geography. On both the micro and 
aggregate level, the competence based view of the firm can provide coherent theoretical 
fi-amework. It can explain the behaviour of competing firms with respect to the former, 
and territorial competitiveness (between regions and countries) with respect to the latter. 
The theories of competence take into consideration the external environment where firms 
are located. Teece and Pisano (1994) argue that "Geography matters". Non tradable 
location assets can lead to uniqueness in certain business. Both learning processes and 
location with respect to business assets guide the strategies and tactics taken by a firm. 
The above theories take into consideration the local and/or regional forces that affect the 
competencies of the firm mainly through the facilitation of learning and knowledge. 
Lawson (1999) develops the idea of expanding the competence theory of the firm to the 
analysis of the region. He argues that the competence perspective is equally relevant to 
the study of the firm and to the study of the regional productive system. In his analysis he 
presents firms and regions as ensembles of competencies that emerge from, but are not 
reducible to, social interaction. Furthermore, he tries to match the competence theory of 
the region with recent regional literature (local milieu, industrial districts, untraded 
interdependencies) arguing that they are based on the same rationale. Finally he 
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concludes by saying that there is a need to understand and assess the regional set of 
competencies within which the firms act. 
III . The debate over the firm in economic geography 
Two main issues have to be addressed about the role of firm in economic geography. The 
first one is about the relevance of business enterprise in economic geography and the 
second is concerned with the choice of a precise theory of the firm that can be adopted by 
economic geographers. The two topics are highly interlinked, since the proper theory of 
the firm might give more credit and relevance of the firm in economic geography. 
Therefore, the first of the issues is highly dependent on the ability to build a robust 
theoretical, as well as empirical base, of the theory of the firm (Dicken 1990). Or as 
Crang (1997) puts it a theorisation and methodology is needed to make sense of whatever 
empirical and conceptual concerns economic geographers decide they are interested in. 
Or more precisely, in the words of McNee "the geography of enterprise requires a theory 
of enterprise". 
The theory of the firm in economic geography has developed initially within the broader 
context of industrial geography and specifically industrial location theory. However, the 
concept of industrial (location) geography itself has changed considerably over time and 
within it the concept of the firm. A broad classification into three main schools is possible 
in order to follow the progress of the firm. The first school, and arguably the one with the 
greatest/longest influence, was the so-called classical location theory school. Two other 
schools followed as a response to the first one, the 'geography of enterprise' firstly and 
secondly a more radical political-economic school of thought. The contribution of the 
above schools into our understanding of the nature and organisation of the firm has been 
valuable. However, nowadays they meet criticism for being, at the least, limited in the 
way they conceptualised and used the firm in their analysis. 
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III.l The classical location theory 
The 'classical location theory' school is rooted in the neo-classical economic tradition 
and is mainly concerned with the interpretation of the location patterns of individual 
plans or industries. The main subject of study is the individual firm and the aim is to 
define the variables which determine the location choice of those firms. This approach 
treats space as distance and as land that each productive unit occupies (Labrianidis 1990). 
Within this school the firm is perceived as a black box that converts market price signals 
into outputs of commodities or intangibles. No specifications of any particular processes 
are involved in this transformation (Maskell, 2000). The basic building block in neo-
classical location theory is "an idealistic, abstract model of the individual firm, a model 
constructed to represent either all, or a specified, subset, of actual firms" ( Massey, 1979 
in Yeung 2000)". The firm is separated from the rest of the society and it becomes a 
highly atomistic entity- a 'representative firm'. Furthermore, this approach is not 
interested about the organisational structure of the firm, this is reduced to an over-
simplified dichotomization between single or multiple plant. Finally, central to the 
classical approach is the idea of the 'economic man' which posses perfect knowledge and 
makes the best, rational decisions. 
The 'world' of the classical school is an abstract society in a permanent equilibrium state. 
It disregards the complicated and often contrasting social relations and moves within 
society and ends up in mistaken conclusions about society and human behaviour. 
In the 1960s the classical school started to lose credit and to be under scrutiny. The first 
to challenge this approach were urban and regional geographers that were trying to 
explain uneven spatial development. There was a consensus that the equilibrium analysis 
of classical location theory could not cope with the realities of strongly disequilibrium 
forces in the space economy (Walker, 1989). Furthermore, the School has been criticised 
for its deductive and normative character (Labrianidis 1990, Chapman 1987). 
The 1960s were characterised by a rapid economic growth that was accompanied by a 
high volume of investment by large multinational corporations. Those large corporations 
attracted the attention of economic geographers. On the centre of their academic interest 
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was the power of those large corporations on the creation of space-economy: the way 
they could influence the spatial distribution of economic activity. 
IIL2 Behaviourist school 
At the same period emerged the so-called behaviourist school of industrial location. This 
school was emphasising the behaviour of the people (and the companies) in the location-
decision-making. Behaviourists utterly reject the world of perfect competition and 
information in which the Marshallian single-plant family firm operates. (Walker, 1989). 
According to the behaviourist view, large firms have, to some extent, control over their 
environment. Furthermore, central to this approach is the concept that the firms are acting 
on the basis of 'bounded rationality'. 
IIL3 The geography of enterprise 
Under the above influences appeared the school of 'geography of enterprise' that become 
the dominant theory of industrial geography since the late 1960s and up to the 1970s. The 
theory of 'geography of enterprise' is widely attributed to the work of McNee in 1960 
and it is preoccupied with the locational and behavioural patterns of large firm in the 
space. The Geography of enterprise tried to set more realistic behavioural assumptions 
into the location decisions of the firm. The location-decision making is not as central in 
the 'geography of enterprise' as in the classical school. During the 1970s the focus was 
directed on the organisational structure of the firms and their strategies. Some writers 
emphasised, in particular, the need to explore the environment within which firms operate 
(Walker, 1989). 
A major shift in emphasis has occurred due to the geography of enterprise approach. 
This has been exemplified by normative location theory, and has to do with the concern 
for the influence of the spatial dimension of the economic environment upon industrial 
location (i.e. proximity to raw materials, markets, etch.). Concern is now placed more on 
an interest in the impact of the activities of industrial enterprises upon the environment 
(Chapman, 1987). 
The school however did not escape criticism. Yeung (2000) argues that the geography of 
enterprise approach gave economic geography a new focus, but did not go far enough. 
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But, it was Walker (1989), and Storper and Walker (1989) who were most critical of 
geography of enterprise or 'corporate geography'. Walker sings the requiem of 'corporate 
geography' focusing on the failures/limitations of corporate geography. He claims that it 
could be possible to put corporate studies to a subordinate place in the geography of 
industrial organisation. That statement initiated a debate about corporate geography and 
the relevance of business enterprises in the study of geographical industrialisation. 
Dicken and Thrift (1992), taking part in the debate, are arguing in favour of the centrality 
of business enterprises in our understanding of the organisation of the production which, 
on its turn, is a prerequisite to our understanding of the dynamics of space economy. 
Furthermore, they are calling for a need to adopt "a broader socio-organisational view of 
the business enterprise". 
IIL4 Political-economy approach 
The eariy 1970s was the beginning of the rise of an intellectual hegemony of marxian 
political-economy approaches (Crang 1997). A number of radical geographers were not 
satisfied by the explanatory framework offered by both classical and behavioural 
approaches to the geography of business organisations and geographical industrialisation: 
(e.g. Massey 1977, 1984; Harvey 1975, Walker and Storper 1981) 
Major theoretical and empirical reorientations with respect to research industrial 
(economic) geography came out of a radical approach in the 1070s and 80s. In the late 
1970s there was a turn in the focus of industrial geography (fi-om corporations) towards 
industrial restructuring (Yeung 2000, walker R). Emphasis was placed on industry studies 
rather than enterprise research, on change in the space economy rather than management 
of corporate systems. That was associated with the recession of the economy and the de-
industrialisation process that was taking place in England, Western Europe and U.S. 
Subsequently, because of this radical literature, the firm was subsumed under dominant 
capitalist class relations such that the spatial behaviour of the firm was explained by 
capital's logic . While the 'geography of enterprise concentrated on the individual firm 
and on particular aspects on management behaviour, the Marxist school focussed on the 
economic system as a whole and, especially, on the conflict between capital and labour 
(Dicken, 1990). 
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Despite the useful contributions of the radical school, Yueng (2000) criticises the way it 
conceptualised and used the firm. He refers to two main strands of radical literature: 
firstly, the spatial division of labour thesis and second the flexible specialisation and 
Post-Fordism debate. In the first theory he identifies the problem in the fact that it was 
given very little consideration in the specific strategies followed by the firms and the way 
that might influence the spatial division of labour. In the second strand he comments that 
virtually no analytical attention was given to the firm since the key analytical unit in this 
approach was the production systems. 
That comes to verify Maskell (2000) who claims that the economic geography lacks any 
real micro-theoretical foundation, which gives clear explanations of how and why 'the 
firm' behaves and performs the way it does. In overall, it can be claimed that "the firm 
has not been adequately theorised in economic geography" (Yeung, 2000). 
IV. Competitiveness of firms and the local and regional environment 
Nowadays, it is widely accepted that the firm's competitiveness is highly related to its 
ability to continuously learn, innovate and upgrade its knowledge. Having accepted the 
above statement, then, what remains, for researchers, is to identify the factors that 
facilitate and promote these processes of knowledge and learning to take place. Whether 
these factors can be found within or outside the borders of the firm has been a topic of an 
on-going debate. However, the recent years, it has become increasingly common for 
scientists, even outside the discipline of economic geography (economists, sociologists), 
to try to analyse the effect of the 'environment' of the firm on firms' innovation and 
learning capabilities. Some of them emphasise the national level (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 
1993), while others favour the regional level as the most influential on the firm's 
innovative and learning performance (Lawson, Storper, 1997). But, the most significant 
break with the past is that a significant number are now focusing on the so-called 'soft' 
(non-economic) factors of firm's environment. Concepts such as 'institutions''^, 'social 
By institutions here we don't refer as much to the formal institutions (pubhc or private bodies) as to sets 
of habits, routines, rules, norms and laws (Johnson, 1992) 
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capital''^ 'culture''*', 'untraded interdependencies' are being used extensively in the 
literature of economic geographers. Amin (1999) distinguishes this new strand of 
literature from a previous one drew more on economistic concepts (external economies, 
economies of scale) in order to explain the dynamism of regions and firms. This new 
strand of literature that Amin calls the 'relational strand' is concerned very much with the 
role of proximity and local ties of association as a source of knowledge and learning 
(Amin, 1999). Furthermore, this new strand of literature challenges the old 
conceptualisation of the firm. "The theory of the firm is being pushed well beyond its 
early disciplinary concerns by new insights developed in organisation theory, sociology 
of science, communications theory, evolutionary economics and linguistics, cybernetics 
and cognitive theory" (Amin, 1999). 
In the following section I briefly discus the 'new' theoretical conceptualisation of the 
region and the relationship between the firm's competitiveness and its regional/local 
environment. 
IV.l The rediscovery of the region and the firm in 'new economic geography' 
During the last decade the region has been rediscovered, not only, by economic 
geographers but also researchers of other social science disciplines. A growing number of 
social scientists-often inspired by new sets of ideas labelled 'flexible specialisation', 
'networking' and 'post Fordism'- have argued that regional production systems, 
industrial districts and technological districts are becoming important. The attention was 
attracted by the observation that in a world of intensified globalisation the region seemed 
to gain/retain power as a source of competitive advantage and success. The examples of 
" The 'Social capital', similar to the above notion of'institutions' refers to 'features of social organisation, 
such as networks, norms and trust, that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit' 
(Putman, 1993) and comes to challenge the previous notions o f physical capital' and 'human capital' that 
prevailed in classical and neo-classical economis respectively (Ashein, 2000) 
Two broad categories can be made of culture as a) ideas (understood as beliefs, attitudes, understanding, 
myths, values, norms, etch.) and b) as social practices (traditions, established way of behaving, etch) 
(Oinas, 1998). Saxenian, distinguishes between three different types of culture: 1) Regional culture: shared 
ideas and social practices that remain relative persistent over time in a (typically subnational) spatial entity 
2) A regions Industrial culture and 3) organisational culture. 
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successfiil regional economies and industrial districts were not limited (Some of the most 
well known are: Emilia Romagna, Baden Wurttemberg, Silicon Valley). Under this 
observation an interesting research started taking place around the region and its 
importance as a source of dynamism and competitive advantage of production systems 
and capitalism. 
A broad distinction can be made between two different conceptual strands that have 
developed in economic geography working with the above idea. The first one, that we 
will call N E G ' ^ I , is associated with the work of Knigman. The main characteristic of this 
strand is that it is closer to 'mainstieam' economics, using mathematics and formal 
modelling. This strand has become quite popular due to its purely economic reasoning. 
On the other hand there is the NEG I I that is highly associated with the 'cultural turn' that 
takes place in economic geography. As Perrons (2000) comments, the issues considered 
intangible or 'messy' by the NEG I form the substance of NEG I I . Specifically, in NEGII 
it is the 'soft' factors - that is, relational, social and contextual aspects of economic 
behaviour, which are mostly emphasised. These are refereed to as 'untraded 
interdependencies' (Storper, 1995) or 'institutional thickness' (Amin and Thrift 1994). 
Martin (1999) makes a very interesting critique of Krugman's 'economistic' approach 
and argues that it suffers fi-om epistemological and ontological limitations. Specifically, 
Martin criticises the reluctance of Krugman to involve 'messy' social, cultural and 
institutional factors in his analysis. On the contrary, Martin argues that the embedded 
nature of social, institutional, cultural and political aspects of local and regional 
economies play a key role in determining the possibilities and/or constraints on 
development, and therefore spatial agglomeration occurs in particular places and not in 
others. In the first theoretical strand, a fundamental problem with previous schools is 
their reliance on neo-classical economics to explain firm behaviour. It draws fi-om 
endogenous growth theory to support its arguments on theories of economies of scale, 
reduction of transaction cost and economic externalities. The focus of the school is 
predominately on 'traded' relations, typically conceptualised on input-output relations. 
'^NEG stands for new economic geography according to the categorisation tha Perrons makes(2000) 
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More recently however, the rediscovery of the region has begun to drawn on insights 
offered by institutional and evolutionary economics where emphasis is put more on the 
'untraded inderdependencies' of the region (Amin, 1999). Storper (1995, 1997) 
accentuates the role of 'untraded interdependencies' (labour markets, local conventions, 
norms and values, public or semi-public institutions) in order to explain the observed 
spatial patterns. Transaction based approaches cannot be figured into the field of untraded 
interdependencies opened up by evolutionary economics. 
Although untraded interdependencies seem to be rooted in transactions and market 
contract exchanges- the analysis of such cannot easily be accommodated within 
transactions-cost based theories" (Storper, 1995, p 207). 
Storper argues (1997) that these untraded interdependencies have become the most 
general, and necessary, role of the region. It seems that they take the form of 
conventions, informal rules, and habits that co-ordinate economic actors under conditions 
of uncertainty. These relations constitute region-specific assets in production. He 
suggested that distinctive insights into why the local continues to matter as a sphere of 
economic organisation in which globalisation is consistent with the localisation of 
economic activity is the strength of their 'relational assets' or untraded 
interdependencies'. Furthermore those assets are claimed to be scarce in contemporary 
capitalism and therefore they constitute a distinctive characteristic that can be used for 
the growth of the region. 
These relational assets are claimed to have an impact on the competitive advantage of 
firms through the effect they have on the learning ability of firms and consequently on 
the region's competitive potential. The relational assets or untraded interdependencies 
constitute the learning environment of the firms. 
IV.2 The firm's environment and its competitiveness 
A major question for economic geographers is how much the place'^ where the firm is 
located affects its performance and its competitive strategies. It is a subject of questioning 
I adopt Ettlingers (2000) definition of the 'place' as the variety of social, economic, political ecological 
and cultural processes occurring in a locality 
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whether it is the firm or the environment of the firm that is the main actor of 
competitiveness. Is the competitiveness of the firm constituted on the level of the firm, 
industrial system, or network? How does the place and space where firms are located 
affect its competitive strategy? 
A significant number of studies have tried to examine the relations of firms with their 
local and regional environment in order to understand how they are affected by they 
environment and vice versa. Many economic geographers, trying to identify the reasons 
for the success of certain firms, are looking into the productive system and networks 
within which firms operate. Yeung (2000), making a evaluation of 'the firm' in industrial 
geography, is looking into the relationship of the firm with networks, institutions and 
regional development. Others are looking in to the economics of sunk cost on firms 
competitive strategies (Clark). Furthermore, more recently they are focusing on cultural 
bases of industrial organisation and corporate behaviour (Schoenberger,1997; Saxenian, 
1994). Finally the last, and perhaps most popular, theory that develops around the firms' 
competitiveness and its local/regional environment is related with the notion of 
knowledge learning and learning economies. 
Saxenian (1994) emphasises the culture of the region in her explanation of firm's failure 
or competitiveness. She develops her argument by comparing Silicon Valley and Route 
128 and arguing that the successful story of the later and the less successful story of the 
former are based on their cultural and institutional legacy. Firms, to Saxenian, "are 
embedded in a social and institutional setting that shapes, and it is shaped by, their 
strategies and structures". In Saxenian's analysis firms are entrenched in their regional 
environments, providing a basis for their success (or lack of it) in competition" (Oinas, 
1998). In other words, firms are embedded in their regional environments and their 
competitiveness is not only a result of firm characteristics alone but a result of its 
embeddedness in an industrial system, characterised by a practical kind of regional 
industrial culture and supported by the wider regional culture. Saxenian tries to prove that 
the competitivenes is created in the level of the region, not that of the firm; firms are not 
key actors, regional networks are. 
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Similar ideas have been expressed by Amin and Tomaney (1998). They argued that 
companies or nations do not compete in global markets, but productive systems including 
individual districts, clusters and value chains do. Using similar reasoning, Ettlinger 
(1996) examines firms performance in the US, in the context of an industrial system. 
Firms and their performance are part of a system; one firm's performance is tied to the 
performance of others. 
Oinas (1997) also attempts to examine the nature of firm-environment relation. He claims 
that it is not possible to understand regional development without understanding the key 
economic actors who affect the development of the regions (i.e. the firm). Although he 
mentions that it is a rare phenomenon in economic geography to study economic 
phenomena at the level of the firm. Furthermore he argues that this tradition of neglecting 
the nature and variety of the firm has also hindered the analysis of the spatial change in 
relation to theories of organisation and operation of the firm. Oinas, names the resources 
that firms derive from their institutional environments 'institutional resources'. (This 
concept is similar to the one of 'untraded interdependencies'). According to Oinas 
'embeddedness' is one term that captures the firm's relations to environments which 
provide them with such resources or 'interdependencies'. 
A comparable idea is that of 'localised capabilities,' developed by Maskell et al (p.51). 
Maskell calls 'localised capabilities' all the regional properties that influence the 
competitiveness of the firms. According to him, firms become competitive, and retain 
their competitiveness, by envisioning, developing and implementing strategies which 
utilise several valuable traits and properties specific to their place of location. He also 
argues that the strategies that the firms pursue can not be completely different to the 
quality and capabilities of the region (and country) where they are located. By backing 
and subsidising certain types of activities, while at the same time hampering or blocking 
others, the potential of a region or country do have a directional effect of efforts of the 
firms located there. Dicken and Thrift (1992) state that business organisations are 
'produced' through a complex historical process involving interactions between specific 
cognitive, cultural, social, political and economic characteristics of a firm's 'home 
territory' which ultimately leads to entrenchment or some sord fo embedded 
nature(Porter, 1990). Oinas (1997) interprets that as i f "the authors want to point out that 
71 
firms operate under influences originated fi-om various societal spheres and competitive 
situations in certain environments in which they are active in different countries and 
regions". 
But the subject that seems to attract the most attention, for economic geography, related 
to firms competitiveness is related to issues of learning and knowledge( Amin and 
Willkinson 1999, Maskell and Malberg). At the same time the transfer of knowledge and 
learning is said be easier and/or more efficient at the regional/local level. Regions are 
therefore said to represent the effective spatial scale for contemporary dynamic 
development (Perrons, 2000). 
V. The firm in a knowledge-based economy 
The turn of the last century proclaimed an entrance to a new era of "Knowledge-based 
economy". Drucker in 1993 argued that in the new economy, knowledge is not just 
another resource alongside the traditional factors of production. He states that it is the 
only meaningfiil resource today. The fact that knowledge has become the resource rather 
than a resource, is what makes the new society a knowledge society, he contends 
(Nonaka, 1995). Similar ideas have been expressed by highly regarded academics 
claiming that "knowledge is the source of the highest-quality power and the key to the 
power shift that lies ahead"(Toffler 1990). This widely projected view that "knowledge is 
power" and hence a/the competitive asset for an economy has become an issue of highest 
interest. Thus, although the notion of knowledge (and its importance in the economy) has 
a very long history, it is only recently that the interest has become ever so great. 
Academics from different disciplines expressed a vivid interest to define and explain the 
new phenomenon and the consequences arising this new "Knowledge era ". 
Economic geographer's interest on the above issue seems to have reached a point close to 
obsession (Hudson, 1999). Some of the themes that appear most fi-equently in economic 
geography, recently, are concerned with notions of knowledge and learning since it has 
been widely accepted that knowledge has become the most strategic resource and 
learning the most important process (Lundvall, 1999). Hence, a great interest is focused 
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on the importance of Knowledge and learning in economic performance (of regions and 
firms). 
VI. 1 Knowledge creation, local capabilities and competitiveness. 
The learning process is collective activity and its effectiveness depends to a great extent 
on social interaction and the cultural environment (Amin, 2000). This interactive nature 
of learning makes geography an important factor to be taken into consideration (Maskel 
et al 1999). Sharing knowledge, like many other transactions, is "highly sensitive to 
geographical distance by virtue of the sensitive complexity, uncertainty and recurrence 
over time" (Storper and Scott 1995, pp 507-508 in Malecki 2000). Therefore, many 
academics are concerned with the exploration of the role of the region/territory in this 
learning process. They question how far does the local environment affect firm learning 
and how far is this learning process space-specific? 
In other words, the topics of knowledge and learning, industrial and regional 
competitiveness and socio-spatial issues (local capabilities, institutional thickness, local 
and culture) have come to the front of an academic debate in economic geography. One 
of the main issues that is discussed concerns the importance of geographical proximity as 
generator of corporate competitiveness through facilitation of learning and iimovation. 
Maskell et al (1998, 1999, 2000) are arguing that proximity within firms plays an 
important role in the promotion of competitiveness. First, they presume that the ability of 
a firm to learn and upgrade its knowledge is one of the most important assets of firm's 
competitiveness. Proximity between firms promotes interactive learning and 
consequentiy helps their competitiveness. Therefore, the proximity of the firms plays an 
important role since it facilitates exchange of information and collective learning. The 
advantage of being local and of benefiting fi-om face-to-face contacts, social relations, 
and embedded institiutions and structures is widely known (Malecki 2000). The factor of 
proximity, according to Maskell, operates in two levels. First, it is the physical/natural 
geographical proximity that facilitates collaboration (especially when the knowledge is 
tacit) making its exchange cheaper, easier, faster. The second level is related to a social 
and cultural dimension (trust, understanding). 
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The socio-cultural dimension of proximity is dealing with the aspect of knowledge 
creation as a localised activity, embedded in the cultural context of the area (Maskell, 
1999). A shared social and cultural environment, from which develop common routines, 
norms and conventions which depend upon trust and the willingness to co-operate, 
enhance social interaction and communication (Amin, 1999). The local culture of some 
regions can operate as "internal" and facilitate knowledge creation and widespread 
learning (Malecki 2000). Social relations and corresponding institutions, at all levels of 
the state, help to promote knowledge creation in industrial networks between firms 
(Maskell, 1998). 
Furthermore, the increased importance of embedded tacit knowledge gives more credit to 
the importance of geography in the learning process. The concept of tacit knowledge was 
made widely known by Nonaka, who made a distinction between explicit (or codified) 
and tacit knowledge. The nature of tacit knowledge "is often collective rather than simply 
individual, locally produced and often place specific" (Hudson, 1999). One important 
feature of tacit knowledge is that it is not easily transferable or replicable. Tacit 
knowledge is embedded in people (on skills, routines etch.) rather than in written form. 
Therefore, it caimot be transferred easily and it can not easily be replicated elsewhere. 
Lawson (1998) is arguing that tacit knowledge because of the difficulty to be transferred 
in the absence of labour mobility may constitute a basis for sustainable regional 
competitive advantage. Therefore, tacit knowledge can reasonably be argued to account 
for the sustained competitive advantage of regions and corporations. 
This specific character of knowledge is used to explain the existence of agglomerations 
of related firms. The benefits of proximity can be seen in the ability of interchange of 
knowledge among firms that constitutes an important part of their competitive advantage. 
" The path-dependency and interactive character of knowledge is a key to the 
understanding of the contemporary emergence and reproduction of spatial 
agglomerations of related firms" (Maskell, 1998). Proximity and tacit knowledge are also 
used to explain the competitiveness of industrial districts. Nooteboom is arguing that 
variety and proximity (owing to the importance of tacit knowledge) encourage learning, 
which explain the competitiveness of industrial districts under a regime of globalisation. 
Lawson and Lorenz (1999), also, are trying to incorporate the notions of knowledge 
74 
creation and innovation into the theory of industrial districts. They are attempting to 
develop a notion of 'collective learning' among regional clustered firms that can help 
account for the innovative capabilities of high tech clusters. They are arguing that an 
important feature that differentiates fi-om the regional innovation system literature is that 
they turn for theoretical inspiration to micro level concepts developed in what can be 
broadly referred to as the capability or competence perspective of the firm. 
So, there is a debate whether it is the macro or micro level where 'collective learning' 
takes place and hence how important is the geographical proximity of firms for their 
competitiveness. For instance, Sternberg and Amdt (2000) disagree with the recent 
literature that gives credit to regional and national level for the explanation of the 
innovative behaviour of (European) firms. They argue instead that firm specific 
determinants are more important to the firm's innovation ability than external factors (as 
regional and national characteristics). 
Amin (2000a) does raise the question as to the degree to which innovation and learning 
are territorial properties. He emphasises communities of practice, which highlight the 
power of relational proximities and distances and defy the simple reduction of learning to 
geographies of place and space. He argues that codified and tacit knowledge become 
mobilised for competitive advantage through organisational spaces and their complex 
geographies, which blend action at a distance and local practices. Thus, he goes beyond 
the debate about geographical proximity as the source of (tacit) learning and he 
emphasises the importance of the relational assets of firms (Storper, 1997) in securing 
innovation and competitiveness. Whether these properties are geographically 
circumscribed or not may be a secondary issue, primarily due to the fact that effective 
learning and adaptation is the combined product of informal and formal knowledge, at 
both the local and global levels. Similarly, Hudson (2001) argues that instead of arguing 
over territorial and corporate knowledge production and learning we should rather 
explore the relationships between these two institutional bases of learning. 
According to Hudson competitive success is dependant on how companies combine 
knowledge and learning strategy rather than the strength of ties among firms and their 
networks or tacit and codified knowledge. Knowledge and learning are important assets 
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for firms following "strong" competition (i.e. competition that lies on innovation and 
differentiated strategies) rather than "weak" competition (based on price competition). 
VI.2 knowledge and internationalisation process of SMEs 
Knowledge and learning development are also very important assets for firms engaging 
in foreign markets (Johanson, 1994). According to Meyers (2000) most of the resources 
crucial for international business are knowledge-based. They include both general 
knowledge on how to do international business, and country-specific knowledge, such as 
knowledge on local markets, business practices and institutional conditions. 
Meyers (2000) studied the intemationalisation process of SME in the CEECs and found 
out that firms draw extensively upon partners in their home enviroimient for information, 
experience and support services. The knowledge that acquire through interaction with 
firms of their home environment is crucial especially in the first stage of the engagement 
into foreign markets. Indeed, most decisions on entry are based on knowledge and 
contacts. (Meyers 2000, p. 19). Especially when the firms investing are SME then the 
exchange of information and experience is of great importance. Unlike large 
multinationals SME rely very much on shared knowledge for their decision making. Even 
more when the investment takes place in countries with different economic, political and 
cultural environment, such CEECs. The east European countries representing an 
unknown, volatile and risky environment and therefore any source of information and 
knowledge is crucial in firms decision making. 
Several authors point to the special importance of network relations for firms doing 
business within Eastern Europe for creation and dissemination of knowledge (Pervez n 
Ghauri and Hemiksen 1994, Meyers 2000, Johanson 1994). By network Meyers (2000, 
p.7) means "long-standing relationships between legally independent firms, that exploit 
mutual complementarities and exchange information". These networks are generally 
based on mutual trust and/or common long-term interest and can work as a pool of 
information. Networks provide a knowledge-pool that grows with the experiences of the 
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partners and also can provide stimulus to pursue business opportunities. "Firms 
intemationalisation co-evolves with the intemationalisation of their networks, as they can 
draw upon resources in the network and react to opportunities arising with business 
partners"(Johansen 1994, p.8). 
Knowledge can be either objective (codified), which can be taught, or experiential which 
can be learned by experience (Johansen and Vahlens, 1977). The results from research 
contacted on SME investing in the CEECs show that practical experience is considered 
more important than formal knowledge. "Experiential knowledge, such as the 
understanding of a foreign business culture can be transferred through active 
involvement, preferably in the host country itself, but not in codified form"(Meyers 2000, 
p.6). Furthermore, information barriers can be overcomed easier by personal contacts. 
Therefore, personal and professional networks and socialising are essential because the 
practical knowledge is believed to be acquired by those actually engaged in business. 
Furthermore, codified information is provided by media, education and formal 
institutions such as champers of commerce. But for SMEs undertaking FDI in eastern 
Europe exchange of view and information with people in the business seems to be the 
most decisive factor for knowledge creation and decision making. 
Another important aspects in the intemationalisation process of SME is related to the 
influence of firms home environment in this process. Meyer's argues that in the case of 
SME their intemationalisation process is influenced by their domestic environment (i.e. 
cultural, institutional and economic environment). SMEs are embedded more than the 
large multinational in their domestic business environment. Therefore, decisions and 
practices of intemationalisation are influenced directly and indirectly by the home 
environment. 
Drawing from the above theories and empirical findings, the following chapter will 
attempt to shed some light on the Greek case of firms engaging in FDI activities in 
CEEC. The chapter will try to explain the process of how exchange of information and 
knowledge took place, what kind of networks developed, how decisions were made, what 
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type of competitive strategies followed and how the home enviroranent of the firms 
influenced the above process. 
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5. SECONDARY DATA ON F D I AND TRADE FLOWS 
L Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence on Greek FDI and trade with 
the CEECs and also to analyse and deepen our understanding of this economic process. 
The chapter is organised in the following way. The first part provides a general picture of 
Greek FDI in the CEECs. The amount of FDI, the type of investment, the sectors, and the 
firms are presented. The second section proceeds with a more detailed analysis of the 
Greek FDI by country and the major recipient countries of FDI are examined. The third 
part attempts to describe the geographical pattern of Greek FDI and comments on the 
possible regional impact. The fourth section of the chapter focuses on the evolution of 
Greek trade with the CEECs. Finally the last part of the chapter employs a more 
qualitative approach and drawing from the previous theoretical chapters attempts to 
analyse the qualitative aspects of FDI, explain and evaluate the phenomenon. 
At this stage is important to refer to the difficulties faced while collecting data on Greek 
FDI. The main problem is related to the fact that there is no official body in Greece that is 
responsible for collecting and processing data on FDI. In addition most of the host 
countries are also lacking these information centres, with the exception of Bulgaria. That 
creates serious obstacles in finding reliable sources on FDI flows coming from Greece 
towards CEECs. It is indicative that the official EU statistics, despite the provision of 
extensive data for all the rest of EU members, have no figures on FDI data emanating 
fi-om Greece. Therefore, after extensive search this paper had to be based on a collection 
of data coming from various sources, mainly secondary. However, although the data that 
has been collected is quite rich the disadvantage is that it does not exhibit continuity. 
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that a substantial amount of investment form Greece 
towards CEECs has been directed through Cyprus and Luxembourg. These numbers do 
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not appear in the official statistics as Greek investment. Thus, i f we take them into 
consideration the picture of Greek FDI might change considerably. 
Specifically, the data has been collected from a number of Greek institutions and 
international bodies and also by the Greek daily press and specialised magazines. The 
most important sources are the following: Chambers of Commerce and Industry of 
Thessaloniki, Inter-Balkan business centre (DIPEK), Ministry of National Economics and 
Finance (YPETHO), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), EBRD, Eurostat, Bulgarian 
Foreign Direct Agency (BFDA), Ambassador reports, Euroinfocentre, limited number of 
Interviews and collection of articles from specialised Greek magazines and newspapers. 
11. Greek FDI in the CEECs: the overall picture 
Since the demise of the Communist regimes in 1989, the CEECs have received a 
considerable amount of FDI. The transition of these countries into free market economies 
and the opening of their economies created many opportunities. The new conditions 
urged many Greek companies to take part in that process of investment. The phenomenon 
was unprecedented for the Greek business world. The Greek firms up to that moment 
used to restrict their activities within the borders of the country and not to undertake FDI. 
Most of them had neither the experience, know how or the economic assets for doing 
FDI. Therefore, the new phenomenon, the so-called "economic penetration" of the Greek 
firms to the CEECs attracted much attention and raised many hopes about the future of 
the Greek economy. However, the extent and the nature of Greek outward investment 
have not been explored thoroughly yet and many questions remain open about its impact 
on the Greek economy. 
The total Greek investment in the region is currently estimated at about $ 5bn according 
to Alpha Bank's economic research divisioa It is estimated that over the past seven years 
about 2000-3000*' Greek companies have set-up their operations across Eastern Europe 
to promote cross-border trade, including retailing and distribution operations, as well as 
more substantial amounts spent on acquiring and modernising manufacturing plants. The 
" Not all the companies are active. The number of active firms probably does not exceed 1500. 
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number is impressive on its own, and even more when someone takes into account the 
very poor record of previous Greek FDI before '90. However, this figure reflects mainly 
small-size investments. Indicatively the total amount invested by OTE, Greece's public 
telecom operator accounts for almost 1/5 of the total amount invested in the region. 
The majority of the investments are concentrated in the tertiary sector (47,2%) (with the 
exception of Albania), aiming more in the distribution and commercial activities and less 
in industrial ones (36%) (Labrianidis, 2000). Furthermore, the investments in 
manufacturing are concentrated in traditional sectors (food products, textiles, apparel and 
accessories) with most of them in the clothing industry. 
The telecom sector accounts for more than a billion dollars of investment in Albania, 
Bulgaria, the FYROM, Romania and Federal republic of Yugoslavia, mainly by the state-
controlled Greek state telecom (OTE) but also by private mobile operators (Panafon-
Vodafon). The next biggest group of investors are the banks, where National Bank of 
Greece has been the most aggressive in terms of establishing branches. Total Greek 
banking investment in the region amounts to more than $400 million (EFG Ergasias and 
commercial bank are active in Bulgaria and Alpha Bank in Romania). Just below banks 
and telecom in the ranking come the oil and energy sectors. Hellenic petroleum is the 
leader, whith more than $90 million already invested in FYROM, where it is building the 
Thessaloniki-Skopje oil pipeline, and in Albania (http://www.greece.gr/business'). 
Specifically, the ten leading Greek investors in the region are: 1. OTE 2. Hellenic 
Bottling Company ( Coca-Cola's Greek franchise holder) 3. Hellenic Petroleum 4. 
National Bank of Greece 5. Alpha Credit bank 6. Titan Cement 7.Mytillineos (metal 
trading group) S.Athenian Breweries (the Greek affiliate of Heineken) 9.Delta dairy 
(Greece's biggest dairy products and ice cream company) and 10. Chipita (snacks 
manufacturer). 
However, along with these few large companies there is a great number of very small to 
medium size business that set up their operations in the CEECs during the last 10 years. 
Those were initiated by small retailers, distributors and/or manufacturers and they do not 
have much to exhibit in terms of size or invested capital. However, it was mainly those 
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small entrepreneurs who attempted to do business first in the CEECs, choosing mainly 
their close neighbourhood. 
The first wave of Greek outward investment toward the Eastem European countries 
initiated in 1989, immediately after the collapse of the communist regimes. Specifically 
Greek firms were among the first ones that opened the doors of South Eastem European 
markets. During the first years of the transition it was mainly small (trading and 
manufacturing) firms that took the risk to invest in a very risky environment. In 
subsequent years, they have been followed by larger Greek companies that have become 
some of the leading foreign investors in the region. Therefore it is argued that the first 
years there was an element of opportunism and experimentation in many of the Greek 
investments while the second wave of FDI that followed was characterised by more 
maturity and included some very important investments by large Greek companies 
(Nautemporiki 1997). 
The volume of the Greek investment has not been equally distributed throughout CEECs. 
A clear distinction of Greek FDI can be drawn between Balkan and non-Balkan 
countries. Specifically, he vast majority of the Greek investment has been concentrated in 
four Balkan countries (Bulgaria, Albania, FYROM and Romania) (Table 5-1). On the 
other hand the Greek FDI to the non-Balkan countries has been marginal (Dimelis & 
Gatsios 1995, Financial Times 1998). 
The first country to receive Greek FDI was Bulgaria in 1989, afterwards Albania and 
Russia and since 1994 the wave of Greek outward investment expanded to the rest of the 
CEECs (Labrianidis 1999). At this stage Bulgaria remains the biggest host country 
concentrating 41.1% percent of the total invested amount followed by Albania and 
Romania (20.3 each). Russia, as well is a significant recipient of Greek investment and to 
a lesser extent Poland, FYROM, Ukraine and Yugoslavia (Labrianidis 2001). 
The impressive concentration of the Greek FDI in the Balkan countries, at the same time 
when these countries receive little investment comparing to the rest of the CEECs renders 
Greece a very important economic actor in the area of south East Europe. Table 5-2 
demonstrates the concentration of FDI in few CEECs. Precisely, it is the Visegrad 
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countries that have attracted most of the FDI. While, on the other hand Balkan's share in 
the total investment in the CEECs accounts only for 13% (Figure 1). 
The relative small size, the poor economic conditions (table 5-3) and the unstable 
environment in the Balkan region discouraged many large multinational companies. 
Large multinational companies considered the risks too high and the markets too small. 
Thus, they choose to place their investments in more promising markets like those of 
Poland, Hungary and Chech Republic. 
On the contrary the Greek companies have been attracted by the Balkan region. Greek 
companies limited resources and inexperience in FDI prohibited them from attempting 
big ventures beyond their neighbourhood. They were aware that their competitive 
advantages were limited outside the region of the Balkans. Therefore, they focused in an 
"easier" environment were they had more chances to compete successfully. Those two 
factors in combination; the relative indifference of the international investors in the 
Balkans in accordance with the active involvement of that same investors in Central 
Europe combined with the limitations of Greek management, lead into a Greek focus and 
a leading position in the Balkans (Kamaras, 2001). 
Consequentiy, Balkans have become an area of great importance for the Greek 
investment activity. Therefore, the following section will provide a detailed analysis of 
the Greek investment activity in the Balkans by country. 
table 5-1 Cumulative Greek invested capital and number of firms in 4 Balkan countries 
Country Value million $ Number of firms 
registered 
Albania 100 300 
Bulgaria 489 1700 
FYROM 230 150 
Romania 500 1679 
Total 1319 3829 
Source: Oikonomhkh kathimerinh, 04/08/99), YPETHO (Ministry of national Economy) 
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Table 5-2 FDI to Central and Eastern Europe 
Central/Eastern 






inflow as per 
capita 1989-
2000 
FDI 1989-2000 as per 
cent of total to region 
Albania 546 161 0.005762 
Bulgaria 3152 386 0.033265 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
307 75 0.00324 
Croatia 3984 885 0.042045 
Czech Republic 19424 1884 0.204992 
Estonia 1882 1307 0.019862 
FYR Macedonia 368 184 0.003884 
Hungary 19420 1935 0.20495 
Latvia 2400 1016 0.025328 
Lithuania 2307 626 0.024347 
Poland 29052 751 0.306601 
Romania 6768 303 0.071426 
Slovakia 3611 669 0.038109 
Slovenia 1534 768 0.016189 
Total 94755 782 1 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
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Figure 1 Balkans Share on FDI, Source: EBRD 
Table 5-3 GDP in Central Eastern Europe and the Baltic states 




Czech Republic 4909 
Estonia 3409 









Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
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III. FDI by country 
III.l Bulgaria 
Bulgaria seems to be by far the most attractive country for Greek Investors. It is 
estimated that around 1700 companies are operating in Bulgaria according to Bulgarian 
ambassador in Greece (Kerdos, 17/02/2000). During the period 1991-1994 Greek 
investment in Bulgaria was very important, since Greece was the biggest investor there 
(70%). However things changed abruptly in 1994 when a huge German investment was 
realised, and Greece's share fell to 3.6% (Labrianidis, 1999). In 1996, Greece accounted 
for 6.2% of the total foreign investment (718.5 million dollars) in the country and ranked 
fourth after Germany (32.8%), Netherlands (9.7%) and Switzerland (7.9%) (OECD 1997, 
Foreign Investment Agency). In 1998, according to Naytemporiki 1998, the amount of 
FDI emanating from Greece accounted for 120 million dollars, \0% of the total foreign 
investment, and that made her the third most important FD investor of Bulgaria. 
According to recent estimations the total Greek invested capital in Bulgaria accounts to 
489 millions dollars and that renders Greece the second most important investor in the 
country after Germany (table 5.5). The picture of the Greek investment in Bulgaria has 
changed considerably during the last two years where large investments took place. That 
is demonstrated in the tables 5.4 and 5.5. Greece, in 1999 ranked 10* foreign investor in 
Bulgaria, representing only 3.3 percent of the total invested amount (table 5.4). While 
today officially is second and i f we take into consideration the Greek interest investment 
that goes through Cyprus and/or Luxembourg, that is not included in the official 
statistics, then it is the most important investor in the country (Dipek, Bulgarian business 
guide 2001). 
The majority of the investments are concentrated in the tertiary sector, aiming more in 
distribution and commercial activities and less in industrial ones. Furthermore, the 
investments in manufacturing are concentrated in traditional sectors (food products and 
beverages, textiles, apparel and accessories) with most of them in clothing industry. 
There are few large projects by Greek manufacturing companies. Most of the firms are of 
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very small size, are coming from Northern Greece and invest in the areas close to the 
borders (Labrianidis 1996, Naytemporiki 1998). 
It is estimated that the firms with Greek capital invested employ around 22.000 people in 
Bulgaria, with the majority of them working in southern Bulgaria for Greek clothing 
manufacturing firms. The number of these firms is arguable: Naytemporiki (1998) 
mentions that around 80 Greek clothing firms have moved in southern Bulgaria in order 
to exploit the cheap labour force of the area, while a report by the Financial Times (1998) 
rises the number to 200. 
The second most important sector of Greek investment is the sector of food and 
beverages. In this group belong the largest Greek enterprise in Bulgaria: Delta Dairy. 
Delta Dairy is the fourth largest investment in Bulgaria and has managed to dominate in 
the Bulgarian market of dairy products Other large Greek investment enterpises are 3E, 
Intracom, Tsipita and Latsis and Vardinogiannis group (Dimelis & Gatsios 1995, 
Naytemporiki 1998). 
Finally, this activity by Greek firms in Bulgaria is supported and facilitated by the 
presence of several Greek banks: Xios Bank, Ionian bank, National Bank of Greece. 
Table 5-4 FDI by country 1992-1999 (until 31/06/1999) 
Country Millions USD Companies number % value 
Germany 409.8 420 17.5 
Belgium 307.9 124 13.1 
Cyprus 184.9 200 7.9 
USA 150.9 285 6.7 
United Kingdom 145.9 172 6.2 
Holland 139.3 121 6 
Austria 119.4 275 5.1 
Spain 105.8 30 4.5 
Switzerland 83.1 120 3.5 
Greece 76.8 1.331 3.3 
Luxembourg 72.4 38 3.1 
Ireland 55.9 24 2.4 
Russia 50.2 604 2.1 
N. Korea 49.5 20 2.1 
Turkey 48.7 1664 2.1 
France 47.3 127 2 
Other 
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Total I 2.343.6 11.000 100 
Source: Foreign Investment Agency in Bulgaria, DIPEK (Inter-Balkan business centre) 
Table 5-5 FDI in Bulgaria by countries and by year in millions of USD 
Country 7992 1993 1994 7995 7996 7997 7998 7999 2000 2007* Total by 
countries 
GERMANY 0,11 56,63 111,43 16,16 53,10 31,44 55,7 101,3 72,3 20,32 518,5 
BELGIUM 0,00 0,14 0,30 10,02 0,79 264,39 31,22 66,22 39,80 0,014 413,1 
ITALY 0,01 0,22 5,17 2,27 1,19 0,42 2,06 23,02 339,70 8,02 382,1 
GREECE 0,16 5,08 2,97 29,79 14,55 16,10 3,33 14,91 241,1 161,67 489,7 
CYPRUS 0,33 1,19 0,39 1,40 7,51 20,55 109,09 108,91 -11,3 3,05 241,1 
USA 0,00 10,49 16,15 16,10 20,66 46,61 38,6 49,8 37,1 1,59 237,1 
AUSTRIA 13,03 1,02 14,66 1,39 12,07 12,46 46,91 23,39 88,8 37,75 251,5 
RUSSIA 0,31 1,35 2,27 15,05 14,37 2,01 14,84 103,74 50,8 0,13 204,8 
NETHERLAN 0,07 0,52 37,94 0,85 46,27 10,80 41,28 27,96 17,4 7,71 190,7 
DS 
UK 6,2 5.6 2,4 13,7 7,3 15,8 58,9 48,00 22,6 0,46 181 
TURKEY 0,00 9,84 1,26 13,74 7,26 9,87 23,76 39,39 19,5 0,65 125,3 
FRANCE 0,00 0,22 4,19 4,99 6,51 0,82 3,35 62,72 28,9 -0,49 111,2 
SPAIN 0,04 0,06 0,01 0,00 0,00 49,55 56,8 3,21 0,7 0,13 110,43 
SWITZERLA 0,38 6,69 0,24 7,87 23,08 31,36 6,58 13,13 15,0 13,53 117,8 
ND 
KOREA 0,00 0,00 0,26 0,20 22,31 22,90 1,78 2,81 6,6 0,22 57,1 
BAHAMAS 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 22,76 10,36 14,2 47,3 
LUXEMBOU 0,40 0,58 0,58 0,36 0,23 11,75 22,71 3,81 0,0 7,72 48,1 
RG 
IRELAND 0,00 0,00 0,02 17,40 0,18 5,21 0,97 3,72 1,0 143,02 171,5 
HUNGARY 12,26 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,68 1,68 2,0 0,52 17,2 
ISRAEL 0,00 0,03 0,93 0,02 1,45 0,01 0,03 13,84 0,00 0,14 18,2 
CZECH 0,00 0,00 0,05 2,34 2,28 4,68 0,58 0,09 0,00 25,77 35,92 
MALTA 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,12 0,09 0,09 8,9 0 0,5 0,02 9,72 
LIECHTENST 0,00 1,11 0,13 0,01 0,00 2,53 0,79 1,28 3,0 0,2 9,1 
BIN 
SWEDEN 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,03 1,42 2,36 0,94 1,57 0,3 1,47 8,1 
JAPAN 0,01 0,00 0,08 0,50 0,60 1,90 1,89 0 1,3 0,53 6,83 
DENMARK 0,00 0,00 1,07 0,02 0,00 1,12 1,58 0,33 1,3 0,01 5,41 
Total by years 34,42 102,37 210,86 162,63 256,36 636,16 619,96 806,10 1100,0 303,01 
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4231,917 













Figure 2: FDI in Bulgaria by countries 1992-2001 
Table 5-6 Greek hivestment in Bulgaria by Sector During 1992-1998 
Sector Period Value USD % 
Industry 1992- 1998 1.085.300.000 53.65 
Agriculture 1992- 1998 6.200.00 0.31 
Trade 1992- 1998 418.900.000 20.71 
Construction 1992- 1998 37.700.000 1.86 
Other Sectors 1992- 1998 62.000.000 3.07 
Transfer 1992- 1998 85.300.000 4.22 
Telecommunications 1992- 1998 20.000.000 0.99 
Tourism 1992- 1998 102.400.000 5.06 
Finace/Market 1992- 1998 205.000.000 10.13 
Total 2.022.800.000 
Source: DIPEK (Inter-Balkan business centre) 
IH.2 Albania 
Greece is the second most important investor in Albania with 100 USD millions invested 
capital (27% of the total investment) and 300 established companies. The top investor in 
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Albania is Italy with USD 200mln and 600 companies (Investment guide for Southeast 
Europe, 2001). 
The Greek investment activity has been supported actively by a) the 2601/98 
development law, that applies in the whole of Albania b) the Phare programme and c) by 
the plan for the reconstruction of Balkans 2000-2004 according to which the Greek 
government will support Greek business initiatives in Albania. 
Since 1992, the law 1890/92 (2601/98), which is supporting investments in Albania, has 
motivated a considerable number of Greek entrepreneurs to invest in the country. Most of 
them are located in the south and South-East part of the country where the Greek 
minority of Albania lives. Specifically 26.4% of the Greeks firms are located in Koritsa, 
16.1% in Argirocastro, 4.6% in Delvina and 22.9% in Saranda (DIPEK, Business guide 
for Albania) 
It is estimated the 300 Greek SMEs operating in Albania have created 7.400 jobs 
(DIPEK, 2001). However it should be mentioned that most of the investments are of 
small scale, and are directed to traditional sectors. The investments are mainly 
concentrated in the secondary sector (91,7%): 40% Clothing, 26% food industry, 10% 
tobacco processing, 8%i building materials and 4% footwear (Labrianidid 1996, 
Naytemporiki 1998). 
Table 5-7 Greek investment activity in Albania 
Year Value (million $) Number of firms 
1996 20.44 31 
1997 6.45 30 
1998 13.14 16 
2001 100 300 
Source: Greek Ministry of Economics, DIPEK (Inter-Balkan business centre) 
IIU FYROM 
Greece is the leading foreign investor in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
followed by Liechtenstein and Cyprus. (Investment guide for Southeast Europe, DIPEK). 
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In the case of FYROM the Greek investment belongs in the so-called second "mature" 
wave of investment. This delay of the investement activity occurred because of the 
embargo that was imposed to FYROM fi-om Greece as a reaction to the political 
problems that were created over the name of the new established state. However, 
relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have been 
steadily improving since the signing of the interim Accord between the two countries in 
September 1995. 
It is estimated that Greek firms have already invested around 230 millions USD. The 
number of the active firms varies from 50 (DIPEK, 2001) to 150 (Express, 23/11/1999) 
depending on the source. Nevertheless, what is obvious is that the average Greek 
investment in FYROM is much higher that the average investment in the Balkans. The 
Greek investment in FYROM is characterised by relatively large, "mature", investment 
projects. 
The majority of the investment is directed to the industry (60 million) while the second 
most important sector is Services. Finally, according to Express (23/11/1999) the jobs 
created by Greek investment amounts to 4000 and they are expected to be increased to 
5000 in the near feature. 
table 5-8 Greek FDI in FYROM 1996-30/06/1999 
Year Value USD % value 
1996 1.547.000 1.03 
1997 4.383.000 2.86 
1998 36.274.306 23.67 
1/1-30/06/1999 1.868.949 1.22 
Total (including other countries 153.249.131 
Source: Express 32o issue, results from the international Trade fair of Thessaloniki, ESYE, (National 
statistic service) DIPEK 
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IIL4. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
Yugoslavia has been traditionally the closest economic partner of Greece among the 
Balkan countries. However, during the turbulent years that followed the split of 
Yugoslavia the economic relations deteriorated and Greece suffered an economic loss. 
Today, although the crisis is not completely over, many prospects start to open up for the 
Greek business. Therefore, the Greek government that kept good relation with 
Yugoslavia during the conflict is aiming to re-establish and strengthen the economic 
relations between the two countries. At the moment it is estimated that 230 Greek firms 
are currently operating in Yugoslavia and the invested amount is approximately 1.4 
billion USD. Furthermore, the Ministry of the National Economy foresees an increase in 
Greek investment in the region of up to ten times its current level in a short space of time. 
It is expected the number o Greek firms to reach the 2000 or more in the near future. That 
is even more impressive when compare it to the 150 Greek firms that were operating in 
Yugoslavia up to June 1992 with total capital invested amounting to 29.9 million DM 
(http://www.acci.gr/trade/No20/63-68-pdf) 
Moreover, the Greek government has declared plans to provide 7.5 billion GRD (Greek 
Drahma) funding for the operation of the Stability Pact, which is based in Thessaloniki. 
At the same time, Greece has committed to fund Yugoslavia with 205 million EU over a 
five-year period in the context of the "Reconstruction of the Balkans" plan. The areas 
where investment will focus are infi-astructure, energy, transport, communications, 
tourism and agriculture. 
Table 5-9: FDI in Yugoslavia by country for the period 1996-1998 











Source: Investment guide for Southeast Europe, 2001 
III. 5 Romania 
According to a recent report from the Greek consulate in Romania, Greece accounts for 
7% of the total invested capital and is considered the 6'*' most important investor in the 
country (table 5-10). However i f in this number is added the investment of Greek interest 
that goes through Luxembourg, Cyprus and Ireland and also the large investment by OTE 
(which bought 35% of the Romanian 'RONTELECOM') as well as the investment by 3E 
then the total invested capital accounts for 1,2 billion USD and occupies one of the first 
three leading positions as an investor. 
In Romania the number of firms with participation of Greek capital has reached 1.700, 
however, it is estimated that the number of the active firms comes down to 500. Most of 
the Greek firms are of small size and they operate in trade, retailing and services with a 
relative absence in the manufacturing sector. There is furthermore an additional amount 
of Greek FDI, directed to the shipping industry, pending a clearance by the Romanian 
authorities. 
According to Romanian statistics the companies of Greek interests tend to concentrate 
mainly in Bucharest (77% of the total invested capital) while the second most important 
destination is the region of Timis (9.5%) followed by Konstanza 5.7%. 
Greek-owned banks were prominent in Romania before the second world war, financing 
Greek ship owners who dominated sailing routes across the Black Sea. Now, we see 
again some Greek banks investing in Romania. Banca Bucuresti, controlled by Alpha 
Credit, has established a network of nine branches and is the largest Greek FDI. 
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The ten most important Greek investment enterprises are: Banka Bukuresti (Alpha 
Credit) $7,6 million, Commercial Black sea bank (Emporiki) $5,9 million, Intracom $4,4 
million. Best foods productions $3,2 million, Croif Mister $2,2 million, Frigorex 
Romania 2,1 million, Delrom (Delta Dairy) 2,1 million, Apemin 1,6 million, Butan Gaz 
Romania 1,3 million and Star Foods $o,9 million (Naytemporiki 1998). 
Table 5-10 FDl in Romania by country up to November 2000 
Country Millions USD Percentage % 
France 818.4 11.5 
Germany 748.9 10.5 
Netherlands 706.5 9.9 
USA 662.9 9.3 
United Kindom 585.6 8.2 
Greece 500.1 7.0 
Total 7119.4 100 
Source: Report of the Greek consulate in Bucurest, 3075/2/336, 7/03/2001 
Table 5-11 Cumulative Greek investment activity: Number of firms by sector up to 1997 
Country Industry Trade 
Bulgaria 1439 1009 
Albania 735 660 
Romania 680 431 
F.R of Yugoslavia 238 345 
FYROM 159 189 
Slovenia 39 35 
Croatia 46 41 
Bosnia 20 21 
Total 3356 2731 
Source: Study "Investment in the Eastern Europe: Consequences for the Greek industry", Ministry of 
economic development, general secretary of industry (October 1997). 
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IV. Geographical distribution of the investment 
It is difficult to formulate a specific spatial pattern of Greek FDI, mainly due to lack of 
information. Nevertheless, the following broad observations have been made regarding 
the origins and the destination of Greek investment. 
First of all it is very obvious that, as was mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, there 
is a very strong concentration of Greek FDI in the Balkan countries. The Greek firms are 
represented very well in the Balkans but have a very poor record in the rest of CEECs. 
After all, "the role of geography (adjacency and proximity) seems to be a decisive factor 
affecting the allocation of Greek investment in the region"(Petrakos 2000). 
The majority of the Greek firms that contacted FDI in the CEECs tend to concentrate in 
the capital cities of the host countries (Bucurest 91.2%, Moscow 83.3%, Skopia % Sofia 
48.5% ) (Labrianidis 1998). The concentration in the cities is more common among the 
firms active in the tertiary sector. 
Looking on the above figures it is obvious that the tendency for concentration in the 
capital cities of the host countries is less strong in the countries close to the Greek borders 
(i.e. Bulgaria, FYROM, Albania) than in the others. That can be explained by 
geographical proximity. Many firms are attracted in the southern part of those countries 
taking advantage of the short distance with Greece. 
Thus in Bulgaria, a large number of Greek firms are concentrated in the cities of Petritchi 
and Blagoevrad in southern Bulgaria. This is the case mainly for Greek manufacturing 
firms in the clothing sector. As far as Albania is concerned there is also a strong 
concentration of Greek investment in the south of the country. This is mainly due to the 
close geographical and also cultural proximity. The south part of Albania is occupied by 
a Greek minority. Therefore, there is strong spatial concentration of Greek investment in 
the Greek -speaking regions of Argirkastro, Koritsa and Agioi Saranta. 
As far as the origin of the Greek firms is concerned, the majority of them are coming 
form Northern Greece. The proximity of firms of Northern Greece with the Balkans 
countries has worked as a strong incentive to establish operations especially in the south 
part of their neighbouring countries. 
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Regarding the rest of Greece, there is a significant number of firms emanating from the 
greater area of Athens (where the majority of Greek productive activity is concentrated). 
According to Labrianidis the Greek firms based in Athens are not equally sensitive to the 
proximity factor. Therefore they do not invest as much in the immediately close countries 
(as in Bulgaria Albania and FYROM). 
IV.l The regional impact 
Northern Greece is the region where the impact of the reforms has been felt most 
strongly. Since the early years of the reforms there were great expectations about their 
consequences on the region. Due to its geographical proximity to the Balkans, Northern 
Greece, was accepted to be the region which would enjoy most of the benefits. The 
demise of cold war barriers would allow Northern Greece once again to look northwards 
to what is often called by analysts as its "natural hinterland" (Kostopoulou, 1996). 
The benefits were expected to arrive first for the intensification of economic activity in 
the area. It was expected that the liberalization of previous "closed" economies of the 
Balkans would give a great boost for the local producers by enabling them to trade, co-
operate, establish business and take advantage of the cheap labour force of the Balkans. 
Furthermore, the whole region of Northern Greece and especially its capital, 
Thessaloniki, was expected to play a significant role as commercial center of the Balkans. 
Based on its geographical location, a glorious past and its economic strength, 
Thessaloniki was claimed to become a central trading point and a transit center. This 
argument is further supported by the choice of the city as a headquarters by several 
private and public organization related to the reconstruction of the Balkans. 
However there is a great element of exaggeration in the statement that Thessaloniki is 
"bound to become" the metropolis of the Balkans. Thessaloniki has undisputable 
advantages as a major capital city in Northern Greece but nevertheless we should apply 
some scepticism about the alleged benefits and economic prospects for the city and the 
whole region. 
Indicatively, there are signs of negative consequences on the regional level related with 
job loss in the region. Specifically, the region of Drama (which borders with Bulgaria) 
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suffered a serious job loss during 1988-1996. That was mainly due to local firms 
relocating their operation to Bulgaria and to a lesser extent to Albania. Similarly in the 
region of Thrace according to official estimation there was a loss of approximately 6000 
jobs in the textile and clothing sector due to closures and relocation of firms in the 
Balkans (60% in Bulgaria, 20% in Rumania and 10% to Turkey) (interview 1) 
Furthermore, another negative aspect fi-om a regional perspective is that the Greek firms 
that invest abroad return only a small fi-action of the value added back to Greece, either in 
the form of capital, profit, import of raw material etch. The links also of the Mother 
company and the subsidiary are very loose (Interview 1). 
However, at the same time it is estimated that the policy of FDI of Local firms can prove 
beneficial for the region since can it save also a considerable number of jobs that could 
have been lost anyhow.The factory Falcon (based in Comotini, Thrace) saved 400 jobs 
while at the same time created 1000 outside Greece. "The 400 would get lost i f the firm 
didn't relocate in FYROM and Bulgaria" (Interview 1). 
Overall the prospects for the region of Northern Greece are optimistic, based either on 
real or "created" competitive advantages of Greece over its neighbouring Balkan 
countries. 
V. Trade between Greece and the CEECs 
Along with the FDI flows it is very interesting to observe the trade flows between Greece 
and the CEECs since 1989. Although an in-depth analysis of trade relation would be 
beyond the limits and purposes of this chapter, it is considered useful to present the trend 
of trade flows between Greece and the CEECs. Observing the trade pattern between 
Greece and the CEECs can be very indicative of the scale of the changes that took place 
in the economic relations between Greece and CEECs since the initiation of the reforms. 
Lastly and the most important, is interesting to explain the impressive increase of trade 
flows between Greece and CEECs and maybe see the linkage between trade and FDI 
processes. 
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V.l The evolution of Greek trade with the CEECs after 1989 
The evolution of Greek trade with the CEECs after 1989 is given in Table 5-12 and 
Figures 1, 2 and 3. We can clearly observe amazing changes in the trade pattern of 
Greece with CEECs. What really stands out is the reversal in the trend of Greek exports 
to the CEECs. Between 1989 and 2000 exports rose steadily at an annual growth rate of 
around 140%. Notably, in the same period, Greek exports to its European partners 
declined. Another very important observation is that the Balance of Trade (BOT) with the 
CEECs has been improved in Greece's favour, up from a deficit of 185 millions ECU in 
1989 to a surplus of 629 million ECU in 2000. 
Table 5-12 Trade between Greece and CEECs (million ECU) 
Exports 'ndex Imports Index BOT RX% RM% 
1989 191 100 376 100 -185 2.78 2.5 
1990 169 88.48 339 90.16 -170 2.7 2.18 
1991 277 145.03 466 123.94 -189 3.95 2.68 
1992 373 195.29 390 103.72 -17 4.89 2.05 
1993 720 376.96 460 122.34 260 
1994 765 400.52 571 151.86 194 9.67 3.16 
1995 887 464.40 721 191.76 166 10.49 3.64 
1996 1,144 598.69 828 220.11 316 12.40 3.72 
1997 1,414 740.16 1,065 283.11 349 14.16 4.48 
1998 1,404 735.25 1,059 281.58 346 14.49 3.92 
1999 1,551 812.23 1,010 268.54 542 15.77 3.84 
2000 2,152 1,126.62 1,523 404.96 629 18.45 5.04 
Sources: Eurostat and my calculations 
By the examination of the data we can see that the value of Greek exports to the CEECs 
(in million ECU) has increased in the period 1989-2000 by 1,127%, accounting, in 2000, 
for 18.45 of total Greek exports. This change is extremely impressive, still we should 
mention here that after 1992 the following countries were added in the group of CEECs: 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, after 
1992 the increase is partly due to the addition of these countries. This is reflected in the 
rapid expansion of trade between the years 1992-1993. The value of exports increased 
from 373 (million ECU) in 1992 to 720 in 1993, that means that between these years 
there was an increase of exports equal to 93%. This increase is important in the overall 
understanding of the evolution of trade but nevertheless does not change the main 
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argument that is since 1989 Greek exports to the CEECs exhibit a remarkable dynamism. 
This observation becomes even more important when we compare it with the 
performance of Greek exports to the EU. 
Table 5-13 Trade between Greece the EU and non EU (million ECU 
Intra EU Extra EU 
Exports Index mports ndex RX% R M % B O T Exports [mports B O T 
1989 4,706 100 9,717 100 69.2 66.46 -5,011 2,095 4,903 -2,808 
1990 4,242 90.14 10,547 108.54 68.01 67.69 -6,307 1,995 5,036 -3,041 
1991 4,704 99.96 11,101 114.24 67.72 63.95 -6,397 2,242 6,257 -4,015 
1992 5,212 110.76 12,221 125.77 68.70 66.47 -7,009 2,375 6,166 -3,792 
1993 4,247 90.24 11,843 121.88 58.91 63.00 -7,596 2,962 6,956 -3,993 
1994 4,516 95.96 12,276 126.33 57.13 67.90 -7,760 3,389 5,805 -2,415 
1995 5,080 107.95 13,879 142.83 60.11 70.10 -8,799 3,371 5,921 -2,550 
1996 4,975 105.73 14,328 147.45 53.95 64.42 -9,352 4,247 7,912 -3,664 
1997 5,078 107.92 15,432 158.81 50.85 65.01 -10,354 4,908 8,306 -3,397 
1998 5,216 110.83 17,732 182.48 53.81 65.62 -12,516 4,478 9,289 -4,812 
1999 5,074 107.81 17,401 179.08 51.57 66.19 -12,328 4,764 8,887 -4,124 
2000 5,061 107.55 17,744 182.61 43.40 58.73 -12,683 6,600 12,471 -5,871 
Sources: Eurostat and my calculations 
The high growth rate of Greek exports contrasts sharply with the quite smaller growth 
rate of Greek imports from the CEECs. Partly due to the difficulties of the transition 
process, Greece has increased its exports faster than its imports. As a result, its balance of 
trade (BOT) has turned from negative to positive in the period 1993-2000. This is a very 
important observation since, the permanent negative, Greek balance of trade is one of the 
main problems of the country. Now, in the last few years the asymmetry in the growth 
rate of exports and imports has led to a surplus in the Greek trade balance. In 1993 the 
Greek BOT was 260 ECU millions surplus and it reached the 629 ECU millions in 2000. 
V.2 Geographical distribution of trade 
Although the performance of Greek exports appears to have improved in extraordinary 
pace during the last few years with the CEECs, the picture is changing when we see it in 
a different perspective. The extraordinary performance that Greece exhibits in the above 
table is due to its very good performance mainly in the Balkan countries. In relative terms 
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Greece is still a minor trading partner for most of the CEECs. Greece's share in total EU 
trade with the CEECs is negligible comparing to other EU members. 
Greek exports exhibit a significant dynamism in the Balkan countries comparing to the 
Visegrad, which happen to be the main players in the East-west trade. In overall we can 
claim that there is a dichotomy between Greece's trade performance with the Balkans and 
the rest of the CEECs in favour of the first. 
The above observation might be an indication that geography is, after all, an important 
factor that affects the trade performance of a country. The explosive expansion of trade 
with the Balkan countries, comparing with the Visegrad, indicates that economic, 
geographical, historical, cultural and other factors in operation favour trade in the Balkan 
region (Petrakos 1996). Finally it should be mentioned that an interest research topic 
would be to examine the relation between trade and FDI flows. 
Table 5-14 Greek trade balances with Balkan countries (Prices in million USD) 
Country ]995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000* 
Albania 223,7 228,0 214,9 157,1 183,1 12,8 
Bulgaria -36,5 -58,8 -97,5 57,4 61,4 5,2 
Romania 46,2 30,2 -27,9 28,2 5,0 -2,6 
Bosnia -1,0 0,9 3,3 3,8 9,8 1,25 
Croatia -0,4 3,2 20,8 6,9 -4,8 0,65 
Yugoslavia 20,7 91,2 68,7 93,1 53,3 5,0 
FYROM 28,4 193,7 212,2 201 364,6 40,5 
Slovenia 14,7 -14,1 -5,2 -4,9 -0,3 0,36 
Total 295,8 431,8 389,3 542 672 63.2 
Source Greek National statistics Service-Ministry of the national Economy (in 
http://www.acci.gr/trade/No20/63-68.pdf) (* First quarter/provisional figures). 
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V.3 Explaining trade flows 
Many of the studies about the direction of trade rely on the so-called "gravity" model. 
The fundamental point of this model is that the volume of trade flows is very much 
determined by the physical distance between areas. The gravity model is considered a 
useful tool in explaining the pattern of international tiade flows and has been used to 
estimate the effects of economic reforms in central and eastern Europe. According to the 
model the increase of trade between Greece and the CEECs can be explained by the 
proximity between the areas. 
A research done by Dimelis and Gatsios (1995) tried to estimate the potential trade flows 
between Greece and the eastern European countries, within the prospects of an integrated 
European market, based on a gravity model. According to the results the prospects for 
trade between Greece and the CEECs, within the prospects of a more integrated CEECs 
in the European market, appeared very promising. An EC gravity model has been used 
also by the Commission of European Communities (CEC, 1993) in order to estimate the 
impact on the EC regions of tiade generated by economic reforms in Eastern countries. 
The gravity model made the assumption that the physical distance between the regions is 
the primary determinant of the volume of tiade flows. Therefore Greece was predicted to 
be the main recipient of the gains, among the less developed regions of EU. Similarly, 
more recent researches (Egger, 2001) are also predicting economic profits and increase 
on tiade flows for Greece mainly due to its close geographical proximity with eastern 
European countries. Overall, it can be argued the impressive performance of Greek tiade 
with the CEECs can be explained quite satisfactory by the gravity-model predictions. 
However, a further explanation can be added to this one, looking more at the real 
processes and connecting the FDI process with that of tiade. Kamaras (2001) has been 
arguing that the impressive increase of Greek exports to CEECs lies on the economic 
activity of those Greek entrepreneurs that build distribution networks and created 
linkages between Greece and CEECs. Behind the extiaordinary performance of Greek 
exports lies the activity of those Greek entrepreneurs (primarily small to medium sized 
merchants-distributors), businessmen that had been marginalised in Greece, who 
established a presence in the countries of the region in the very early years. "In the 
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absence of the population of merchants-distributors the average Greek exporting 
company would have stayed inactive" (Kamaras, 2001, p . l 1). 
According to kamaras the average Greek exporting firm would not have been able to 
materialise exports because it lacked the managerial and financial resources to establish 
distributorship. Furthermore it was also unable to evaluate, take risks and approach the 
local private sector and finally was unwilling to deal with the illegal environment that 
characterised the early years of the reforms. 
Therefore, according to Kamaras approach the frade activity is part of broader network of 
economic activity of Greek entrepreneur and very closely interrelated to the foreign 
investment activity. The following section is tiying shed some light in the process of FDI, 
locate whom where those entrepreneurs that engaged in FDI, what type of strategies they 
followed, the channels through knowledge was disseminated and how the process of FDI 
has developed over time. 
VT, Qualitative aspects of FDI 
The purpose of this section is to provide a more in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of 
Greek FDI. It will attempt to explain why and how it started and to provide explanations 
as well as an evaluation of the phenomenon. Several qualitative aspects of the Greek FDI 
are discussed. Specifically, the issues that are raised in this section concern the process of 
FDI, the reasons that urged Greek firms to invest (pull and push factors), the factors that 
enable them to invest, the nature of investment, contributed in the success/failure, the 
type of the firms invested, their sustainability and the possible consequences for the 
Greek economy. 
VI.I Why do Greek companies invest in the CEECs: the pull and push factors 
It is justifiable to initiate this discussion by asking why Greek firms wanted to invest in 
the CEECs in the first place. What urged them to contact FDI in those countries? 
According to a survey conducted by Labrianidis (1999) the reasons that urged the Greek 
firms to invest in the CEECs can be divided into two categories: push and pull factors. 
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The Push factors are those that push them outside the Greek market. Those are the 
saturation of the Greek market and intensification of competition mainly due to import 
penetration and the deteriorating competitive advantage that firms had over the labour 
cost (especially in the those labour intensive sectors i.e. clothing and footwear industry). 
The Greek firms competitiveness has been deteriorating gradually for many years. The 
entrance of Greece in the EU and the gradual abandoning of the protective measures 
exposed Greek firms to an intense competition that they were not well prepared to face. 
Therefore, many Greek producers that were facing serious problems with selling their 
products in the EU could find a relatively easy outlet for their products in the CEE 
countries. Especially the Balkan region represented a new regional market where they 
could relatively easily sell their products since those markets were not mature yet and the 
Greek firms could compete successfully on the base of low-cost products. Furthermore, 
for many producers the Balkans represented the solution for their lost competitive 
advantage of low labour cost in the country. 
On the other hand, several pull factors attracted the Greek firms to invest abroad, those 
are the following: a) the possibility of lowering the production cost by reducing the 
labour cost (which for many labour intensive industries is very important), b) The 
possibility of exploitation of raw material (such as mineral, agricultural or animal 
products) aiming either to produce there (for the local market or for exports) or to import 
them in Greece for the needs of the firm, c) The rush of some firms to invest first in order 
to get a good position in the market (especially for consumer goods such as ice-creams 
and beverages), d) In order to avoid problems with customs or any other problems in the 
importation, e) To take advantage of the good linkages with the other CEECs, and use 
them as platforms for their export activities to other CEECs f) the fact that the are still 
new, undefined markets, which means that the Greek firms would have the opportunity to 
compete on the cost basis rather than in quality. Finally the first flow of Greek firms was 
followed by other that followed their customers (such as banks, insurance companies, 
packaging firms). 
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VL2 Competitive advantages of Greek firm 
The question that follows is related to the factors that allowed the Greek firms to invest 
successfully in the CEECs. The Greek firms had to have some competitive advantages 
over the local companies as well as to the other foreign competitors in order to be able to 
establish successful investment projects. 
One of the factors that facilitated the successfiil investment activity of the Greek firms 
was the relatively indifference of large foreign companies towards the Balkan Market 
during the early years of transition. As was mentioned in the beginning of this chapter 
and supported by table 5.1, the Balkan Market due to its small size, weak purchasing 
power and slim prospects for the future was unattractive for the large investing 
companies. The mass market was expected to remain poor beyond the planning horizons 
of most of the multinationals (Dawar N & Chattopaddhyay 2000). Therefore, the Greek 
firms faced a relatively reduced competition at least in the first years of transition in the 
whole area of the Balkans. 
Secondly, it is claimed by Kamaras (2001) that the MNCs suffered from diseconomies of 
scale compared to the Greek firms. "For an MNC to...internalise essentially regional and 
local expertise and regional and local entrepreneurship on a global scale, it is often 
impossible. In that respect diseconomies of scale are an ever-present danger for ever the 
most well run MNC". A proof might be the fact that many MNCS have chosen to enter 
the Balkans through their Greek subsidiaries and partners. 
Labrianidis (1999) also maintains that Greek firm's familiarity with the unstable 
environment of the Balkans was a great advantage over the large MNCs. Furthermore, 
the Greek firm's structure, small family-run type, paradoxically proved to be an 
advantage regarding the speed of response and decision making. Greek firms were more 
flexible, decisions could be taken faster and the involved risk was smaller. Another 
advantage of Greek firms was the fact that could combine host and home country assets. 
An excellent example of that was the use of a relatively cheap skilled labour force from 
Greece. Finally one factor that was of great significance was the close proximity of 
Greece with the Balkan countries. 
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As far as local firms are concerned, Greek firms were far superior in terms of available 
capital, know-how and linkages with the western markets (Labrianidis, 1999). However, 
it is significant to mention that the competitive advantages of Greek firms over the locals 
are weakening over time. Host firms are improving, learning and adapting to the firee 
market conditions and might become significant competitors for the Greek companies in 
the near future. 
VI.3 Characteristics of FDI: type and control mode 
Another question that is raised is about the nature of the assets that Greek entiepreneurs 
have acquired in the region. Since most of the host countries companies are facing 
serious problems (organisation structure, obsolete machinery) it is justifiable to query 
about the worth of the asset attained by the Greek investors. This can be answered by 
looking into the type of investment done and the reason that lie behind it. 
As far as the type of investment three main classification can be made according to the 
main objective of the investment itself: Exporers, Local suppliers and Distributors, while 
the three main control mode categories are: wholly owned. Joint venture and Licensing-
franchising. 
The majority of the Greek companies prefer to do joint ventures with local producers. 
That depends on several factors that are behind the general stiategy of FDI. By choosing 
this type of investment firms "can reduce transaction cost as the local firm not only 
contiols key assets but is embedded in local networks and labour markets" (Kamaras 
2001). In other words they can use the existing network, enjoy a privilege position (the 
local labour pool/relations) and avoid problems that would have to face as foreigners 
(bureaucracy, foreign language, ignorance of the legal system). This type of stiategy is 
mainly followed in the food, beverage and tobacco sectors where the above 
considerations are important. 
Another category of firms is that seeking for resources, like the extraction sector. In this 
case an early entry can be of crucial importance. Therefore, "Greek companies have also 
been active acquisition-wise in the cement sector and in the metal extiaction and 
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processing. Two classical examples of companies of this kind are Titan (cement) and 
Mytilinaios (metal processing and frading). 
Finally, there are companies that follow their customers wherever they go. For example 
the banks followed a customer-follower tactic. "We followed companies we had backed 
in Greece into the Balkans...that turned out to be a wise policy, given the problems the 
neighbouring countries faced with economic fransition" (Angelos Plakopittas, chief 
executive of Global Finance) 
In the first two cases the replacement of the technological equipment is easy and it is a 
common tactic for firms to use old equipment of the parent companies in Greece (57.4%) 
or to purchase new equipment in Greece (35.3%). The consequences from both actions 
are positive for the Greek economy (Labrianidis). Greek firms invest in order to enjoy 
spillover benefits and use those countries as platforms for their expansion. 
VI.4 Characteristics of the firms investing in the CEECs 
Finally, one more issue open for investigation is about the nature of the firms that have 
invested in the CEECs. What type of firms are those that took the risk and the initiative to 
invest in the CEECs? What were their sfrategies and what are the possible consequences 
of this? 
At a first look a broad division can be made between two major groups of investors. On 
the one end of the scale, there are small trading companies, retailers and clothing 
manufacturing firms (almost exclusively from Northern Greece) that relocate part of their 
operation in countries such as Bulgaria and Albania in search of a cheap labour force. 
While on the other, there are some of the largest Greek banks, fast growing firms in food 
industry and big service companies that saw the opening up of CEECs as an opportunity 
to expand their business and become the multinationals of the Balkan region. It is mainly 
the latter group that creates many expectations about the future of the Greek economy 
and the role that can play in the Balkan Peninsula. 
The latter group of companies has been sfrengthened in the last decade by a process of 
mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, the comparative advantages that they have 
compared both with local producers (possession of capital and know-how) and foreign 
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investors (geographical proximity and better familiarity with the environment) gave them 
the potential of economic penetration in CEECs and especially in the area of Balkans. 
Those companies are presenting a very dynamic profile, investing widely in CEECs and 
arguing that the investment in those countries is not merely an opening to new markets 
but a strategic movement to become a " regional power" in the area of Southeast Europe 
(To Bima, 8/11/1998). 
On the other hand the majority of the Greek FDCs are characterised by small size, little 
invested capital, and lack of long run strategic plan. Furthermore most of those small 
companies have been relying on a cheap labour cost and the trade of low-price and 
relatively poor-quality products (Labrianidis 1997). Therefore, this type of investment 
has been criticised for not making a significant contribution into Greece's economic 
development and competitiveness. On the contrary, it has been claimed they are focusing 
only on the temporary, short -term gain and that their life cycle can be very small since 
they do not have strategic plans (Express, Hellenews July 1998). 
This type of firms were dominating especially during the early years after the reforms 
(1989-1993). During this period it was very common the phenomenon of "entrepreneurs" 
who sought short-term profits with no long-term investment perspectives, an "El Dorado" 
approach. 
Another characteristic of the majority of Greek companies investing in the Balkans is its 
weak connections with Greece. According to a survey in Bulgaria, many small firms tend 
to have no affiliate with a company in Greece or to have very loose relations. The same 
survey reveals that many companies of Greek interests have no parent company in 
Greece. That is interpreted to very few links/connection with the Greek economy. 
Consequentiy, in this case the benefits for the Greek economy are expected to be minimal 
(Labrianidis et al 2001). Similar worries are shared by lamarino and Pitelis according to 
whom the impact of FDI in Greece depends crucially on the strategies followed by the 
FDIs. 
That is a very common phenomenon in the clothing sector, where firms are relocating all 
or part of the operations to the Balkans in order to find a cheap labour force. This strategy 
however has lead, at least for the short-run, to significant unemployment in certain areas 
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(As in Drama -prefecture of N.Greece-). Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
perpetual search of cheap labour, and cutting down of cost might prove to be a 
problematic tactic in the future. Therefore Labrianidis questions whether the investment 
of those firms offer any benefit for Greece at all. 
However, a different view is presented by Kamaras (2001). Although Kamaras does not 
deny the obvious difference between the two groups he disagrees with the "crude" 
dichotomy on short-termist, opportunistic action and the long-term sustainable business 
strategies. Particularly he claims that the dichotomy between short-termist, opportunistic 
action and long-term sustainable business strategies misses the mark. 
Kamaras, stresses the positive aspects of small firm activity and its contribution in the 
overall economic activity of the Greek business community. He argues that both types of 
investment are part of the same process and he emphasises the importance of those small-
scale investments especially in creating links/channels for trade and fixrther investment. 
He argues that those investments should be examined in the context of "a social setting 
which makes available substantial resources and opportunities; a social setting in the 
absence of which resources and opportunities would simply not exist" (Kamaras, 2001, 
p. 11). This kind of network developed between Greek enterpreneuers is evident in the 
process of knowledge and decision making that took place in the first stage of 
investment. 
VI.5 Learning process and decision making 
As explained in the fourth chapter, knowledge is a very significant asset for firms 
engaging in FDI activities. Especially when the foreign investment is directed to a 
country like the CEECs where the environment is unknown, volatile and involves high 
degree of risk then knowledge plays a crucial role. 
Therefore, the Greek entrepreneurs investing in the CEECs for first time had a strong 
desire to apprehend the changes that there were taking place in those countries and to 
acquire knowledge on the local circumstances. It was due to this eagerness to gain 
understanding of the new conditions, evaluate the new environment, and identify 
opportunities that lead to the learning process to take place. In the case of the Greek 
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firms, characterized by small size and limited financial and managerial capabilities, this 
knowledge could not be an outcome of a single firm's research. Sharing and exchange of 
information was of great importance. Therefore, a significant exchange of knowledge and 
experience was shared between Greek entrepreneurs. 
Kamaras (2000) is arguing that significant knowledge was acquired by the first wave of 
FDI contacted by small Greek traders. The experience gained by those first investors 
allowed know-how to be built and to be transferred throughout the Greek community. 
Specifically he claims that "extensive knowledge was accumulated on the purchasing 
power and evolving consumer preferences of the market in question as well as on 
regional variations" (kamaras 2000, p. 10). Familiarity was also gained. This knowledge 
and experience played an important role in the decision-making of Greek firms especially 
during the first years of investment activity. 
The learning process followed mainly informal charmels. Linkages were established 
between the first investors and their co-nationals both on a personal and on a corporate 
level. However, knowledge was mainly acquired through face to face contacts and an 
informal way of socialising. Despite the formal learning through champers of commerce, 
public and private institution and education the learning process took place through 
socialising and exchange of views and experiences between people in the business. 
Airports, border crossing, restaurants and bars acted as meeting points were this place 
type of knowledge-generating socialising took place. 
Gradually, since the mid-1990s onwards the investment opportunities changed and the 
learning process often took more advanced/mature form. One of the most important ways 
of sharing knowledge was through corporate partnership. Kamaras mentions the example 
of three corporate alliances, 3E and Athinaiki Zythopiia, Delta and Chipita, Kavex and 
North Greece Canneries, in order to exhibit how corporate alliances reinforce internal 
learning process for a company. 
Geographical proximity played a very significant role in this process of learning. It made 
easier cheaper and faster the interaction and exchange of information to take place. 
Geographical proximity made possible for investors, which often had their base in cities 
of Northern Greece, just few hours drive from several Balkan capitals, to establish a 
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rapport and operationalise a partnership with Greek-based companies and Greek 
executives. Together with the physical proximity social and cultural closeness with the 
Balkan attitudes and norms facilitated the exchange of information. 
VII. FDI and the Greek institutional and corporate environment 
The decisions and corporate strategies adopted by Greek firms and their competitiveness 
could be explained partly fi-om the existing socio-economic environment and the Greek 
corporate culture. 
As it was demonstrated in the firm's theory chapter the socio-cultural and institutional 
structures are considered to play a significant role in the competitiveness of the firm. The 
importance of the firm's environment on its competitiveness and behaviour has been 
stressed also in the previous chapter by several authors (Saxenian, Amin, Oinas etc.). 
Especially, when we are dealing with SME contacting FDI, like the majority of Greek 
firms, then they tend to be embedded more than large multinationals in their domestic 
business environment and their practices and decisions are influenced by the home 
environment (Meyers, 2000). 
Overall, the Greek economic environment is very demanding and uncertain. The Greek 
economy is marked by low 'structural competitiveness' in the sense of loosing its 
competitiveness in the advanced international markets. Many firms base their operation 
on state support (i.e. public procurements, public grants, etc) while innovative sectors are 
underrepresented in the economy. Furthermore Greece lacks a developed network of 
company support schemes and the services provided by those schemes that exist leave 
much to be desired (i.e research institute. Public/local authorities schemes, consulting 
companies etc). 
Furthermore, the Greek state is characterised by weak civil society. As Tsoukalas (1993) 
argues, the everyday Greek experience of work systematically cultivates "anti-reformist" 
values and attitudes, while reinforcing corruption, clientelism and personalised 
reciprocities. This value mix hinders severely the implementation of modernizing 
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reforms while the solid networks of personalised relationships that fosters are of low 
restricted trust in nature. 
There is lack of community spirit and low trust between the public and private sector. 
Furthermore, the industrial culture is mainly characterised by individualism and mistrust. 
The majority of Greek firms are characterised as Street smart, they lack of formal 
education, they put emphasis on personal contacts and family ownership ethos, have very 
limited research knowledge and no-understanding of long term needs. 
These conditions have encouraged for years attitudes and norms that contributed towards 
short-term ventures and encourage self centred and undisciplined behaviour (Tsipouri, 
1998). 
I l l 
6. CONCLUSION 
The Greek investment in the Balkans is a novel phenomenon that attracted the attention 
of Greek academic world and raised many issues. Some of the most important questions 
raised were related to the nature of the firms that contacted FDI and the impact of FDI in 
the Greek economy. Therefore, this thesis attempted the shed some light in several 
aspects related to Greek FDI in the Balkans and to contribute in the understanding of this 
novel phenomenon. The task has proved very difficult due to its extent and also the 
difficulty on collecting data concerning FDI in the Balkans. The research did not include 
primary research as it was originally planned. Therefore, the information is mainly drawn 
form academic literature, secondary sources, a couple of interviews and closely 
examination of the press. 
The aim of this thesis was to look into the process of FDI taking into consideration the 
broader changes that were taking place in the area of south East Europe. Therefore, the 
first chapter attempts to examine the phenomenon adopting a historical and geopolitical 
view. Although, it is to my knowledge that a single chapter wouldn't be sufficient to 
cover such a broad and complex issue I believed that it important to delve into it in order 
to understand the overall context under which those economic development took place. 
The chapter stresses the importance of the geopolitical position of Greece on its 
economic relations with the Balkan countries and the impact of the momentous events of 
1989 for the Greek economy related to neighbouring countries. 
Greece was in geographical isolation form the rest of western countries (its official allies) 
and in economic "isolation" for its neighbouring Balkan countries due to the fact that 
belonged in different economic-political blocks, missing benefits that might have arisen 
from economic interaction with neighbouring countries. 
However, the political reforms of 1989 gave the country the opportunity to restore 
economic relation with former communist countries. Also its upgraded regional position 
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in the Balkans rendered Greece a significant economic and political player in the area. Its 
posistion in the international community (member of the EU and NATO) and its 
economic supremacy constituted an important advantage over the rest of South-eastern 
neighbours. The economic opportunities became evident by the performance of the Greek 
entrepreneurs in both trade and FDI activities. The most striking change was an 
unprecedented wave of Greek firms investing throughout the Balkans. Therefore, the 
thesis is focusing on this phenomenon of Greek FDI. 
The third chapter focuses on FDI from a national/regional point of view. A wide review 
on FDI theories are presented and an evaluation of the Greek FDI is attempted. However, 
Greek FDI does not see to fit in any single theory which would be sufficient to explain 
the phenomenon of Greek FDI (i.e TWMNCs, typical MNCs etc).. 
According to the academic literature there are no clear benefits for the Greek economy 
coming fi-om the investing activity in the CEECs. The results of outward FDI on the 
home country depends crucially upon the characteristics of the economies involved, 
strengths and weakness of the national economy, and the strategies followed by MCs 
(type and pattern of FDI relations of mother company short-term opportunistic/ long term 
strategies etc). 
Furtheremore, there are questions on whether there is a link between Greek outward 
investment and Greek competitiveness. A distinction is made between private and public 
profit since competitiveness of Greek firms does not imply competitiveness of Greece. 
Also the links between the firms and their subsidiaries are proved to be rather week i f 
any. Therefore, doubts are expressed about the possible benefits that could be generated 
from Greek FDI activity. The chapter suggests that the Greek government should not 
consider outward investment as uncodintionally desirable. Instead some caution is 
suggested to policy makes related to supporting of FDI and the design of an industrial 
strategy which will facilitate outward investment beneficial to Greece. 
The fourth Chapter focuses on the firm as a level of analysis. Unlike the previous chapter 
that looked into FDI from a national point o view, looking at the consequences of the host 
and home countries, the centre of this chapter is the firm. The theoretical background of 
the firm is presented and how it is related to society and space. The chapter attempts to 
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place the firm in its socio-economic environment and examine how that affects firm's 
strategies and competitiveness. The aim of the chapter is to add theoretical knowledge in 
order to understant the process of Greek FDI, the learning process and the decision 
making of Greek firms investing in the CEECs. 
The fifth chapter finally comes with the empirical findings which is a collection of data 
on FDI and trade with the CEECs coming mainly for secondary sources. The chapter is a 
manifestation of the economic impact that the reforms had on the Greek economy. It is 
estimated that more that 2000-3000 Greek companies have set-up their operations across 
Eastern Europe since 1989. The number is impressive on it sown and even more when 
someone takes into consideration the poor records of FDI of the country the years before. 
The trade number are equally impressive. We can clearly observe amazing changes in the 
trade pattern of Greece with CEECs. What really stands out is the reversal in the trend of 
Greek exports to the CEECs. Between 1989 and 2000 exports rose steadily at an annual 
growth rate of around 140%. Notably, in the same period, Greek exports to its European 
partners declined. 
The importance of geographical proximity is demonstrated clearly in both FDI and trade 
by looking at the geographical pattern of the two. Regarding FDI one can understand the 
importance of geographical proximity on the one hand by the fact that the great majority 
of FDIs have been materialised in the neighbouring countries. Moreover, within each 
country the majority of the Greek FDI is concentrated in the areas along the Greek 
borders. However, the proximity argument is valid mainly for the smallest firms. 
Finally the chapter examines the qualitative aspects of FDI. The characteristics of Greek 
FDI, the nature of Greek firms, the factors that allowed the investment to take place, the 
process of learning and decision making, the strategies that followed and the viability of 
the firms are discussed and tried to be understood under the prism of the existing socio-
economic environment and culture of Greece. Greek firms were pushed by the 
intensification of competition and the deteriorating competitive advantage that firms had 
over the labour cost (especially in the labour intensive sectors). The advantage of the 
Greek firms were based on the geographical proximity relatively familiarity with the 
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unstable environment of the Balkans and the relatively indifference of large MNCs for 
the Balkans especially during the first years after the reforms. 
A broad division is made on the nature of the investors. On the one hand are some large 
Greek investors (banks, food companies etc) that expand their business and become 
MNCs. On the other hand a significant number of Greek firms have adopted an 
opportunistic behaviour towards the reforms in the CEECs. They followed weak 
strategies focusing simply on cost-reduction and had no strategic plans. Consequently, 
the fiiture and the viability of those firms are dim and the contribution in the Greek 
economy rather weak. This attitude could be understood by the general corporate culture 
of Greece that encourages individualism and short-term ventures. However there is an 
obvious improvement in the recent years and significant number of firms are following 
more mature and long-term strategies. Therefore, the strategies that Greek firms are 
following now are of crucial importance for their fiiture survivor. The firms should stop 
relying in cheap-cost policies and should invest in quality production. 
Furthermore, as far as the regional consequences are concerned, the fifth chapter 
demonstrated that although there are expectation for great benefits there are also some 
threats related to the opening of the CEECs. There is some job loss in labour-intensive 
industries in Northern Greece, which has resulted form the relocation of firms in the 
CEECs. A fiirther intensification of the competition is expected in the following years 
specially after the local firms (in the CEECs) acquire skills. 
Withought wanting to diminish the importance of Greek FDI, the case remains that many 
Greek firms responded towards the 1989 reforms and the opening of economies of 
neighbouring countries by adopting short-term ventures, having no strategic plan and 
following mainly cost-cutting strategies. Although their positive contribution should not 
be ignored (i.e. establishing linkages and providing usefiil knowledge information about 
the economic environment of the CEECs) their overall contribution in the Greek 
economy is rather poor and their fiiture uncertain. 
115 
/ . Amin A and Tomaney J (1995) 'The regional development potential of inward 
investment in the less favoured regions of the European Community' in Amin A 
and Tomaney J (eds) Behind the myth of the European Union, London: Routledge 
2. Amin, A (2000) 'Organisational learning through communities of practice' (draft 
for workshop on the firm in economic geography. University of Portsmouth) 
3. Amin, A and Cohendet, P (1999) 'Learning and adaptation in decentralised 
business networks' Environment and Planning, Society and place Vol.17 n.l 
p.86-104 
4. Amin, A and Willkinson, F. (1999) 'Learning proximity and industrial 
performance: an introduction', Cambridge Journal of Economics, 23, 121-125 
5. Antonelli, C. (1999) 'The evolution of the industrial organisation of the 
production of knowledge' Cambridge Journal of economics, Vol.23 p.243-260 
6. Ashein,, B (2000) 'The learning firm in the learning region: workers participation 
as social capital' paper presented at the workshop on "the firm in economic 
geography", university of Portsmouth, 2000 
7. Bailey D, Sudgden R and Thomas R, 'Inward investment in Central and eastern 
Europe: the compatibility of objectives and the need for an industrial strategy in 
Storper M, Thomadakis S and Tsipouri L (eds). Latecomers in the Global 
Economy, London: Roudledge. 
8. Balkania (special issue of Hmerisia) (November 1997), 'Greece as a bridge of the 
Balkans' 
116 
9. Balkania and black sea (special issue of Hellenews and Express) (July 1998), 
'Growing consems about the prospect in the Balkans' 
10. Barlett W & Rangelova R (1997), Nature and role of small firms in Bulgaria in 
Jones D & Miller J The Bulgaria Economy Lessons from Reform During Early 
Transition. 
11. Begg R & Pickles J (1998), Institutions, social networks and ethnicity in the 
cultures of transition: industrial change, mass unemployment and regional 
transformation in Bulgaria in Pickles J and Smith A, Theorising transition: The 
political Economy of Post-Communist transformation, London: Roudledge. 
12. Blomstrom M, and Kokko (1995) 'Multinational corporation and spillovers: A 
review of evidence' Paper prepared for the conference on the creation and 
transfer technology: Institutiond and Incentives, Castelgandolfo, Rome, 
September. 
13. Buckwalter D W (1995), Spatial inequality. Foreign Investment, and Economic 
Transition in Bulgaria, Professional Geographer, 47(3) 1995 
14. Cantwell J (1991) 'A survey of theories of international production' in PiteHs C 
and Sudgden R (eds) The nature of the transnational firm, London: Roudledge 
15. Carter F W and Norris H T (1996) 'The changing shape of the Balkans', London: 
UCL press. 
16. CEC (1993), 'Trade and foreign investment in the communities regions: the 
impact of economic reform in central and Easter Europe', Regional studies, 7. 
Brussels: Commission of the European Community. 
17. Chapman, K, and Walker, D, (1987) 'hidustrial location', Blackwell 
18. Chronaki Z, Hatzimichalis C, Labrianidis L, Vaiou D (1993), 'Diffused 
industrialisation in Thessaloniki: from expansion to crisis, International journal of 
urban and regional research, 17, 178-94 
19. Clark, G L. (1993) 'Cost and prices, corporate competitive strategies and regions' 
Environment and Planning A, Vol.25 p.5-26 
117 
20. Clark, G L. (1994) 'Strategy and structure: corporate restructuring and the scope 
and characteristics of sunk costs' Environment and Planning A, Vol. 26 p.9-32 
21. Clogg R and Yannopoulos G (1972) 'Greece under military rule', London: Seeker 
and Warburg. 
22. Close D (1993) 'the Greek Civil War, 1943-1950', London: Routiedge 
23. Coase, R H. (1937) The nature of the firm, Economica volume FV p.386 
24. Coe N (1997) 'US transnational and the Irish software industry: Assessing the 
nature and stability of a new wave of foreign direct investment' European urban 
and regional studies, 4 (3): 211-230 
25. Cook, P (1998) 'Indroduction: origins of the concept' in Braczyk H et al (ed) 
Regional innovation systems, UCL press 
26. Crang, P. (1997), Intioduction to cultural turns and the (re)conceptualisation of 
economic geography, in Lee and Wills (ed): Geographies of Economies, London: 
Arnold 
27. Cviic C (1991) 'Remaking the Balkans', London: The Royal Institute of 
international affairs 
28. Dawson A H (1987), Planning in Eastern Europe, London: Croom Helm 
29. Dicken and Thrift (1992) 'the organisation of production and the production of 
organisation: why business enterprises matter in the study of geographical 
industrialisation' Transaction Institute of British Geographers, Vol 17 p. 279-291 
30. Dicken P (1990) 'The geography of enterprise: elements of a research agenda' in 
Smidt, M and Wever, E (ed) The corporate firm in a changing world economy 
London, Routlegde. 
31. Dicken P (1998) ' Global Shift: transforming the world economy', Paul Chapman 
Publishing Ltd (PCP). 
32. Dicken P, Forsgren M and Malmberg A (1994) ' The local embeddedness of 
Transnational corporations' in Amin A and Thrift N (eds) Globalisation, 
118 
Institutions and Regional Development In Europe, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
33. Dimelis, S. and Gatsios, K. (1995) 'Trade with Central and Eastern Europe: The 
case of Greece' in Faini, R. and Portes, R. (eds), European Union Trade with 
Eastern Europe, CEPR (Centre for Economic Policy and Research). 
34. Dobrinsky at all (1995), Economic transition and industrial restructuring in 
Bulgaria in Landesmann & Szekely Industrial restructuring and trade 
reorientation in Eastern Europe 
35. Duiming D (ed) (1974) 'Economic analysis and the multinational enterprises' 
London, george Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
36. Dunning J (1985) 'Multinational enterprises, economic structure and international 
competitiveness, Chichester: John Louis & Sons 
27. Dunning J (1994) 'The prospects for foreign direct investment in Central and 
Eastern Europe' in Buckley P & Ghauri P (ed). The economics of change in 
eastern and central Europe, London, Academic press 
38. Dunning J and Robson P (1988) 'Multinationals and European Community', Basil 
Blackwell 
39. Ettlinger, N (2000) 'A relational Perspective in Economic Geography: 
Competitiveness with Diversity and Difference' 
40. Ettlinger, N and Patton W (1996) 'Shared performance: The proactive diffusion of 
competitiveness and industrial and local development' Annals of the association 
of American geofraphers' Vol (86) p.286-305 
41. European Commission (1996): The impact of the development of the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe on the community territory 
42. European Commission (1997), Agenda 2000: Commission opinion on the 
Bulgaria's application for membership of the European Union. 
43. Eurostat, (19944-1998) 'Statistics in focus, External trade: European Union trade 
with the Central and Eastern European countries' 
119 
44. Eurostat, (1998) 'External and Intra-European Union trade'. 
45. Financial Time (June 1 1998) 'Greece and South-East Europe'. 
46. Financial Times Survey, Greece and South-East Europe Monday June 1 1998 
47. Flowedrew, R and Martin, D (1997) 'Methods in human geography: a guide for 
students doing a research study', Logman 
48. Gertler, M (1997), 'The invention of regional culture' in Lee, R and Wills, J (ed) 
Geographies of economies, London, Arnold 
49. Giannitsis T (1993) 'Globalisation, technology factors and industrial structuring 
in southern Europe: the Greek experience' in Humbert M (eds) The impact of 
globalisation on Europe's firms and industries, London, Pinter Publishers. 
50. Gilpin R (1987) 'The political economy of international relations', Princeton: 
Princeton Universit Press 
51. Golbloom M (1972) 'United states policy in post-war Greece' in Clogg R and 
yannopoulos G (eds) Greece under military rule, London: Seeker and Warburg 
52. Grabber, G. (ed) (1993) the embedded firm: on the socioeconomics of industrial 
networks, London: Routiedge 
53. Graham M and Krugman P 'The surge in foreign Direct Investment in the 1980s' 
in Froot K A (ed) Foreign direct investment, Chicago, The University Chicago 
Press. 
54. Gustafsson, B (1990) 'Foreword' in Aoki M et all 'The firm as a nexus of 
treaties', London, Sage. 
55. Hadjimichalis C and Vaiou D 'Informalisation in along global commodity chains, 
some evidence fi-om southern Europe. 
56. Hadjimichalis, C. and Vaiou, D. (1990) ' Flexible labour markets and the regional 
development in northern Greece', International Journal of Urban and regional 
research, 14. 
120 
57. Hall D and Danta D (1996) 'Reconstracting the Balkans: a geography of the new 
Southeast Europe', Chichester: John Wiley & Sons 
58. Hardy J (1998): Cathedrals in the desert? Transnationals, Corporate startegy and 
Locality in Wroclaw, Regional studies, 32 (7) 639-652. 
59. Harrington, J W et al(1999) 'Economic geography: reconceiving "the economic" 
and the region", Ec Geog chapter for GIA 2"** edition, 28 April submission, 
(available at: http://vm.uconn.edu/~wwwgeog/econ_reg.pdf) 
60. Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (1998) 'regional economic co-operation in 
the Balkan region'. 
61. Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (1998) 'South Eastern Europe: The Greek 
perspective'. 
62. Hodgson, M G. (1998) 'Competence and contract in the theory of the firm' 
Journal of economic behaviour and organisation Vol.35 (2) p.179-201 
63. Hood N and Young S (1979) The economics of multinational enterprises, 
London, Longman. 
64. Hood N and Young S (1994) 'The internationalization of Business and the 
Challenge of east European Development' in Buckley P and Ghauri P (eds). The 
economics of change in east and Central Europe: Its impact on International 
business, London: Academic Press. 
65. Hudson, R (1999) papers on producing places 
66. Hudson, R. (1994) 'East Meets West: The regional implications within the 
European Union of political and economic change in the Eastern Europe', 
European Urban and Regional Studies, 1,1. 
67. Hudson, R. (1999) 'The learning economy, the learning firm and the learning 
region:a sympathetic Critique of the limits to learning, European Urban and 
Regional Studies, 6) 
121 
68. Hughes K (1996) 'European Enlargement, Competitiveness and Integration', in 
Devine P, Katsoulacos Y, Sugden R (eds). Competitiveness, subsidiarity and 
Industrial Policy, London: Routiedge.. 
69. lammarino S and Pitelis C 'Foreign direct Investment and "less favoured regions" 
Greek FDI in Bulgaria and Rumania. 
70. latrides J and Wrigley L (1995) 'Greece at the crossroad: The Civil War and its 
legacy', Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State Uviversity Press University park. 
71. Inter Balkan and Black sea centre (1999) 'Business guides of Bulgaria, Romania 
and Albania' 
72. Jelavich B (1983) 'History of the Balkans', Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
73. Johnson, B (1992) Institutional learning in Lundval (ed) National systems of 
innovation: towards a theory of innovation and interactive learning, London, 
Pinter. 
74. Kalandaridis C and Labrianidis L (1997), 'Globalisation and local Industrial 
development in the European Periphery: Enterprise strategies in Eastern 
Macedonia and Thrace' European Planning studies, vol 5, No 4, 
75. Kamaras A (2001), A capitalist diaspora: The Greeks in the Balknas, Discussion 
paper No.4. The Hellenic observatory, 
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory) 
76. Karakasidou A (1997) 'Fields of wheat, hills of blood: passage to nationhood in 
Greek Macedonia 1870-1990', Chicago: The University of Chicago press. 
77. Kofas J (1989) 'Intervention and Underdevelopment: Greece during the Cold 
War', University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 
78. Kostopoulou S (1996) 'Thessaloniki and Balkan realities' in Hall and Danta (eds) 
Reconstracting the Balkans: a geography of the new Southeast Europe, 
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons 
122 
79. Kostopoulou S (1996), 'Thessaloniki and Balkan realities' in Hall D and Danta D 
(ed) 'Reconstructuring the Balkans 'A geography of the new Southeast Europe' 
Chinsister, John Wiley & Sons 
80. Koulov, B. (1992) Tendencies in the administrative territorial development of 
Bulgaria (1878-1990), Tijdschrift voor Econ. en Soc. Geographic 83 (1992) No.5. 
81. Krogh, V. and et all (ed) (1998) Knowing in firms: understanding, managing and 
measuring knowledge, London: SAGE Publications 
82. Labrianidis L (1996), ' Thoughts of an industrial policy in view of the activity of 
Greek firms in the Balkans', in Tetradia tou INE, 'Networks: Industiial policy and 
employment', V6-7 April-September 1996. 
83. Labrianidis L (1999) 'Are Greek companies that invest in the Balakns in the '90s 
Transnational companies? In Mitsos A and Mossialos E (ed) 'The contribution of 
a changing Greece to the European Union. European Institute LSE European 
political Economy series, Ashgate Press London (forthcoming). 
84. Labrianidis L (1999) " The Investment activity of Greek companies in the CEE: 
The situation beyond the myth' in Andrikopoulou E and Kaukalas G (ed), ' 
Greece and the new European space', Themelio (forthcoming) (in Greek). 
85. Labrianidis, L (1990) Critic of industrial location theory in Hatzimichalis (ed) 
Regional Development and Politics: articles from international experience 
Athens, Exantas 
86. Labrianidis, L (1997) 'The opening of the Balkan Markets and quensequent 
economic problems in Greece', in Stavrou T (ed) 'Modem Greek studies 
Yearbook' , University of Minnesota 
87. Labrianidis, L. (1996) 'Subcontacting in the Greek garment industry and the 
opening of the Balakn markets', Cyprus Journal of Economics, 9, 1. 
88. Lavigne M (1995) 'The economics of Transition: from socialist economy to 
market economy', Houndmills: Macmillan Press LTD. 
123 
89. Lawson, C. (1999) 'Towards a competence theory of the region' Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 23 p. 151 -166 
90. Lawson,C. and Lorenz, E. (1999) 'Collective Learning, tacit knowledge and 
regional Innovative Capacity' Regional studies, Vol.33 n 4, 305-317 
91. Lyberaki A (1999) 'Difficult transitions and eccentricities on the road to 
economic convergence: Availability of resources and dissonance between 
institutions, mindframes and behaviour in the case of Greece' Seminars of the 
Aegean, Paros. 
92. Malle, S (1996) A general overview of the approach to solving the problems of 
redevelopment of regions from a comparative perspective, Eastern European 
Economics: Regional Problems and & SNE in transition countries 34 (2) 1996. 
93. Marssal, C and Rossman, G. (1995) 'Designing qualitative research', London: 
Sage 
94. Martin R (1999) 'Critical survey: the new 'geographical turn' in economics: some 
critical reflections', Cambridge journal of economics, 23 pp 65-91 
95. Martin R and Sunley P (2000) 'Rethinking the economic' in economic geography: 
broadening our vision or losing our focus? 
96. Maskell P (2000) 'Why are all theories of the firm not equally well suited for 
application within the conversation of economic geography?', paper presended at 
the seminar on 'The firm in economic geography' university of Portsmouth, UK, 
9-11 March, 2000 
97. Maskell, P et al (1998) Competitiveness, Localised learning and regional 
development: specialisation and prosperity in small open economies, London: 
Routledge 
98. Maskell, P. (1999) 'The competitiveness of Firms and Regions: 'Ubiquitification' 
and the importance of Localised Learning', European Urban and regional 
Sstudies,6{l) 
124 
99. May, T. (1997) 'Social research issues: Methods and process', Buckingham: 
Open University press. 
100. McNeil W H (1982) 'The view from Greece' in Hammond T (eds) 
Witnesses to the origins of the cold war, Seatle: University of Washington press. 
101. Mellor R (1975) 'Eastern Europe: A geography of the Comecon 
Countries', Bath: The Pitman Press 
102. Michalak W Z (1993) 'Foreign direct investment and joint ventures in East-
Central Europe: a geographical perspective', Environment and Planning A, 25, 1573-
1591 
103. Minassian G and Totev S, the Bulgarian Economy in Transition: Regional 
aftereffects (possibilities for structural and Regional redevelopment), Eastern European 
Economics, Regional problems and SME Development in Transition Countries may-June 
1996. 
104. Morgan, K (1997) 'The learning region: institutions, innovation and regional 
renewal' Regional Studies Vol.31 No.5 pp 491-503. 
105. Nautemporiki, (August 191998) 'Balkans and Greek enterprises'. 
106. Oinas P (1998) 'Competitive advantage and the role of regional culture: 
reconstructing Saxenian's narrative' 2"** EURs conference, Culture, place and spce in 
contemporary Europe, Durham 17-20 September 1998. 
107. Oinas, P (1997) 'On the socio-spatial embeddedness of business firms' Erdkunde, 
6and51 
108. Pavliken P (1998) 'Foreign Direct Investment in the Czech Republic', the 
professional Geographer 50 (1) 71-85 
109. Petrakos G and Stoyan Totev (1999) 'Economic structure and change in the 
Balkan region: Implication for integration, transition and economic cooperation' 
(forthcoming). 
125 
110. Petrakos G C (1997), The regional structure of Albania, Bulgaria and Greece: 
implications for cross-border co-operation and development, European Urban and 
regional studies 1997 4 (3). 
111. Petrakos, G. (1996) 'A European macro-region in the making? The Balkan 
relations of Greece. European planning studies, 5, 4. 
112. Pickles J (1998), Restructuring state enterprises: industrial geography and Eastern 
European transitions in Bulgaria in Pickles J and Smith A, Theorising transition: The 
political Economy of Post-Communist transformation, London: Roudledge. 
113. Pitelis C, Sugden R and Tsipouri L (1996) ' Greek Outward Investment, 
Competitiveness and Develoment' in Devine P, Katsoulacos Y, Sugden R (eds). 
Competitiveness, subsidiarity and Industrial Policy, London: Routledge. 
114. Prahalad, C. and Hamel, G. (1990). The core competence of organisations. 
Harvard Business review, V 68 n 3, 79-91 
115. Sadler D and Swain A (1994) ' State and market in eastern Europe: regional 
development and workforce implications of direct investment in the automobile industry 
in Hungary', Trans Inst Br Geogr 19 387-403 
116. Santos, D (2000) 'Iimovation and territory: which strategies to promote regional 
innovation systems in Portugal?' European urban and regional studies Vol. 7 No.2 
p. 147-156. 
117. Saxenian, A (1994) Regional advantage: culture and competition in silicon valey 
and route 128, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
118. Schoenberger, E (1994) 'Corporate strategy and corporate strategists: power, 
identity, and Knowledge within the firm' Environment and Planning A, Vol. 26 p.435-
451 
119. Schoenberger, E. (1998) 'Discourse and practice in human geography' Progress 
in human geography, vol. 22 (1) p. 1-14 
120. Scott, A (1988) New industrial spaces: Flexible production organisation and 
regional development in north America and western Europe, London, Pion Limited. 
126 
121. Short J R (1993) 'An introduction to political geography', London: Routledge 
122. Simoes V C (1993) 'Going Global or Going European? The case of Portugal' in 
Humpert M (ed) The impact of globalisation on Europe's firms and industries' London, 
Pinter Publishers. 
123. Smith A (1997), Breaking the old and constructing the new? Geographies of 
uneven development in Central and Eastern Europe in Lee R & Wills J(ed) Geographies 
of Economies London: Arnold 
124. Smith A and Ferencikova S (1998) 'Inward investment, regional transformation 
and uneven development in eatsem and Central Europe', European urban and regional 
studies, 5 (3) 155-173 
125. Spiridonakis B G (1977) 'Essays on the historical geography of the Greek world 
in the Balkans during the Turkokratia', Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies 
126. Stavrianos L (1989) 'Introduction' in Kofas J (1989) Intervention and 
Underdevelopment: Greece during the Cold War, London: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press University park and London. 
127. Sternberg, R (2000b) 'Innovation networks and regional development- evidence 
from the European regional innovation survey (ERIS): Theoretical concepts, 
methodological approach, empirical basis and introduction to the theme issue' European 
Planning studies. Vol. 8, No.4, p.889-407 
128. Storper, M (1995) 'The resurgence of regional economies, ten years later: the 
region as a nexus of untraded interdependencies' European Urban and Regional Studies, 
Vol.2No.3 p.191-221. 
129. Storper, M (1998) 'Industrial policy for latecomers: products, conventions and 
learning' in Storper, M et al (ed) latecomers in a Global economy, London, Routledge. 
130. Storper, M (1998) The regional world: Territorial development in a global 
economy, New York, the Guilford press. 
127 
131. Swain A and Hardy J (1998) 'Globalisation, Institutions, foreign direct investment 
and the regeneration of East and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union with the 
world economy'. Regional studies, 32 (7) 587-590. 
132. Takeuchi, N (1995) The knowledge creating company, New York: oxford 
university press 
133. Taylor, M (2000) 'The firm as a temporal coalition' Draft of the paper presended 
at the workshop on 'the firm in economic geography' Univrsity of portsmouh, 9-11 
march, 2000 
134. Teece D and Pisano G (1994) 'The dynamic capabilities of the firm, and 
introduction' in Teece D (1998) Economic performance and the theory of the firm, 
Chaltenham, Edward Elgar. 
135. Thomadakis S (1995) 'Stabilisation, Development and Government Economic 
Authority in the 1940s' in latrides J and Wrigley L (eds) Greece at the crossroad: The 
Civil War and its legacy, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press 
University park. 
136. To Bima, (May 31 1998) 'The expansion of Greek entrepreneurs activity to the 
Balkans'. 
137. Todling, F. (1997) 'Strategic reactions of firms in Austrian regions to change in 
Central and Eastern Europe', European Urban and regional studies, 4, 2 
138. Tsekov N (1992) Regional policy for rural settlements in Bulgaria, Tijdschrift 
voor Econ. en Soc. Geographie 83 (1992) No.5 
139. Tsipouri L (1998), 'Promoting coordination at regional level: The case of 
Northern Greece' in Storper M et al (ed), 'Latecomers in the global economy', London, 
Routledge 
140. Tsoulouvis L. 'Urban and regional restructuring in Northern Greece and the single 
European market' in 'An enlarged Europe: Urban and regional restructuring'. 
141. Turok I (1993) ' Inward investment and local Uncages: 'How Deeply embedded is 
'Silicon Glen'?', Regional Studies, 27: 401-417. 
128 
142. Walker, R. (1989) 'A requiem for corporate geography: new directions in 
industrial organisation, the production of place and the uneven development' Geografiska 
Annalerl\{B) 
143. Wallden S (1993) 'Greece and Eastern Europe: Economic relations' in Psomiadis 
H J and Thomadakis S B (eds) Greece, the new Europe and the changing international 
order, New York: Pella 
144. Wallden S (1993) 'Greece and Eastern Europe: Economic relations' in Psomiadis 
H J and Thomadakis S B (eds) Greece, the new Europe and the changing international 
order. New York: Pella 
145. Williamson, E O. (1999) ' Strategy research: governance and competence 
perspectives' Strategic management journal, J vol. 20 p. 1087-1108 
146. Williamson, O (1990) 'The firm as a nexus of treaties: an introducfion' in Aoki M 
et all 'The firm as a nexus of treaties', London, Sage. 
147. Williamson, Oliver E. and Winter, Sidney G (ed) (1993). The nature of the firm: 
origins, evolution, and development. New York: oxford university press. 
148. Wyzan M L (1997) Economic transformation and regional inequality in Bulgaria: 
in search of a meaningful unit of analysis in Jones D & Miller J The Bulgaria Economy 
Lessons from Reform During Early Transition. 
149. Yeung, H W-C (2000) 'Does economic matters for/in economic geography?' 
150. Yeung, H W-C (2000) 'reconceptualising the "Firm" in new economic 
geographies: an organisational perspective' paper presended at the workshop on "The 
Firm in economic geography", 9-11 march 2000, University of Portsmouth, U.K 
151. Yeung, H W-C. (1997) 'Business networks and transnational corporations: A 
study of Hong Kong firms in the ASEAN region' Economic Geography, Vol.73 p.1-25 
152. Young S and Hood N (1995) 'Attracting, managing and Developing Inward 
Investment in the Single Market' in Amin A and Tomaney J (eds) Behind the myth of the 
European Union, London: Routledge. 
129 
153. Young S, Hood N and Peters E (1994) 'Multinational Enterprises and regional 
Economic Development', Regional Studies, 28:657-677 
154. Young S, Hood N and Wilson A (1994) ' Targeting policy as a competitive 
strategy for European inward investment agencies', European Urban and Regional 
Studies. 1(2) 143-159 
155. Zaniewski K (1992) Regional inequalities and social wellbeing in Central and 
eastern Europe, Tijdschrift voor Econ. en Soc. Geographic 83 (1992) No. 
130 -W-
